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CULTIVATION OF SALIX VIMINALIS WILLOW
AND POSSIBILITIES OF IMPROVING THE ENERGY
BALANCE OF EASTERN POLAND VOIVODSHIPS
Adam J. Lipiński, Alicja A. Żejmo
Chair of Working Machines and Separation Processes
University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn
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A b s t r a c t
The aim of this study was to analyze the possibility of improving eastern Poland energy balance
by transforming the agricultural areas, destined for food production purposes, to crops with
industrial purpose. The problem was analyzed in terms of perspectives, problems and challenges
facing the eastern Poland voivodships in order to diversify energy sources. The direction was
indicated, which, according to the performed analysis, gives the best chance of improving the present
situation, in terms of energetic security and also improving the socio-economic conditions of the
inhabitants of these regions. The expediency of exploring opportunities of producing energy from
biomass, with particular reference to the Salix viminalis willow, was pointed out.
UPRAWA WIERZBY SALIX VIMINALIS A MOŻLIWOŚCI POPRAWY BILANSU
ENERGETYCZNEGO WOJEWÓDZTW POLSKI WSCHODNIEJ
Adam J. Lipiński, Alicja A. Żejmo
Katedra Maszyn Roboczych i Procesów Separacji
Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie
S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: biomasa z wierzby, wierzba Salix viminalis, Polska Wschodnia, potencjał
upraw.
A b s t r a k t
Celem pracy była analiza możliwości poprawy bilansu energetycznego Polski Wschodniej przez
przekształcanie upraw rolniczych o przeznaczeniu żywnościowym na uprawy z przeznaczeniem
przemysłowym. Zagadnienie przeanalizowano pod kątem perspektyw, problemów i wyzwań stojących
przed województwami Polski Wschodniej w kwestii dywersyfikacji źródeł energii. Wskazano kierunek
działań, które według przeprowadzonej analizy dają największe szanse poprawy obecnej sytuacji,
zarówno w zakresie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego, jak i poprawy warunków socjalno-ekonomi-
cznych mieszkańców omawianego regionu. Wskazano na celowość poszukiwań możliwości produkcji
energii z biomasy, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem wierzby Salix viminalis.
Introduction
Constantly rising prices of conventional energy sources (oil, natural gas,
coal) prompt to search for alternative sources of energy. Renewable energy
sources are becoming a substitute for its conventional sources (LESZ 2006).
Poland, after joining the European Union (EU), was obliged to implement the
Directive on the share of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) in the energy
sector. Polish parliament approved the ”Strategy for Development of Renew-
able Energy”, which obliges to achieve 7% (in 2010) and 14% (in 2020) of the
RES share in the country energy balance (NIEDZIÓŁKA, ZUCHNIARZ 2006,
BIENIEK, ŻOŁNIERZ-RUSINEK 2008).
Currently, approximately 52% of energy used in Europe is imported from
other continents and this share is prognosed to increase (DENISIUK 2006,
Charakterystyka obszarów wiejskich 2008). According to DENISIUK (2006), as
early as in 2015, 72% of energy will be imported to the EU. Given this, the idea
of allocating agricultural lands for purposes of non-food production seems to be
reasonable, especially since such actions may help to solve the problem of
agricultural overproduction in eastern Poland, typically regarded as agricul-
tural land (KUKUŁA, KRASOWICZ 2006, Charakterystyka obszarów wiejskich...
2008). Another appealing premise for the introduction of such crops is protect-
ing the local population against the progressive impoverishment and exclusion,
being effects of hidden unemployment (MYSZCZYSZYN 2001). In case of larger
farms, it will allow diversifing their income and exploit uncultivated land.
Non-agricultural activities of agricultural holdings are positive phenomenon.
It reflects the process of adaptation of agriculture to market conditions and
allows for the relative security in terms of possible crisis on markets for specific
products (GĄSIOREK 2005, LESZ 2006).
Poland in the European Union is perceived as country with great possibili-
ties of biomass production. It is estimated that up to 1.6 million ha of
agricultural land can be allocated under that production. The current area of
growing plants for solid fuels is estimated at about 10 thousand ha (VAN DAM et
al. 2005, KUŚ et al. 2008). The use of biomass energy potential is dependent on
many issues, among which the most important is economic factor, conditioning
the formation of biomass projects. EU legislation regulates these issues in
some detail (EU directives 2001, 2009). This applies to the principles of
electricity market operation and methods of electric energy production. The
percentage of energy from renewable sources in total energy production in
Poland is 7.9% and is lower than the EU average, which is 10.3% (Eurostat
2008). It should be noted that as many as 94% of renewable energy produced in
Poland is obtained from biomass (LESZ 2006, PAWLAK 2007). The degree of
biomass use on a local scale depends largely on the correct identification of
local production opportunities (SIEJKA et al. 2008).
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Aim and scope of work
The aim of this study was to determine the natural and socio-economic
determinants of agricultural development on eastern Poland territory in terms
of non-agricultural farm activities and to search for opportunities to improve
the energy balance of the eastern Poland voivodships.
The scope of work included the review of the challenges and opportunities
facing the eastern Poland voivodships under the circumstances of future
inevitable changes of the agrarian structure of Poland and in order to
introducing alternative energy sources.
Problem justification
The development of technologies, as well as trends in research and
development of energy-generating systems, and the priorities of the Commis-
sion of the European Union under the following acts: Green Paper (2000), the
Kyoto Protocol (2005) and the European Directives (2001/77/WE,
2001/77/EC), tend to consider wider exploitation of renewable energy sources
(ŚCIBISZ 2006, PIECHOCKI, BIERANOWSKI 2007). Many studies show a high
probability of a future energy crisis, the differences concern only its occur-
rence time forecast (15 to 25 years) (ROSZKOWSKI 2008). Under the Polish
energetic law, local authorities are required to develop plans for heat and
energy supply. These plans should also include the use of locally available
renewable energy sources.
The most common method of obtaining electrical energy is to use the power
grid, covering almost the entire country (WALSKI 2007). For thermal energy,
electric heaters or charcoal/gas stoves are used and, more and more frequently,
biomass stoves (ŚCIBISZ 2006). Conventional energy sources may be replaced
by its renewable sources and, in terms of integration with the European Union,
active participation in the campaign of implementation of renewable energy
can be an asset of Poland. The most important reason for promoting the
production of biomass for energy purposes is the desire to tackle climate
changes (SOŁOWIEJ 2006, ŚCIBISZ 2006, SZWEDZIAK 2010).
Changes in the era of economic development are forcing manufacturers and
distributors of energy to explore new forms of fuels structure, especialy those
more environmentally friendly. The use of biomass energy potential in both,
the global and the local area, is dependent on many factors. The most
important of these is the economic factor, conditioning the formation of
biomass projects. The degree of using biomass on a local scale (e.g. a specified
municipality) depends above all on the correct identification of possibility of
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local biomass production (GRZYBEK 2007, SIEJKA et al. 2008, SZWEDZIAK 2010).
The shift of the individual farm from classical methods of meeting its energy
needs (power grid, coal stoves) to the use of renewable energy requires the
economic analysis of the entire project. It must be based on determining the
energy needs of the specified farm purposed to modernization and the evalu-
ation of energy resources available within it, but the specificity of individual
farms, in terms of the character of production, as well as their location,
particularly predispose them to use renewable energy sources (SOŁOWIEJ 2006,
ŚCIBISZ 2006). The use of agricultural biomass in most cases is contradictory to
the basic purposes of agriculture, implied as the production of food. To
convince farmers to cultivating willow, it must be profitable, at least as
profitable as cultivating cereals.
Energetic use of rural areas implies a threat of disturbances on food
markets. Despite this, establishments of willow plantations are becoming
increasingly popular topic (Charakterystyka obszarów wiejskich... 2008). Grow-
ing energetic crops is part of a complex system, which is the national economy.
At themacro level, it should therefore be considered in many aspects, including
the principles and stages of implementation of the strategy of obtaining energy
from renewable sources (ROSZKOWSKI 2008). Unfortunately, decisions concern-
ing energetic crops production are currently being made using the results of
incomplete energetic and environmental analyzes, often under the influence of
constantly changing economic regulation system (donations system).
Energy efficiency of wilow plantations depends mostly on the agrotechnical
procedures performed there (LESZ 2006, GRZYBEK 2007, PAWLAK 2007, ROLA et
al. 2007). At plantations surveyed by Kwaśniewski (2008), willow cultivation
required high initial material and resource costs, which may pose an additional
problem in the impoverished farms.
Much of the energy potential of biomass is lost in the overall balance of
energy flow through the area. According to the study of the Board of the
Warmia and Mazury voivodship (2005), the condition of the profitability of
willow transport from the field to the point of combustion is fulfilled if the
itinerary does not exceed 80 km, thus willow-growing farms should be located
possibly close to the location of existing combustion installations. It is
therefore appropriate to define the conditions for decentralized heat and
electricity production from local energetic resources (SIEJKA et al. 2008,
SZWEDZIAK 2010).
Deepening economic integration of Europe is advantageous for countries
and regions more developed, but also create a series of threats to the the less
developing and peripheral regions. Polish accession to the European Union has
highlighted the problem of the differences in development between the coun-
tries lying on one continent, as well as interregional differences at the scale of
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the state, as well as at a whole Community scale. Depopulation trends are
noted: population growth of area considered in whole is negative and slow
exodus to other voivodships is observable (GUS 2004–2009, PAWLAK 2009).
System transformation and industrial restructurization has resulted in declin-
ing the agricultural production potential (GUS 1995–2005). Country aid is
directed to industrialized areas, to eliminate the negative effects of a changing
economy. This resulted in a deepening interregional diversity (GREWIŃSKI
2008). Eastern Poland voivodships are characterized by the lowest level of per
capita investment in the national economy in general (MIKOŁAJCZYK 2008).
These conditions are reflected in the level of development of the eastern
provinces, when compared to the rest of the country. It concerns the level of
infrastructure development, as well as the attitude of their inhabitants to the
enterprise, resulting in low levels of vocational activity (employment rate was
54.8% – GUS), low standard of living and low dynamics of economic develop-
ment (www.mrr.gov.pl 2009). Introduction of energetic plantations in these
areas can create employment opportunity in areas of construction, operation
and service of renewable energy systems.
Characteristics of biomass from Salix viminalis willow
Energetic plants have a high annual growth, high calorific value, high
resistance to pests or diseases and the relatively small soil requirements
(NIEDZIÓŁKA, ZUCHNIARZ 2006). In agricultural practice, energetic plants can be
grown on soils of different quality classes, successfully resisting the rising prices
of food products (ROLA et al. 2007, GRZYBEK 2006). Willow plantations can be
successfully set up on good soils – with quality classes I–III, but often soils of
V and VI quality classes also meet the requirements of energetic plants. This is
one of the ways of restoring and using lands, that are agriculturally degraded
(KUŚ et al. 2008). From 1 ha of willow plantation one can get 20 tons of raw
material with a calorific value equivalent to 10 tons of fine coal, thus producing
wood in own farms saves the money spent on purchases of fuel, and in turn is
equivalent to reducing the deficit in the household budget (GĄSIOREK 2005).
Cultivation of energetic plants is often placed on areas of great natural value,
which will be lost as a result of the introduction of energetic crops. Growing
energetic plants could take effect in a significant threat to biological diversity,
because the area will be occupied in this way for 15 to 20 years (GRZYBEK 2006,
NIEDZIÓŁKA, ZUCHNIARZ 2006). A characteristic feature of alternative crops is
their pioneering and, therefore, not fully explored character. As indicated
KORNIAK (2007), weed flora of willow is very similar in composition to the weed
flora of northeastern part of Poland. It should be assumed though, that with the
long cultivation of willow more specialized and burdensome weeds would
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develop. It should be remembered, however, that the combustion of willow (as
an alternative to coal) helps reduce solid and gas wastes in energy production, so
it has also a positive impact on the environment. In addition, willow, a plant
with large and rapid increments, collects pollutants from the soil, enriching the
environment with oxygen; it also regulates water relations (GĄSIOREK 2005,
GRZYBEK 2006).
There remain many other issues to be resolved, such as yielding in climatic
conditions of the individual regions, or the decision-making processes related to
supply chain management (JANOWICZ, KUNIKOWSKI 2008). An important factor
is also the seasoning of willow. Seasoning should be performed until the proper
humidity is reached – about 25%, in the place of cultivation (FRĄCZEK, MUDRYK
2008, www.ieo.pl). It allows increasing the purchase price and the value of raw
material.
Possibilities of Salix viminalis willow cultivation
in eastern Poland voivodships
Eastern Poland regions are characterized by low population density in
comparison with the rest of the country. The data presented in Table 1 indicate
that the urban population equals to 46.59% of the total population, with
a nationwide rate of 61.5%. At the same time, these voivodships account for
nearly one third of the country area. These areas are then sparsely populated
– the total number of population is 4.789 million, what is slightly less than one
fifth of the country population (Ludność według płci... 2004). Different levels of
socio-economic development in Poland occur due to geographical location,
natural abundance of individual regions (Efekty polityki spójności UE w Polsce.
Table 1
Chosen indexes characterizing eastern Poland voivodships
Voivodship
Lubelskie Podlaskie Warmińsko-Mazurskie
Indexes Poland
Population [tys.] 2,185.2 1,202.4 1,428.7 38,173.8
Rural population [tys.] 1,168.2 493.6 569.9 14,690
Total area [ha] 2,508.877 2,018.975 2,322.011 31,267.938
Area of fallow[tys. ha] 27.2 17.1 20.1 498.4
Percent of the fallow area
in arable land 2.9 2.3 3.0 4.1
Consumption of electricity
[GWh] 5,169 2,609 3261 134,473
Consumption of heat [TJ] 25,566 10,613 11,954 426,131
Source: own study based on GUS data from years 2004 and 2009.
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2009) and the fact that the eastern voivodships of Poland are characterized by
the lowest level of capital expenditures ”per capita” in the national economy in
general (MIKOŁAJCZYK 2008).
The above considerations are inevitably reflected in the level of the eastern
voivodships development when compared to the rest of the country. It should be
noted though, that some of the features conditioning the slow development of
the eastern Poland regions, also provide advantages in the context of the
energetic crops introduction to this area. Among these features are:
– area of land not used for agricultural purposes,
– area of arable land with low soil quality class (i.e. IV, V and VI),
– sufficient human potential,
– appropriate science and research base.
The following subsections describe the specificities of the individual voivod-
ships in the context of the above-mentioned conditions.
Warmińsko-mazurskie voivodship
The energy potential of energetic crops in the Warmia and Mazury voivod-
ship is, according to PIECHOCKI and BIERANOWSKI (2007), equal to 47,250 TJ and
is important in terms of energy balance of the area. Area of energetic crops
currently cultivated in the region is about 300 acres and nearly the whole of this
area is willow, while the forecast predicted that in Warmia and Mazury
voivodship in 2009 will be grown 21 thousand ha of willow (Program ekoener-
getyczny województwa... 2005).
Temporarily unused rural area in Warmia and Mazury voivodship was equal
to 148.7 thousand ha in 1998 and 179.5 thousand ha in 2003. This amount is one
of the largest, in comparison to other provinces (Program ekoenergetyczny
województwa... 2005). If the human potential is added (such as high level of
unemployment in rural areas), and appropriate science and research base
(especially the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn), it appears that
Warmia and Mazury voivodship has all the features predestening it for growing
energetic plants.
Lubelskie voivodship
According to Biuro Planowania Przestrzennego in Lublin, willow cultivation
is 2 times more profitable than growing wheat and six times more profitable
than the cultivation of rye. This analysis, in contrast with the decline in
profitability of agricultural production, results in a decrease in the income of
farming families, and so it takes effect in noticable growth of establishments of
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new energetic plantations in Lubelskie voivodship. It should be noted that these
crops are used primarily for farms own purposes.
Areas of fallow and idle lands in Lubelskie voivodship in 2004 was equal to
77.7 thousand ha, i.e. 6.5% of the total rural area of the region (Wojewódzki
program rozwoju alternatywnych... 2006). There are large areas of arable land
(about 152 thousand ha) and grassland (about 60 thousand ha) in the region,
belonging to the IV, V and VI soil quality class (Wojewódzki program rozwoju
alternatywnych... 2006). Therefore, this region has large reserves of land that
could be used for energetic crops.
Podlaskie voivodship
Forecasts of energetic crops in Podlaskie voivodship developed by Polish
Society for Biomass predict their steady growth. Podlaska Fundacja Rozwoju
Regionalnego (Praktyczne aspekty... 2006) predicted that in Podlaskie could be
grown 3 thousand ha of willow in 2006 and 5 thousand ha in 2009. Anticipated
areas of crops in Podlaskie voivodship have not been met. As other voivodships,
Podlaskie in the cultivation of energetic crops sees the possibility of reducing
unemployment. Knowing its energy demand, the region is trying to introduce
modern technologies involving refining biomass and creating biocarbon of high
calorific value (about 28–32 MJ/kg) (Praktyczne aspekty... 2006). This action will
allow the transfer of territory stigmatization and lengthening the distance from
the farmer to the intended recipient.
Current consumption of energy obtained from energetic plantations in the
Podlaskie voivodship is about 55 TJ, and estimates suggested further dynamic
growth to 2010. It was anticipated that in 2010 the energetic plantations will
result in 2,698 TJ of energy obtained annually. The energy potential, possible to
be obtained from energetic plantations is, according to IBMER prognoses, not
less than 17,940 TJ (Praktyczne aspekty... 2006).
Summary and conclusions
1. In Poland grows area of lands not used for agricultural purposes.
Therefore, unquestionable alternative to the traditional agricultural production
is the use of these terrains for energetic crops. The amount of such production
should take into account environmental specifications and the expectations and
limitations existing in specific region.
2. Coherence of legal provisions and actions relating to renewable energy,
giving it priority status, will intensify the growth of this sector, eliminating the
risks of not fulfilling obligations imposed on Poland by the European Union.
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3. There is a possibility of energetic use of willow in both, micro (fuel), and
macroscale (increasing share of RES in the country energy balance). The
production of this type may increase the significance of eastern Poland regions
and help in stopping the impoverishment of society in the region – this
particularly applies to holders of soils of lesser quality.
Translated by SEWERYN LIPIŃSKI
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A b s t r a c t
The aim of this paper is to give the insight into the energy and exergy analysis and the usefulness
of the exergy balance next to the energy balance for the evaluation of the different kind of buildings.
In our case we applied this method to the traditional and low-energy (passive) showing the differences
in heating systems used for these buildings. In traditional house the condensing boiler and water
heating radiator were used while in the passive the heat pump and air heating were used. The exergy
analysis showed that the exergy destruction for the low-energy house is much lower than for the
conventional one.
BILANS ENERGII I EGZERGII DLA DOMU JEDNORODZINNEGO TRADYCYJNEGO
I PASYWNEGO
Zygmunt Wierciński, Aldona Skotnicka-Siepsiak
Katedra Inżynierii Środowiska
Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie
S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: przemiana energii w budynku, bilans egzergii, dom pasywny.
A b s t r a k t
Celem artykułu oprócz bilansu energii, jest bilans egzergii oraz wykazanie jej przydatności do
oceny różnych rodzajów budynków. Zastosowano tę metodę do budynku tradycyjnego i niskoenergetyc-
znego (pasywnego) i wskazano na różnice w zastosowaniu różnych systemów ogrzewania w budynkach.
W budynku tradycyjnym zastosowano kocioł kondensacyjny i grzejniki radiacyjne,
w budynku pasywnym pompę ciepła i ogrzewanie powietrzne. Po analizie egzergii wykazano,
że w budynku niskoenergetycznym destrukcja egzergii jest znacznie mniejsza niż w budynku
konwencjonalnym.
Introduction
Drastically decreasing resources of fossil fuels cause the need to search for
the energy efficient technological solutions. In the field of housing technology
and construction those trends have resulted in the designs of the so called
low-energy and passive houses. Those, however, are not ultimate and fully
satisfying solutions (exhausting the potential of scientific and technological
development). Further reducing of heat demand for buildings heating will
probably require application of new notions and analytical tools allowing the
energy efficiency assessment of various heating circuits. This assessment will
be done to answer the question where in the entire process of energy flow and
conversion the exergy losses are the greatest and occur the most frequently.
Energy and additionally exergy analysis with respect to the building could give
us such a tool for analysis the heat demand and the choice of proper solution.
Actually, this analysis is only partially, because it does not take into account
the analysis of exergy in the different processes of production of building
materials and components.
The goal of the paper is to show the suitability of exergy analysis – made
beside and not instead of the energy analysis – to present the actual processes
of energy conversion during its flow (use) in residential buildings in view of
computations and to show it on an example of the comparison of two detached
houses: the traditional with the passive.
Idea of passive house versus traditional
Exergy loss during the energy conversion (the notion of energy consump-
tion or even worse energy loss is very often used – not only in common
language – to describe this process, but it is rather not appropriate designa-
tion) for heating the building covers three types of needs: (1) exergy lost
through external partitions of the building as the result of the processes of heat
conductivity, conversion in wall and radiation, (2) exergy lost as a result of
exchange of air in the building for the purpose of ventilation and (3) exergy lost
in the energy flow needed to heat the domestic hot water for general use.
Continuous progress in technology of building materials, in manufacturing of
windows and doors allow decreasing utilization of energy to satisfy the needs of
the first type. Application of ground heat exchangers and heat recovers in blow
in-blow out ventilation systems decreases the needs of the second type. Solar
energy is used to heat water increasingly frequently.
Thanks to the technological development within the last 40 years the
demand for energy to heat the buildings decreased by almost a half (from 80%
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to 45%) while energy utilization related to ventilation and water heating
remained practically unchanged because of the need to secure or enhance the
appropriate hygienic conditions. As a consequence, in the energy balance of
housing of 1990s the percentage share of energy utilization for ventilation and
domestic water heating is relatively high at 30% and 25% respectively.
Shrinking resources of fossil fuels motivate the search for solutions that
would allow further limitation of energy utilization during use of residential
buildings. Implementation of the notion of low energy house and attempts at
practical implementation of that idea are manifestations of those efforts.
Low-energy house should consume 30% less energy as compared to a tradi-
tional house. Energy consumption per one square meter per year in the
low-energy house with the usable area of 150 square meters should not exceed
35 kWh for heating purposes, 35 kWh for ventilation of the space and 15 kWh
for water heating. The additional decrease in fossil fuels consumption for
satisfying those needs is possible thanks to, among others, application of
condensation technology or heat pumps in the building heating installations.
Further attempts at decreasing energy consumption resulted in the idea of
the passive house. The notion of the passive house designates an object
– roughly speaking – that does not require the active heating system during the
house operation. In such a house that significant reduction in heat losses is
possible through application of maximally insulated external partitions and
tight windows with triple glazing, passive use of solar energy and controlled
ventilation with recovery of heat from the air blown out. The so called passive
sources in the form of solar energy passing through the windows, heat
generated by the residents and heat generated from the use of household
equipment especially electric devices is sufficient to cover the exergy losses
during the heating. Only during the period of decreased temperatures supple-
mentary (usually ecologically friendly) heating is used, usually based on the
heat supplied by the ventilation installation. In the area of Central Europe the
passive building have to be equipped with mechanical blow in-blow out
ventilation with heat recovery with maximum insulation of the partitions.
Appropriate performance of all the above improvements results in obtaining
the building offering high heat comfort and very low demand for heat energy
not exceeding 15 kWh/ (m2 · y).
Despite the obtaining of such low heat-demands of the passive house for
energy as compared to traditional construction further attempts at minimizing
energy outlays are undertaken. It seems that energy balance based on the first
principle of thermodynamics is not the sufficient analytical tool in that field.
That balance treats in the same way the different forms of energy without
considering their different quality and practical value. On those bases it is
difficult to asses the energy efficiency of heat circuits and answer the question
Energy and Exergy flow Balances... 17
where in the entire process of the flow the largest losses take place and, as
a consequence, in which link further improvements should be searched for.
The need appeared to introduce a thermodynamic notion of exergy necessary
to characterize the problems considered. The notion of exergy is actually not
a new one, but its application for the building and its service systems is rather
new.
A few words on exergy
The notion of exergy means the maximum ability to perform work by
a given matter determined by considering the participation of environment.
Exergy can serve determining the practical use of energy contained in matter.
The assessment of that use requires knowledge of total quantity of exergy of
the considered thermodynamic medium and the relation of exergy to the
volume of the medium. That parameter is called the exergy density.
One of the most important differences between the notion of energy and
exergy is that energy is subject to the conservation law while the exergy
conservation law does not exist. Additionally, energy has conventional refer-
ence levels while in case of exergy the reference levels are imposed by the
nature ie. environment. Losses of exergy are inevitable and at the same time
unwanted as every loss of exergy cause a decrease of the use effect of a given
process (SZARGUT, PETELA 1965, SZARGUT 2005, WALL 1999). The investiga-
tions by Gouy – Stodola indicate that loss of exergy is irreversible and cannot
be recovered even partly. That characteristic of irreversible loss of exergy
differentiates it from the losses of work determined by other methods. In case
of investigation on exergy the mutual relation of phenomena occurring in
individual links of the compound process should be considered. If, in the
process of investigation it is found out that the loss of exergy is particularly
substantial in a given link of the compound process than possibilities of
decreasing the level of irreversibility of transformations within that link
should be investigated and possibilities of changes in the progress of processes
at earlier stages should be analyzed.
Losses of exergy can be divided into internal and external. Loss caused by
irreversible transformations occurring within a considered device are called the
internal loss. The causes of internal losses of exergy can include, among others,
heat flow at finite temperature difference, transfer of work coupled with lack of
mechanical balance, mixing of substances possessing different chemical compo-
sitions or loss of liquid pressure during flow caused by viscosity.
On the other hand, destruction of exergy caused by irreversible equaliz-
ation of the parameters of waste media with the parameters of environment
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media is defined as an external loss. In the majority of energetic ther-
modynamic processes discharge of waste thermodynamic medium into the
environment (e.g. discharge of flue gas from the boiler) takes place.
Parameters of the components of the discharged medium differ generally from
the parameters of the environment. The waste medium still possesses a certain
unused exergy. In the environment the destruction of this exergy takes place.
As a consequence of the mentioned exergy losses the exergy does not
satisfied a low of conservation. The difference between input and output
exergy is equal to the internal exergy loss. As a consequence the exergy balance
can be represented by the following formula:
Bd = ΔBu + Bwus + L + ΣΔBsr + δBw + δBz (1)
where:
Bd – exergy of system input substances,
ΔBu – increase of system exergy,
Bwus – useful exergy of useful input products,
L – mechanical or electrical work done by the system,
ΣΔBsr – increase of exergy of the external heat source operating in the
control casing of the system,
δBw, δBz– internal and external exergy loss respectively.
According to the simplest representation the exergy balance equation can
take a following form:
Bi – Bcons = Bo (2)
Bcons = Tref · Sgen (3)
Where Bi and Bo are exergies at the input and output of the system and Bcons
is the exergy destroyed (consumed) in the system, which in turn is equal to the
product of reference temperature Tref and the entropy Sgen produced in the
system. Usually the environmental temperature is acknowledged as a refer-
ence temperature in the building analysis of exergy.
Reference to the notion of entropy in that balance allows explaining what
can be used and what can be generated. The notion of exergy is used to express
what is used, consumed, while entropy describes what is removed. Exergy
means the ability of energy to dissipate during its flow through the system
while entropy expresses the state of dissipation. In the context of the purpose
of this paper it is important that the theory of exergy can be applicable in
assessment of reversibility and efficiency of all energetic processes, in which
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heat radiation participates that is in case of devices using energy of solar
radiation and heating system operating through radiation.
The most important goal of exergy analysis is detecting and quantitative
assessment of causes of the thermodynamic imperfection of thermal processes
and it can contribute to improvement of those processes. That analysis can be
highly useful as a tool in research works aiming at increasing energy efficiency
of housing construction as concerns maintaining the conditions of residents
thermal comfort with possibly low energy utilization. The aim of such works is
to design objects and heating systems with possibly low exergy (i.e. decreasing
the input of exergy during heat generation and management). Low exergy of
the heating system encompasses: the increased level of use of the chemical
energy of fuels (or substitution of fossil fuels with devices using renewable
energy sources), low consumption of heat in the building and use of low
temperature heat for heating purposes. All that should result in decreasing the
consumption of fossil fuels and decrease of the emissions of pollutions,
production of waste and environmental losses.
Energy and exergy balance spreadsheet of Annex 49
Development within Annex 37 software of the spreadsheet for exergy
balance analysis was one of the effects of works on decreasing the residential
buildings heating exergy (Collective work, 2003). It is further complimented
and improved in Annex49 (TORIO, SCHMIDT 2011) to the version 7.7.
The spreadsheet is divided into seven modules. In the first of them the
basic data concerning the building such as its volume, net area, external and
internal temperature is input. The second module covers the heat losses
involved in heat transmission. It covers heat losses through partitions (on the
basis of the area of partitions and their heat transmission coefficients as well as
the difference between the external and internal temperatures) as well as loses
for ventilation (computer, among others on the basis of air infiltration,
exchanger efficiency and temperature difference). Parts three and four deter-
mine the possible heat gains. They include gains from solar radiation (taking
into account the surface of windows and their orientation in relation to the
sides of the world) and internal gains (in the form of residents; body heat and
heat generated by household appliances). In module five the losses and gains
are balanced. In part six the types of installations and energy source should be
chosen. On the basis of the choice of the heat generating system the spread-
sheet describes the efficiency, maximum supply temperature and the degree to
which the system uses the renewable energy sources using “macros”. Similar-
ly, in selecting the heat generating system the spreadsheet selects characteris-
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tic values for a given type of installation such as the supply and return
temperature, output and additional energy. Exergy analysis is done in the last
module of the code. It progresses describing one by one the heat flow stages:
building envelope (walls, roofing), air in premises, heat discharged, heat
distribution, container, generation, basic transformations (Fig. 1). In Figure 1,
apart of the mean stream of energy the additional stream of auxiliary energy in
the form of electricity is shown.
Fig. 1. Energy stream in building services
Source: SCHMIDT (2004).
In the exergy calculation of the room air only the thermal part of the
heating exergy is taken into account and the changes of the exergy connected
with the change the humidity and pressure of the air both inside and outside of
the building are not considered. Sakulpipatsin, (2008), has calculated the
exergy changes for three different climates (hot and wet as in Bangkok, rather
cold in Holland and finally sea climate in Lissabon) and he came to the
conclusion that the error caused by the neglecting of the wet part of exergy for
the cold climate can caused not more than 3% error in exergy calculations.
Heat transmission through partitions
We start the computation with determining the thermal load of the
building considering transmission coefficients of the window, walls, doors and
others according to the formula beneath:
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Φtr = Σ(Ui · Ai · Fxi) · (Θi – Θe) (4)
where:
Ai – area of i-th partition in [m2] (walls, windows, doors and others),
Ui – heat transmission coefficient for the i-th partition in [W/m2 K],
Θi, Θe – indoor and exterior air temperatures under the design conditions in
[K],
Fx,I – temperature correction coefficient.
Heat loss for ventilation
Next the heat flow connected with the ventilation air is considered along
the following formula:
ΦV,is = (cp · ρ · V · nd · (1 – ηV)) · (Θi – Θe) (5)
cp – specific heat of air in [kJ/kg deg],
ρa – density of air in [kg/m3],
V – building volume (capacity) in [m3],
nd – air exchanged rate (ach) in [1/h],
ηV – efficiency coefficient of heat exchanger (recuperator) if used.
Solar heat gains ΦS
The sun radiation gains in the building can be calculated with the formula
below:
Φsol,gn = Σ(Isol,j · ( 1 – Ffr) · AWj · gj) (6)
where:
Isol,j – intensity of solar radiation (dependent on window orientation to world
directions and slope angle to direction of radiation) [W/m2],
Ffr – window frame fraction, constant for all windows used in building [–],
Awj – area of j-th window [m2],
gj – total transmittance of j-th window [–].
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Internal heat gains Φi [W]
These heat gains can be divided into two different parts:
– heat gains from occupants:
Φin,gn,o = noo · Φ’’in,gn,o (7)
where:
noo – number of occupants,
Φ’’in,gn,o – heat gains from one person [W]
– Heat gains from internal devices
Φin,gn,equ = Φ’’in,gn,equ · Ani (8)
where:
Φ’’in,gn,equ – specific heat gains from devices [W/m2],
Ant – netto floor area [m2].
Another heat gains
Finally two different heat gains are considered especially from lighting and
electromotors especially driving the fan:
– lighting [W]
PL = pL · Ant = Φin.L (9)
where:
pL – specific power of lighting [W/m2],
Ant– netto floor area [m2].
– gains from the fan motor [W]
PV = pV · V · nd (10)
where:
pV – specific fan motor power in [Wh/m3],
V – volume of building [m3],
nd – air infiltration, [ach/h].
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Heat demand
At the end of calculation the heat demand and its specific value for the
building can be given by following formulae:
ΦH = (Φtr + ΦV,is) – (Φsol,gn + Φin,gn,o + Φin,gn,equ + Φin,L) (11)
And also the specific heat demand:
Φ’’H =
ΦH (12)
Ant
Exergy load calculations
In this part of our paper we will show some formulae relating to the exergy
calculation used in the code Exergy 7.7.
At the beginning it is necessary to consider the exergy loss understood as
the exergy flow through the envelope of the building. So it the exergy needed to
sustain the temperature difference between the interior and exterior condition
of the building. Thus, the value of exergy for heating the premises results from
the formula:
Bheating = Fq,roomΦH (13)
where
Fq,room = (1 –
Te ) (14)
Tin
is called a quality factor of room air, and it is in the form of the so called Carnot
coefficient, and where Te and Tin are the external environmental and internal
temperature of the air. In the case of Te = -22oC and Tin = 20o the coefficient
Fq,room = 0.14.
When the air in the building is heated by the heater (radiator or floor, or
any other) then next the exergy load for the heater should be calculated. So
next the different temperatures of the heater should be defined as follows: Ting
and Tret as the temperature of the inlet and outlet of the heater, and Tin is the
temperature in the heated room or in whole building.
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First, the mean temperature of the radiator Theater can be calculated
according to two following formulae:
Theater = 0.5 · TLn + Tin (15)
Whereas TLn is the averaged logarithmic temperature of radiator:
TLn =
(Ting – Tin) – (Tret – Tin) (16)
ln(Ting – Tin) – ln(Tret – Tin)
Then the exergy stream from the radiator (heater) will be given by:
Bheater = Φheater · Fq,heater (17)
Where Fq,heater is the quality factor of air at heater (Carnot coefficient) given by
below formula:
Fq,heater = 1 –
Te (18)
Theater
Of course, the heater belongs to the so called emission part of the system,
Fig. 1. It is necessary to consider the loss in it and to calculate the necessary
demand of energy and exergy caused by the loss in this part of the system.
The additional demand for the heating energy should be calculated accord-
ing to following formula:
Φls,em = ΦH · ( 1 – 1) (19)ηem
Where ηem is the efficiency of the emission system.
The exergy demand for the emission system is to be calculated along formula
given below:
Bem = ΔBem + Bheat = {(ΦH + Φls,em)} · {(Tin – Tret) – Tref · ln( Tin )} (20)(Tin – Tret) Tret
Where Tref is usually the environmental temperature of air, as mentioned
above.
In very similar way the exergy and energy load in the distribution system
and storage can be calculated only using another efficiency factors and
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temperatures at the inlet and return. The reference temperature remains the
same.
It is also possible by means of the Exergy code version 7.7 to calculate the
energy and exergy demand according to the number of occupants and amount
of DHW for one person per day according to the appropriate standard. And this
possibility was used in our calculations of energy and exergy use in the
detached family houses.
In each part of the system some additional energy is needed to drive the
system usually in the form of electrical power. This auxiliary energy and its
exergy should be taken into account.
And finally at the begin of the chain, Figure 1, stands the generation part of
the system energy and primary energy transformation usually in the form of
chemical energy and exergy of the fuel. To take into account this part of the
system the efficiency of the generation (e.g the efficiency of boiler or heat
pump) of energy and exergy and its auxiliary energy load is to be included into
the balance. If the primary energy transformation is considered and the
renewable energy, as the solar gains, Eq. 6, is taken into account the total
energy and exergy amount are the results. Actually, all calculation of the
energy demand for heating of the building are made according to the European
standard EN-13790 Energy performance of buildings. Calculation of energy for
space heating and cooling.
Description of houses under consideration
The computations were made for a passive house and traditional technol-
ogy house according to the design by the Architecture Office Lipinscy Houses.
In can be supposed that the first detached passive house designed by the
Lipinscy Domy was built in Smolec near Wrocław, see also (Lipińscy Domy).
For the purpose of our calculations the both houses are placed near Olsztyn
so in the fourth climatic zone with the standard winter temperature (average)
in January -22oC. Both houses have the same heated volume of 415.9 m3 and
heated area of 142.3 m2.
Passive house
The design was developed in collaboration with the specialists from the
Institute of Passive Buildings at the Polish National Energy Conservation
Agency in Warsaw. It received the positive opinion of the Passive House-
Institute from Darmstadt and at the further stage certification by that
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Institute. According to the energetic certificate issued by the above institutions
its demand for thermal power is to be 1.9 kW (13.5 W/m2), year final energy
(heat) consumption for heating the building 13.5 kWh/m2/year and
4.7 kWh/m3/year. The seasonal demand for heat to heat that building will be
1944 kWh/year. This data are for the passive house located near Wrocław.
As mentioned above, the construction of the passive house is made accord-
ing to the passive house regulations, and especially the thermal transmittance
U of the building elements are appropriately chosen: exterior wall thermal
transmittance is equal to 0.1 W/(m2K), and appropriately the thermal trans-
mittance of window 0. 60 W/(m2K), door 0.80 W/(m2K), roof 0.15 W/(m2K), and
finally floors to ground 0.11 W/(m2K). So the superinsulation was employed to
lower significantly the heat conductivity through the house envelope.
The insulation layers are 30–44 cm thick. The house is made of gravelite-
concrete prefabricated walls and the thermal bridges are actually minimized as
often as possible.
This house is designed fulfilling the passive solar design technique: it is
possibly compact in shape to reduce its surface area with the shape coefficient
equal to 0.75, the windows are oriented south to maximize the solar gains, but
the solar gains are of secondary importance in minimizing the total energy
demand requirement. The windows of advanced technology was applied with
possible small U = 0.8 W/(m2K), for the entire window including also the
frame. So in the house the door of Clima Design and window woodwork of
REHAU Company were used. Of course the airtightness of walls are very
important in the passive house, and the special test for tigthness against the
air penetration was necessary giving the result 0.3 air change per hour.
The Lipinscy passive house is equipped with the mechanical ventilation
including the heat recovery system. According to the passive house standards
the ground heat exchanger was provided for and it is Awaduct Thermo of the
REHAU Company. The ground heat exchanger heating initially the air
supplying the heat pump (air-water) and the building was also installed.
In case of the passive house the temperature of air blown in past the ground
heat exchanger was assumed to be 5oC. In this case electric heating installation
and hot water preparation was applied using the integrated compact Vitotres
343 device by Viessmann (air-air heat pump, heat recovery device and electri-
cally heated container of water for general use). The heat pump in the heat
exchanger heats the air blown into the room after leaving the heat recovery
device. To prepare the DHW the vacuum solar heat collectors Vitosol of
Viessman were additionally used.
In Figure 2 the scheme of energy streams (with appropriate temperatures)
are shown for the passive house heating. The solar collector used for DHW
preparation is not shown in this figure.
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Energy from ground
Tair, inlet - 18°C
Tair, used +20°C
Tair from GHE +5°CGHE
Recuparator
Heat
pump
Tair, fresh +24°C
+8°C
+35°C
+16°C
Tair, out -2°C
Fig. 2. Scheme of the heating system for the passive house
Traditional house
The traditional house was supposed to be made on the basis of a similar
design as the passive house and had the same heated space of volume of 456.1 m3
and heated area of 153.7 m2. The difference in construction lies in the thermal
transmittance of external partitions made of different materials than the
passive house. Thus, especially, the thermal transmittance U of the building
elements are appropriately changed: exterior wall thermal transmittance is
equal to 0.37 W/(m2K), and appropriately the thermal transmittance of window
1.0 W/(m2K), door 1.4 W/(m2K), roof 0.27 W/(m2K), and finally floors to ground
0.22 W/(m2K).
The heating installation in the conventional house consisted of gas conden-
sation boiler and central water heating installation equipped with plate
conventional heaters. The boiler also served heating the water. The natural
ventilation is only supposed.
Results of calculations
In what follows, the results of computations made using the spreadsheet
designed within the frameworks of IEA ECBCS Annex 37 and improved and
complemented in the Annex49 are presented. The results are shown in Table
1 and 2. It is easy to see that the heat losses through partition are about
80 percent higher for the traditional house than for the passive one. Further-
more the loss for ventilation is five times higher for the traditional house than
passive, what is quite clearly because there is natural ventilation in traditional
house versus mechanical in passive house. The mechanical ventilation is also
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seen in the line for the electrical consumption of electricity for ventilator,
where is nil for the traditional house versus 112 W in the passive house. Again
the gains from the solar radiation in the case of passive house is 2.5 times
higher than in traditional house. Three remaining gains: internal from resi-
dent and from electric devices and from lighting solar are the same because of
the same number of inhabitants (four persons) and the number of electric
devices and the power of lighting.
Table 1
Summary of the demand for thermal power of the traditional and passive house
Components in [W] Traditional house Passive house
Heat losses through partitions 5,531 3,045
Heat losses for ventilation 3,511 702
Gains from solar radiation 108 262
Internal heat gains (from residents) 320 320
Internal heat gains (from electric devices) 270 270
Electricity consumption for lighting 284 284
Electricity consumption for ventilators 0 112
Demand for thermal power 8,059 2,610
Demand for thermal power per 1 m2 of usable area 56.6 18.3
Table 2
Results of exergy calculation
Components in [W] Traditional house Passive house
Exergy load room (envelope) 1,154 373
Exergy load at heater (room air) 1,616 408
Exergy load emission 2,134 471
Exergy load distribution 2,371 547
Exergy load storage 2,472 580
Exergy load generation 10,874 752
Exergy load transformation 11,364 2,258
Lighting exergy demand 284 284
Ventilation exergy demand 0 112
Exergy load plant 433 461
DHW prim exergy demand 471 153
Energy/Exergy prim load plant 1,067 1,134
Primary energy renewable 13 629
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Finally, the demand for thermal power in traditional house is equal to circa
8.1 kW, when in the passive house is only 2.6 kW. And this huge difference is
actually caused by two things: much better isolation and mechanical ventila-
tion in the case of the passive house. Actually, the solar gains in the case of
passive house could be a bit higher because it was impossible to calculate it in
the spreadsheet Exergy ver. 7.7 according to the rules given for the passive
house. The solar gains estimation along the rules for the passive house looks
also to some extend optimistic. The specific power for the traditional house is
equal to 56.6 W/m2 and is more than three times higher than for the passive
house, which is equal to 18.3 W/m2.
In Table 2 the results of exergy flow calculations are quoted. These results
are more instructive, because the exergy flow points out how much exergy
finally disappears.
In Figure 3 and 4 the comparison of energy calculation for the conventional
and low-energy house are illustrated. In Figure 3 the energy gains and losses
are shown in bar diagram for the conventional, while in Figure 4 the same
calculation for the low-energy house (passive) are given. The differences are
very striking: the energy losses in passive house are 50% lower than in
traditional house. In passive house the renewable energy gains (green) are
rather huge, while in traditional house are equal to zero. The total input for the
traditional house is equal to 13.525 kW, while for the low energy house is only
5.5 kW. The solar gains in traditional house are small in comparison to passive
house, the internal gains are the same the same, because of the same number
Fig. 3. Energy gains and losses in the traditional house
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of occupants and lighting gains. Very instructive is also the comparison of
exergy supply and demand for the traditional and low-energy house shown in
Figures 5 and 6 respectively. The exergy supply and demand in the case of
low-energy house is about two and half times lower than in the traditional
house. It is the proper measure what exergy (energy) savings are achieved in
the case of the low energy (passive) house.
Fig. 4. Energy gains and losses in the low-energy (passive) house
Fig. 5. Exergy supply and demand in traditional house
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Fig. 6. Exergy supply and demand in low-energy (passive) house
Conclusions
The energy and exergy analysis of buildings are introduced according to the
Energy Conservation for Building and Community Systems (ECBCS) Annex 49
and 37 of International Energy Agency. The code Exergy 7.7 was used to
accomplish the energy and exergy flow analysis for the traditional and low-
energy houses. It was shown that total demand for thermal power (converted
to primary energy) of the traditional house was almost two times higher than
that of the passive house. On the other hand losses of exergy at heat generation
for central heating stage in the first stage were almost eight times higher than
the losses of exergy in the passive house. The highest exergy losses occurred in
the heat source (particularly the water boiler).
Large exergy losses also occur in heat transmission (distribution) to
heaters (or in air channels to blowers in the passive house). In case of the
traditional house losses of exergy were five times higher as a consequence of
the difference in supply temperatures of water 70oC and air 35oC systems. As
a consequence there were also around 3.5 times higher losses of exergy in
transmission of heat from heating elements to the air in the premises.
Poorer insulation properties of the traditional building caused only two
times increase of losses of exergy through the roofing (as compared to seven
times higher losses in the boiler).
The exergy analysis should be a proper tool to compare different innovative
solution also in dwelling houses.
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A b s t r a c t
GNSS observations from a network of permanent stations are a complex system offering not only
post-processing, but also corrections sent in real time and the creation of virtual observations. In
Poland, such a system has been in operation since June 2008: the Polish Active Geodetic Network
ASG-EUPOS. For users three services are provided for real-time corrections, and two services are
offered for post-processing. In this paper, methods of normal height determination from static GPS
measurements were analysed in the context of the technical capabilities of the ASG-EUPOS along
with recommendations for such measurements. Particular attention is paid to the possibility of using
to such calculations the Virtual Reference Stations (VRS). Studies have shown that height determina-
tion using VRS may reduce the length of observation sessions and improve accuracy compared to the
results obtained from the NAWGEO or POZGEO services. In addition, because of the short vectors
between the virtual station and measured points, accuracy is not dependent on the type of used
receiver (L1 or L1/L2).
NIWELACJA SATELITARNA GNSS Z WYKORZYSTANIEM SERWISÓW SYSTEMU
ASG-EUPOS
Karol Dawidowicz
Instytut Geodezji
Uniwersytet Warminsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie
S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: ASG-EUPOS, EUPOS, GBAS, niwelacja satelitarna GNSS, geoida.
A b s t r a k t
Obserwacje GNSS realizowane na sieciach stacji permanentnych są obecnie złożonymi sys-
temami oferującymi, oprócz postprocessingu, również korekty przesyłane w czasie rzeczywistym oraz
tworzenie obserwacji wirtualnych. W Polsce systemem takim jest uruchomiona w czerwcu 2008 roku
polska aktywna sieć geodezyjna ASG EUPOS. Dla użytkowników przeznaczono trzy serwisy
udostępniania poprawek w czasie rzeczywistym oraz dwa serwisy dla postprocessingu. W pracy
przeanalizowano sposoby wyznaczenia wysokości z pomiarów statycznych GPS w kontekście
możliwości technicznych systemu ASG-EUPOS oraz niektórych zaleceń do takich pomiarów.
Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na możliwość wykorzystania do takich wyznaczeń obserwacji z Wirtual-
nych Stacji Referencyjnych (VRS – Virtual Reference Station). Przeprowadzone analizy wykazały, że
procedura wyznaczenia wysokości punktów z wykorzystaniem VRS może pozwolić na znaczne
skrócenie długości sesji obserwacyjnej oraz poprawę dokładności w stosunku do wyników uzyskanych
z serwisu NAWGEO czy POZGEO. Ze względu na krótkie wektory między stacją wirtualną
a wyznaczanymi punktami dokładność ta nie jest uwarunkowana wykorzystanym w czasie pomiaru
typem odbiornika (L1 bądź L1/L2).
Introduction
The EUPOS project (EUropean Position Determination System) was laun-
ched in 2002 in Berlin. Its purpose was to create a homogenous ground-based
GNSS support system in Central and Eastern Europe. In Poland, ASG-EUPOS
(ASG – Aktywna Sieć Geodezyjna) launched in June 2008 (BOSY et al. 2007,
2008). The ASG-EUPOS network assumed the role of a geodetic reference
system in Poland. The connection of the ASG-EUPOS stations and the EUREF
Permanent Network (EPN) stations (which are located Poland) has allowed
the implementation, monitoring and control of the ETRS89 system in the
territory of Poland (FIGURSKI et al. 2009).
The ASG-EUPOS is a multi-functional satellite positioning system. Its
structure is divided into three basic segments: reference stations, management
and user segments. These segments work together to provide a system for
precise positioning in real-time and post-processing applications. The network
of reference stations (reference segment) currently (as of November 2011)
consists of 99 Polish (81 with a GPS module and 18 with a GPS/GLONASS
module) and 22 foreign stations (www.asgeupos.pl). The mean distance be-
tween reference stations is below 70 km. The stations are regularly distrib-
Table 1
ASG-EUPOS services
Service
group
Service
name
Survey
method
Data
access
Estimated
precision
Minimum hardware
requirements
Real-time
services
NAWGEO kinematic
RTK
GSM/
Internet
0.03 m (horiz)
0.05 m (vert.)
L1/L2 GNSS RTK receiver,
communication module
KODGIS kinematic
DGPS
0.2–0.5 m L1 DGNSS receiver,
communication module
NAWGIS 1.0–3.0 m
Postprocessing
services
POZGEO static Internet 0.01–0.10 m L1 GNSS receiver
POZGEO D static/
kinematic
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uted, creating a homogenous network which covers all of Poland. The ASG-
EUPOS services enable transfer of reference frame into real applications in the
field. Table 1 shows the real-time and post-processing services available in the
ASG-EUPOS system (www.asgeupos.pl).
GNSS technology is currently widely used for many kinds of geodetic
surveys, including height determination. Relative GNSS positioning encour-
ages users to compute orthometric (normal) height differences,
ΔH = H2 – H1,by using the well-known relation (Fig. 1):
ΔH = Δh – ΔN (1)
where:
Δh = h2 – h1 – the difference in ellipsoidal heights,
ΔN = N2 – N1, – the difference in geoid heights.
The accuracy of the calculated ΔH depends on the accuracy of Δh and ΔN.
Although it is possible to reach millimetre horizontal relative accuracy levels
over tens, or even hundreds of kilometres, vertical GNSS accuracy is not so
easily obtained. The baseline vertical component is more sensitive to many
disturbing factors, for example: antenna phase centre variations or tropos-
pheric refraction (DAWIDOWICZ 2010, DODSONA et al. 1996, TREGONING, HER-
RING 2006, WIELGOSZ et al. 2011).
Fig. 1. The concept of GNSS satellite levelling
Source: own work.
The second factor determining the accuracy of GNSS levelling is a geoid
(quasigeoid) model. The height system in Poland creates geopotencial numbers
divided by the average value of the normal acceleration of gravity along the
normal line between the GRS80 ellipsoid and telluroid (further reffered to as
“normal heights”) referenced to the average level of the Baltic Sea, set for
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a tide-gauge in Kronstadt near St. Petersburg (Russian Federation) (Roz-
porządzenie Rady Ministrów... 2000, Projekt nowelizacji RRM... 2007). Normal
heights by definition, are related with a quasigeoid. Because in most areas of
Poland the spacing between geoid and quasigeoid surfaces is less than 1 cm,
sometimes in the literature both surfaces are identified (BANASIK 1999, PAŻUS
et al. 2002).
There are a number of categories of techniques for the computation of geoid
undulation. Currently the genaral strategy for computation of geoid undula-
tion is composed of the combination of three effects: global, regional and local,
which are represented by the geopotential model, mean free-air gravity
anomalies and topography respectively (CZARNECKI 1994, HOFMANN-WELLEN-
HOF, MORITZ 2005, TORGE 1991).
Precise modelling of global and regional geoids has become one of the major
tasks of numerous research groups of surveying and mapping agencies. In
order to provide determination of normal heights using satellitemeasurements
techniques, the Head Office of Geodesy and Cartography in Poland in 1999
began intensive work on creating a suitable quasigeoid model. The published
result of this has been the creation of two quasigeoid models. The first model,
called “Geoida niwelacyjna 2000”, is a purely geometric satellite-levelling
quasigeoid model based on the hights of the EUREF-POL, POLREF, EUVN,
WSSG and Tatry network points. This model was included in the “TRANS-
POL” software, which is enclosed in the G1-10 Technical Guidelines. The
second published version of quasigeoid was, approved in 2001 by the Surveyor
General of Poland for use in geodetic practice, model called “Geoida
niwelacyjna 2001”. This model is the result of fitting the “QUASI97B”
gravimetric quasigeoid model into the “QGEOID-PL’01” satellite-levelling
quasigeoid model based on 752 points, of which 62 belong to the EUVN
network, 11 to the EUREF-POL network, 330 to the POLREF network, 23 to
the Tatry network and 326 to the WSSG network. A discrete model in the form
of quasigeoid heights in 1’ × 1’ grid nodes was determined using the spline
function of the third’ degree. Together with the bilinear interpolation formula
of quasigeoid heights, it was used in the “GEOIDA” software attached to the
Technical Instruction G-2. ASG-EUPOS system is used ,QGEOID-PG` model
(Instrukcja Techniczna G-2 2001, PAŻUS et al. 2002, Wytyczne Techniczne
G1-10 2001).
Access to raw gravity data, the development of high-resolution digital
terrain models and densification of precise GNSS-levelling heights have
simulated extensive research into precise quasigeoid modelling in Poland.
Since 2002 a team of reserchers under the leadership of the Institute of
Geodesy and Cartography in Warsaw have conducted advanced research into
modeling a centimetre quasigeoid in Poland (KRYŃSKI, ŁYSZKOWICZ 2006a,b).
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In the meantime, the release of the EGM2008 (Earth Gravitational Model
2008 EGM2008) by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) EGM
Development Team was a milstone step in precise gravitational and geoidal
modelling on a global scale (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2009).
Centimeter-level positioning in an array of reference stations spaced 30 to
100 kilometers apart can be achieved using virtual reference station (VRS)
observations. Precise correction models for dispersive (ionospheric) and non-
dispersive (tropospheric and orbit) distance-dependent biases are obtained
from the real reference data and used in the calculation of the virtual
observations (WANNINGER 1997). The process of creating VRS observations
based on real observations, consists of several stages (WANNINGER 1997, 1999).
The quality of VRS observations fundamentally depends on two aspects: firstly
on station-dependent biases in the reference stations observations (mostly
caused by a carrier phase multipath) and secondly on possible ionospheric and
tropospheric disturbances. Small-scale and medium-scale ionospheric and
tropospheric refraction may not be completely represented by the correction
models of distance-dependent biases. The remaining errors affect ambiguity
resolution and positioning accuracy of the baseline between VRS and the
measured point. The size of these biases (and thus the quality of the VRS
observations) is estimated together with the correction model parameters
(WANNINGER 1999).
The VRS concept was initially dedicated to RTK (Real Time Kinematic)
measurements and is now more often used in a static approach (BAKUŁA 2006,
SIEJKA 2009).
Performing geodetic surveying is regulated by a number of legal acts and
technical standards. At the moment there are no definitive instructions for
measurements using the ASG-EUPOS. In the project phase are technical
guidelines G-1.12. At the beginning of 2011, the Surveyor General of Poland
published the “GNSS satellite measurements based on reference stations of
ASG-EUPOS” technical recommendations, which cannot be treated as a valid
technical standard for GNSS measurements. At present, the use of ASG-
EUPOS services is possible, as long as it meet accuracy requirements. In such
a situation, it is necessary to conduct detailed studies related to the determina-
tion of position using ASG-EUPOS.
In this paper, methods of normal heights determination from GNSSS
measurements were analysed in the context of the technical capabilities of the
ASG-EUPOS along with recommendations for such measurements. Particular
attention was paid to the possibility of using VRS observations for such
determination.
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Research area
Four points situated in Kortowo (UWM Olsztyn) were selected for test
measurements (Fig. 2). This location resulted in the nearest CORS stations of
the ASG-EUPOS system being between 3 and 20 km distant (Fig. 3).
Fig. 2. The location of existing levelling benchmark and test points
Source: own work.
One hundred independent RTK measurements were performed on each
test points with the NAWGEO service. Between the measurements, random
breaks were made from 5 to 30 seconds. Additionally a static session was
carried out on the test points . The following GNSS parameters were assumed
for that session: sampling interval 5s, minimum satellite; elevation 10o, time of
measurement 4 hours.
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Fig. 3. The location of the research area
Source: map: http://www.asgeupos.pl
For the test points normal heights were determined by precise leveling
(Tab. 2). Precise levelling was assigned to two 2nd order benchmarks of the
national levelling network (AI 6940, AI 7040). Table 2 also includes the
separations between quasigeoid and ellipsoid on measured points calculated
with three quasigeoid models (among others the “QGEOID-PG” model which
is used in the ASG-EUPOS system).
Table 2
Normal height and quasigeoid-to-ellipsoid separation on measured points
Quasigeoid Quasigeoid
to ellipsoid to ellipsoid
separation from separation from
“Geoida niwelacyjna “Geoida niwelacyjna
2000” model [m] 2001” model [m]
Quasigoid
to ellipsoid
separation from
“QGEOID-PG”
model [m]
Measurement
point number
Normal height
[m]
0001 117.234 29.816 29.815 29.805
0002 115.318 29.815 29.814 29.803
0003 104.995 29.831 29.829 29.818
0004 105.974 29.831 29.830 29.819
On all test points about a 1 cm difference between quasigeoid-to-ellipsoid
separations calculated from “QGEOID-PG” model and both other models is
visible. The impact of the quasigeoid model used for the normal height
determination has been analysed, among others, by HADAŚ and BOSY (2009).
GNSS Satellite Levelling Using... 41
Analysis of results
Results of the RTK-NAWGEO measurements (normal height differences
between heights obtained from precise levelling and heights obtained from
satellite leveling), are presented in figure 4 (the “QGEOID-PG” model was
used).
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Fig. 4. Normal height differences between heights obtained from precise levelling and heights
obtained from RTK-NAWGEO measurements
Figure 4 shows, that for measured points, on average, within ±2 cm was
nearly half the height differences (43%), while in the range ±5 cm (accuracy of
the RTK height determination declared by the ASG-EUPOS system): 98%
height differences. It should be noted that the largest difference was observed
for the points of nearby tall trees and buildings (0001 and 0002 points). The
standard deviation, being a measure of the precision of the data, was 1.4 cm.
Observations from static measurements carried out on test points have
been processed in several variants. Because cost-effectiveness is a requirement
for most geodetic projects several analyses were conducted into how the
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accuracy depends on the baseline length and on the duration of the observing
session (ECKLE et al. 2001, PSIMOULIS et al. 2004). For this reason, four-hour
session was divided into 4 one-hour sessions and 8 half-hour sessions. Next,
the four and one-hour sessions were sent to the POZGEO service. Additionally,
all measurement sessions were processed with Topcon Tools v7.3 software
(POZGEO-D service) in three variants: with LAMA, with OLST and with VRS
stations as reference stations. VRS station were created with the POZGEO-D
service in the immediate vicinity of the measured points.
In Topcon Tools software, selection of processing frequency is automatic
and for baselines up to 30 km, it appears as follows: 0–10 km processing
on L1 frequency, 10–30 km processing in ionosphere-free combinations. To
process the IGS final orbit and IGS the absolute (converted from relative)
antenna phase center offset model was chosen. The results for one and half
hour sessions (ellipsoidal heights and their RMS errors) are presented in
figures 5–8.
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Fig. 5. Ellipsoidal height and height error for 0001 point: a, b – one hour sessions, c, d – half hour
sessions
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Fig. 6. Ellipsoidal height and height error for 0002 point: a, b – one hour sessions, c, d – half hour
sessions
Fig. 7. Ellipsoidal height and height error for 0001 point: a, b – one hour sessions, c, d – half hour
sessions
Karol Dawidowicz44
1 2 3 4
1 hour sessions
135.80 135.80
135.85 135.85
135.90 135.90
a
b
e
ll
ip
s
o
id
a
l 
h
e
ig
h
t
[m
]
h
e
ig
h
t
e
r
r
o
r
 [
m
]
POZGEO
P-D: LAMA
P-D: OLST
P-D: VRS
0.00
1
1 hour sessions
2 3 4
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
POZGEO
P-D: LAMA
P-D: OLST
P-D: VRS
P-D: LAMA
P-D: OLST
P-D: VRS
2 4 6 8
1/2 hour sessions
c
d
h
e
ig
h
t
e
r
r
o
r
 [
m
]
e
ll
ip
s
o
id
a
l 
h
e
ig
h
t
[m
]
0.00
2
1/2 hour sessions
4 6 8
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
P-D: LAMA
P-D: OLST
P-D: VRS
Fig. 8. Ellipsoidal height and height error for 0002 point: a, b – one hour sessions, c, d – half hour
sessions
Anlysing the results on figures 5–8, it is visible that the ellipsoidal heights
obtained from the POZGEO service are characterized by the lowest stability
and the highest value of RMS error (one hour session variants – min. 720 epoch
needed). It is clear that there is a tendency to increase stability and reduce the
RMS error by shortening the distance between measured points and reference
station. The best results were obtained for the variants using the OLST or VRS
stations as reference points. It should be noted that this solution was obtained
for L1 processing.
For all processing variants the normal heights were calculated. The
“QGEOID-PG” model was used to calculate the distances between the
quasigeoid and ellipsoid. The normal height differences between heights
obtained from precise levelling and the heights obtained from satellite levelling
are presented in figure 9.
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Fig. 9. Normal height differences between heights obtained from precise levelling and heights
obtained from satellite levellin
Height differences calculated from the results from one-hour sessions were
within ±2 cm range for 44% of the POZGEO solution, for 75% of the
POZGEO-D LAMA (P-D LAMA) solution, for 56% of POZGEO-D OLST (P-D
OLST) solutions and for 50% of POZGEO-D VRS (P-D VRS) solutions. With
±3 cm range were 69% of the POZGEO solution, 94% of the POZGEO-D LAMA
solution, 94% of POZGEO-D OLST solutions and 100% of POZGEO-D VRS
solutions.
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Height differences calculated from the results of half-hour sessions were
within ± 2 cm range for 68% of the POZGEO-D LAMA solution, for 59% of
POZGEO-D OLST solutions and for 50% of POZGEO-D VRS solutions. With
±3 cm range were 90% of the POZGEO-D LAMA solution, 75% of POZGEO-D
OLST solutions and 90% of POZGEO-D VRS solutions.
Conclusions
This paper presents an analysis of normal height determination using the
services of the ASG-EUPOS system (NAWGEO, POZGEO, POZGEO-D).
In the case of RTK satellite levelling, the low accuracy of ellipsoidal height
determination (dispersion of the range of 10 cm) has a significant impact on
the value of normal height calculation. A one-hour static session also proved to
be too short for accurate determination of heights in the POZGEO service
(ellipsoidal height dispersion in the range of 7 cm). Neither method provides
determination of normal heights with ±2–3 cm accuracy.
A better solution at the moment is either extending the measuring session
for processing in the POZGEO service or own observation post-processing
(POZGEO-D service). A half-hour session was sufficient to determine ellip-
soidal heights with ±1 cm accuracy (variants with OLST or VRS as reference
station). Additionally, because of the short vectors between the measured
points and the reference station, the accuracy of the calculations did not
depend on the type of receivers used for the measurement (L1 or L1/L2). For
those processing variants, the accuracy of quasigeoid model has a significant
impact on the value of normal height calculation. It is hoped that this accuracy
will be improved with the newest quasigeoid model for Poland.
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A b s t r a c t
The present paper describes the results of the author’s work related to the geoid determination
in the area of Poland. Beginning from the geoid model geoid92 worked out in 1992, various geoid
models calculated from various data sets, using various methods, are presented. Additionally, the
evaluation of the accuracy of the determined geoid models is given. Next, the necessity of the fitting of
computed geoid models to the national vertical reference system and the evaluation of the accuracy of
the functionals N, Δg, ξ, η of the gravity field calculated from the various geopotential models are
presented.
It results from the presented investigations, that at present the accuracy of gravimetric
geoid/quasigeoid models is ± 1.4 cm and accuracy of geoid computed from geopotential model EGM08
is ±2.4 cm. It is stated additionally that accuracy of gravity anomalies computed from the EGM08
model is ± 25 μm s–2 , while accuracy of the deflections of the vertical ξ and η is from ±0.6’’ to ± 0.7’’.
BADANIE PRZEBIEGU GEOIDY NA OBSZARZE POLSKI
Adam Łyszkowicz
Katedra Geodezji Szczegółowej
Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie
S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: modele geopotencjału, geoida/quasi-geoida, składowe odchyleń pionu.
A b s t r a k t
W pracy przedstawiono wyniki badań dotyczących przebiegu geoidy na obszarze Polski.
Poczynając od modelu geoid92, opracowanego w 1992 roku, w artykule przestawiono kolejne modele
geoidy liczone z różnych danych i różnymi metodami wraz z ich charakterystyką dokładnościową.
Uzasadniono konieczność dopasowania wyliczonych modeli geoidy do krajowego układu
wysokościowego oraz podano dokładności charakterystyk pola siły ciężkości N, Δg, ξ, η obliczanych
z kolejnych modeli geopotencjału.
Z wyników badań wynika, że obecnie dokładność grawimetrycznych modeli geoidy/quasi-geoidy
wynosi ±1,4 cm, a dokładność geoidy wyliczonej z modelu geopotencjału EGM08 ±2,4 cm. Dodatkowo
stwierdzono, że dokładność anomalii grawimetrycznych wyliczonych z modelu EGM08 wynosi
±25 μm s–2, a dokładność składowych odchyleń pionu ξ i η od ±0.6’’ do ±0.7’’.
Introduction
Geoid has the basic role in geodesy, oceanography and geophysics. It serves
in geodesy and oceanography, as the reference surface describing the topogra-
phy of continents and oceanic surfaces. One uses geoid in geophysics, as the
representation of the gravity field which reflects the expansion of earth mass
situated in the depth of the Earth.
The paper is based on report presented at the conference dedicated to the
fifth anniversary of Institute of Geodesy and Geoinformatics in Wroclaw. The
main aim of this paper is to show, how in author’s investigations, methods and
data in geoid/quasigeoid models computation in the area of Poland has changed
and how the accuracy of successive models have increased. Beside geoid
determination it presents computation of gravimetric deflections of the vertical
e.g. (ŁYSZKOWICZ 1996a) and recapitulations of these investigations are also in
this paper. More and better geopotential models create a new possibility in
getting the gravity anomalies and the deflections of the vertical without
necessity of laborious field measurements. In the present paper the newest
author’s investigations in this matter are presented.
The paper consists of nine sections. After the introduction, in the second
section the accuracy evaluation of geoid undulations, deflections of the vertical
and gravimetric anomalies are presented. In the next section, briefly an
overview of the basis of geoid calculation from gravimetric data and then geoid
models computed by the author in the last 20 years are presented. Section four
contains information relating to the determination of geoid from the deflec-
tions of the vertical by the collocation method. Section five deals with the
necessity of fitting computed geoid models to the vertical reference system, and
then various ways of such fitting are considered. Then it is shown how the
accuracy of geoid computed from various geopotential models increased in the
last 20 years. Last section contains recapitulation and conclusions.
Evaluation of geoid accuracy
The estimation of geoid/quasigeoid accuracy was for many years unusually
difficult. At the moment when appeared the possibility of the establishment of
geodetic networks by the satellite GPS method appeared, the estimation of
geoid accuracy simplified considerably and it looks as follows.
The relationship between geoid undulation N, ellipsoidal height h and
orthometric height H is.
h = H + N (1)
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From this formula it follows, that if the points of a satellite network at
which ellipsoidal heights h were determined from satellite observation are tied
to the national levelling network, then the geoid/quasigeoid heights at these
points can be computed from relationship.
Nigps/levelling = hi – Hi (2)
From the available (e.g. gravimetric) geoid/quasigeoid models, the distance
between geoid and ellipsoid Nigrav can be computed at the points of a satellite
network and then the differences can be created
δNi = Nigps/levelling – Nigrav (3)
from which mean value xˆ and the empirical standard deviation σˆN can be
computed. So computed empirical standard deviation σˆN is an estimation of
absolute accuracy of geoid models. The method of estimation of the relative
accuracy of geoid/quasigeoidmodels is more complicated and is given e.g. in the
paper (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2009a).
In a case of estimation of gravity anomalies ΔgGM computed from geopoten-
tial models, these anomalies are compared with gravity anomalies Δg obtained
from terrestrial measurements and then the differences are created as
δΔgi = ΔiGM – Δgi (4)
Empirical standard deviation σˆΔg of differences is an estimate of the
accuracy of gravimetric anomalies computed from geopotential models.
In similar way is estimated the accuracy the deflections of the vertical
computed from geopotential model or gravity data is estimated
δξi = ξiGM – ξi
(5)
δηi = ηiGM – ηi
where ζiGM, ηiGM are computed from a geopotential model or gravity data and ζi,
ηi are astrogeodetic deflections of the vertical. Empirical standard deviations
σˆξ, σˆη of differences are estimate of the accuracy of deflections.
In the present work to estimate the accuracy of geoid/quasigeoid models the
POLREF network and control traverse were used. POLREF network consists
of 360 points measured in campaigns from July 1994 till May 1995 (ZIELIŃSKI
et al. 1997). Traverse is about 868 km length, running through the whole area
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of Poland, consisting from 190 points, measured in five campaigns in the years
2003–2004 (KRYŃSKI et al. 2005). The points of the POLREF network and
traverse were tied up to the precise levelling network whose heights are
expressed in Kronsztadt86 system.
The gravimetric data used for the evaluation of accuracy of anomalies
computed from successive geopotential models and also to calculate the
successive versions of gravimetric geoid/quasigeoid models contains data from
the following area: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania,
Ukraine, Germany and Denmark and they are describes in detail in (ŁYS-
ZKOWICZ 1994).
To estimate the accuracy of deflections of the vertical determined from
geopotential models and to compute astrogeodetic geoid by the collocation
method, 171 astrogeodetic deflections of the vertical measured during years
1967–1981 were used (Katalog 1981). These deflections were then improved
(ROGOWSKI et al. 2003) because of the new star catalogue, movements of the
pole, time system and horizontal reference system and these improved deflec-
tions were used in our computations.
Geoid computation from Stokes integral
and by the collocation method
The general adopted strategy of the geoid/quasigeoid calculation consists of
combination of three effects: global, regional and local which are represented
suitably through geopotential model GM, mean residual Faye anomalies and
the topography
N = NGM + NΔgres + NH (6)
Term NGM represents the contribution of spherical harmonic coefficients,
while the term NΔgres represents the contribution of residual Faye anomalies
after removing the effects due to the geopotential model
Δgres = ΔgFA – ΔgGM (7)
The term NH in equation (6) is defined, as the indirect effect on geoid and
represents the change of the equipotential surface after applying terrain
reduction to Δg.
Component NΔgres can be computed from Stokes integral which is evaluated
by the fast Fourier transforms (FFT) or by the collocation method. Computed
geoid undulations can be when transform into quasigeoid according to the
equation
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ζ = N – ΔgBH (8)γ
where ΔgB is Bouguer anomaly, γ is mean normal gravity and H is topographic
height.
Gravimetric geoid models
In the present chapter are presented the successive versions of gravimetric
geoid/quasigeoid models, which were computed by the author for the area of
Poland in the last 20 years. In the description of the models, we pay attention
to gravity data, methods of computation and obtained accuracy.
Model geoid92
The first gravimetric geoid model for Central Europe, including Poland,
was computed in 1949 (TANNI 1949) and has very low accuracy. The first
gravimetric geoid model for the area of Poland was computed at the Depart-
ment of Planetary Geodesy, Polish Academy of Sciences in 1993. This model
was computed by the combination of collocation and the integral method and it
is based on the OSU81 geopotential model to degree and order 80 and on 6000
Faye gravity anomalies from the area of Poland. The estimation shows that the
accuracy of this model is on the level of ± 26 cm (ŁYSZKOWICZ 1993)1.
Model geoid94
The second gravimetric geoid model for the area of Poland geoid94 was
computed using Stokes integral which was evaluated by the FFT method and is
based on a much bigger sets of gravimetric data (about 8000 additional mean
anomalies), topographic data and geopotential model OSU91 to degree and
order 360 (ŁYSZKOWICZ, DENKER 1994). The accuracy of this model is es-
timated2 as ±14 cm.
Model quasi95
In 1994 within realization of the research project of Committee of Scientific
Research (CSR) (ŁYSZKOWICZ 1995) a new set of mean Faye anomalies was used
1 The evaluation of this model was done in 1993 on 10 points of the EUREF network, what means
that estimation of accuracy is not realistic.
2 New evaluation done in 2010 on the basis of all points of POLREF network.
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in the geoid computation for the area of Poland in a grid l’ × l’. These data
together with gravimetric data collected from neighbouring countries and
digital terrain model in a grid 1.5’ × 3’ interpolated from the terrain model in
a grid 30’ × 30’ for Poland, and 5’ × 7.5’ for the neighbouring areas were used to
compute the first gravimetric quasigeoid model named quasi95 (ŁYSZKOWICZ,
FORSBERG 1995). The calculation of this model was conducted with the
utilization of fast Fourier transforms (FFT). In these calculations the global
geopotential model OSU91 was used to degree and order 360. The accuracy of
this model is estimated3 as ± 8.7 cm.
This model was fitted to the vertical reference system Kronsztadt86
(section 7) and was made accessible to practical use by Head Office of Geodesy
and Cartography in 1996 (ŁYSZKOWICZ 1997).
Model quasi97b
Next quasigeoid model named quasi97b was computed in 1997 from at least
140 000 point and mean gravity anomalies and a new geopotential model
EGM96 to degree and order 360 (LEMOINE at al. 1998) by fast Fourier
transforms (FFT) method. This model was realized within the project ordered
by Committee of Scientific Research (ŁYSZKOWICZ 1998) and together
with suitable software it was delivered to Head Office of Geodesy and
Cartography to be used in geodetic practice. The accuracy of this model is
estimated as ± 3.5 cm.
In order to use in practice quasi97b model, it was fitted to vertical reference
system Kronsztadt86 by the collocation method. Accuracy of fitted quasi97b
model is estimated as ± 1.0 cm (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2000)4.
Model quasi09a
Computed in 2009 the next version of gravimetric quasigeoid model named
quasi09 was developed on the basis of gravimetric data, which consists of the
set of mean anomalies from the area of Poland (KRYŃSKI 2007) and of data
from neighbouring countries. Additionally during the calculations topographi-
cal data were used, that is DTED (Digital Terrain Elevation Data) model and
SRTM (Shuttle Radar Topography Mission) model. The gravimetric model
quasi09a was computed with the use of gravity data described above and
geopotentialmodel EGM08 to degree and order 2190 (PAVLIS et al. 2008) by the
fast Fourier method (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2009b).
3 New evaluation done in 2010 on the basis of all points of POLREF network.
4 This evaluation is probably too optimistic.
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Accuracy of quasi09a model estimated at the points of POLREF network
gives a mean error of ± 3.5 cm, while analogous estimation at the points of the
traverse gives a mean error ± 2.7 cm.
Model quasi09c
In 2009, for the first time in Poland, a gravimetric quasigeoid model
(quasi09c) was computed by the collocation method and, for the first time the
mean square error of the term NΔgres present in formula (6) was estimated. The
error of this component over the area of Poland is from 0.3 cm to 0.4 cm
(ŁYSZKOWICZ 2010a).
Estimation of the accuracy of quasi09c model on the points of the network
POLREF gives the mean error ±3.2 cm, while analogous judgment conducted
on the points of the traverse gives the mean error ±1.8 cm (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2010a).
Additional data in the form of 171 astrogeodetic deflections of the vertical did
not improve noticeably the accuracy of this model.
Geoid “GUGiK 2001”
The next published version of the quasigeoid model approved in 2001 by
the Head Office of Geodesy and Cartography to be used in geodetic practice
was the model named “GUGiK 2001” (PAŻUS 2001). This model came into
being as a result of the fitting to the vertical reference system Kronsztad86 the
gravimetric quasigeoid model quasi97b using spline functions of degree 3
(PAŻUS et al. 2002).
In the present work estimation of the accuracy of this model was done at
140 points of the traverse and we get the mean square error of this model ±1.8
cm. Estimation of accuracy of the deflection of the vertical computed from this
model was done on 171 points of the astrogeodetic network and we got a mean
error of the components ξ and η as 0.60’’ and 0.68’’ second of arc respectively.
Graphical illustration of the accuracy of the various gravimetric
geoid/quasigeoid models are given in figure 1.
Geoid from deflections of the vertical by Helmert
and collocation methods
The aim of this investigation was to use the first time in Poland the
collocation method to determine a geoid model from astrogeodetic deflections
of the vertical and show that this method is significantly better than the
classical Helmert method.
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Deflections of the vertical are traditionally used to the determination the
geoid in a local or regional scale. The first astrogeodetic geoid model for the
area of Poland was determined in 1961 (BOKUN 1961) and the next as-
trogeodetic geoid model was determined in 2005 (ROGOWSKI et al. 2005). This
last model was an improved one due to the removal of systematic errors, in
astrogeodetic and astrogravimetric deflections of the vertical.
The latest improved astrogeodetic geoid model is presented in the paper
(ŁYSZKOWICZ 2010b). It was computed for the area of Poland, by the use
improved data and a better computational algorithm, the collocation method.
The theoretical fundamentals of the astronomical levelling and collocation
method are given briefly e.g. in paper (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2010b, sec. I). In the same
paper an evaluation of the accuracy of the deflections of the vertical and
weights estimation is given.
Section II of the paper (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2010c) describes four computed geoid
models, namely: two models from the improved astrogeodetic and astrog-
ravimetric data by the Helmert method and models from the same two data
sets but computed by the least squares collocation method.
These models were compared with quasigeoid undulation Ngps/levelling at the
points of the satellite POLREF network. The results of the comparison show,
that geoid model determined by the collocation method is characterize by an
accuracy of ±12 cm – ±7 cm and is 5–7 times better than the accuracy of the
models computed by the classical method.
Geoid fitting to the vertical reference system
In practice the relationship (1) is not fulfiled and each component in
equation (1) is affected by systematic errors that can be written in the form
h + δh = (H + δH) + (N + δN) (9)
Equation (9) can be written in the form
h = H + N + (δH + δN – δh) or h = H + N + c (10)
where c is correction surface that enables more precise transformation of
heights H from spirit levelling into ellipsoidal heights h from satellite GPS
observations and vice versa. Correction surface c can be determined from
certain parametric models given in table 1 and additionally by the collocation
method e.g. (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2000).
Model#1 in table 1 contains one parameter which can be interpreted as
a constant shift between the considered surfaces. Model#1 was used to assess
the accuracy of geoid models described in the previous sections of this paper.
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Model#2 contains two additional parameters which represent mean north-
south and east-west inclination e.g. between the gravimetric geoid and geoid
from GPS and levelling.
Model#3 is commonly known as four parameter model which geometrically
represents three shifts along the x, y z axis and scale change of reference
systems i.e. geoid heights with respect to GPS heights or the opposite.
Finally, models #4, #5 and #6 represent height-dependent linear corrector
surfaces that constrain the relation between ellipsoidal, normal and
quasigeoidal heights in terms of the generalized equation
h – (1 + δSH)H – (1 δSH) = a0 (11)
The above equation takes into consideration the fact that the spatial scale
of GPS heights does not necessarily match with the spatial scale induced by
quasigeoid undulations of the geopotential model quasigeoid undulations
and/or the inherent scale of normal heights obtained from spirit levelling.
Moreover, the geopotential model of quasigeoid heights and/or local normal
heights are often affected by errors that are correlated, to a certain degree,
with the Earth’s topography, what is a fact that can additionally justify the use
of model #4 or #6 for optimal fitting between ζ gps/levelling and ζ.
Table 1
List of various parametric models, KOTSAKIS (2008)
Number of the model Type
1 a0 + (hi – Hi – Ni) = νi
2 a0 + a1 (ϕ i – ϕ0) + a2 (λi – λ0) cosϕ i + (hi – Hi – Ni) = νi
3 a0 + a1 cosϕi cosλi + a2 cosϕ i sinλi + a3 sinϕi + (hi – Hi – Ni) = νi
4 a0 + δ SH Hi + (hi – Hi – Ni) = νi
5 a0 + δ SH Hi + (hi – Hi – Ni) = νi
6 a0 + δ SH Hi + δ SN + (hi – Hi – Ni) = νi
In the paper (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2009a) the accuracy of fitting of the quasigeoid
undulation computed from the EGM08 model to the vertical reference system
Kronsztadt86 with the use of various parametric models (Table 1) was tested.
From these investigations it can be concluded that the model #2 and #3 which
are commonly used in practice e.g. (FORSBERG 1998) give somewhat better
results than the remaining models. The best results are given by the paramet-
ric model #3 which makes possible to fit the quasigeoid from EGM08 to the
vertical reference system in Poland with the accuracy ±2.4 cm (ŁYSZKOWICZ
2009a) and therefore it will be used in our further calculations.
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Fig. 1. Accuracy comparison of various geoid/quasigeoid models before and after fitting to the vertical
reference system Kronsztad86 in Poland
Figure 1 represents the accuracy evaluation of various geoid/quasigeoid
models before and after fitting to the vertical reference system Kronsztadt86.
From figure 1 it can be seen that in the case of geoid94 model if we apply the
parametric model #3 then geoid94 can be fitted to the vertical reference
system Kronsztadt86 with an accuracy of ±9.1 cm.
If to the quasi95 (= quasi96) model we apply the parametric model #3,
then the fit to the vertical reference system is with accuracy ±3.8 cm. On the
other hand quasi97b model was fitted to the vertical reference system by the
collocation method and surprisingly good accuracy of the fitting ±1.0 cm was
obtained (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2000).
Evaluation of accuracy of the fitted quasi09a model (parametric model#3)
at the points of the POLREF network gives a mean error ±3.1 cm (ŁYSZKOWICZ
2009c). Accuracy of the quasi09c model computed from gravimetric data and
geopotential model EGM08 by the collocation method after fitting to the
vertical reference height system by the least squares collocation method,
performed in this paper gives a mean error on the level of ±1.4 cm.
Accuracy of the fitting of EGM08 model to the vertical reference system
Kronsztadt86 with the utilization of parametric model #3 is the same as by the
collocation method and is equal to ±2.4 cm.
All accuracy evaluations given here were determined on the basis of the
POLREF network. Investigations of the control traverse show, somewhat better
accuracy. For example EGM08 model fits to the POLREF network with an
accuracy ±2.4 cm while the fit to the points of the control traverse is ±1.9 cm.
Model “GUGiK 2001” approved in 2001 by the Head Office of Geodesy and
Cartography is already a model which fits to the vertical reference system and
therefore its new fitting was not done in the present paper leaving in the
suitable place of figure 1 the value zero.
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Geoid, gravity anomalies and deflections of the vertical
from geopotential models
Information about the gravity field can be obtained from direct gravimetric
measurements or computed from geopotential models. The first geopotential
model up to degree and order 8 was elaborated by Żongołowicz in 1956 and
characterized by low accuracy e.g. geoid heights could be computed with an
accuracy of ±8 meters. The most recent geopotential model EGM08 enables to
compute the geoid with the accuracy of few centimetres.
The aim of the preset section is to show how the accuracy of models:
GEM-10B to the degree and order 36 (LERCH et al. 1978), OSU81 to the degree
and order 180 (RAPP 1981), OSU91 to the degree and order 360 (RAPP et al.
1991), EGM08 to the degree and order 2100 (PAVLIS et al. 2008) during the last
50 years increased significantly.
The quasigeoid heights can be computed from the general formula
nmax n n
ζ(r, φ, λ) = ζ0 + GM Σ (a) Σ (Cnm cos mλ + Snm sin mλ) Pnm (sin φ) (12)rγ n=2 r m=0
where Cnm, Snm are fully normalized spherical harmonic coefficients of degree
n and order m, nmax is the maximum degree of geopotential model, GM is the
product of the Newtonian gravitational constant and mass of the geopotential
model, r, φ, λ are spherical polar coordinates, a is the equatorial radius of the
geopotential model and Pnm are the fully normalized associated Legendre
functions. The term ζ0 is the zero degree term due to the difference in the mass
of the Earth used in IERS Convention and GRS80 ellipsoid. Detailed descrip-
tion of the term ζ0 is given in the paper e.g. (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2009a).
In the present work in an analogous way, gravity anomalies ΔgGM and
deflection of the vertical ζ GM, ηGM were computed from various geopotential
models. All computations were done using the program geocol (TSCHERNING et
al. 1992).
Quasigeoid heights were computed at 360 points of the POLREF network
for the various geopotential models and were compared with “true” heights
according to the formula (3) and then empirical standard deviations were
computed for each model (fig. 2). From figure 2 it results that the accuracy of
ζ computed from geopotential models increased extremely (almost 40 times)
and presently without difficulties ζ in the area of Poland can be computed with
accuracy of ±3.6 cm.
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Fig. 2 Accuracy estimation of ζ from the various geopotential models
Terrestrial gravity data from the territory of Poland, used to evaluate the
accuracy of gravity anomalies computed from geopotential models, consists of
147 530 mean gravity anomalies computed in a 1’ × 1’ grid. Gravity anomalies
computed from the geopotential model were then compared with anomalies
from terrestrial measurement, equation (4), and on the basis of such computed
differences their accuracy was estimated (fig. 3). From that figure it can be
concluded that at present, gravity anomalies in the area of Poland, can be
computed from the EGM08 model with an accuracy of ±25 μm s–2.
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Fig. 3 Accuracy estimation of Δg from the successive geopotential models
171 astrogeodetic deflection of the vertical were used to estimate the
accuracy of the deflections of the vertical ξ and η computed from the geopoten-
tial models. According to formula (5) appropriate differences were created and
on their basis the accuracy was evaluated. From fig. 4 it can be seen that the
accuracy of deflections of the vertical computed from geopotential models
increase significantly and in of case the last EGM08 model they are ±0.6’’ and
±0.7’’ for the component ξ and η respectively.
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Fig. 4. Accuracy estimation of ξ η from the various geopotential models
Gravimetric deflections of the vertical
Traditionally deflections of the vertical are determined at the points of
triangulation network from astronomical observations. The access to gravity
data, which appeared in the last decade of the XX century, makes possible the
computation of deflection of the vertical from Vening-Meinesz formulas.
First computation of gravimetric deflections of the vertical for the territory
of Poland was done for the requests of the Head Office of Geodesy and
Cartography in 1966 (ŁYSZKOWICZ 1996a). Deflections of the vertical ξ and
η were computed from available at that time gravity anomalies5 and geopoten-
tial model OSU91 by the fast Fourier method in a 1.5’ × 3.0’ grid. In order to
assess their accuracy from the gridded data 171 gravimetric deflections of the
vertical were interpolated at the points of astrogeodetic network and then the
differences were computed according to formula (5) and their accuracy was
estimated. This comparison gives mean errors ±0.59’’ and ±0.47’’ for compo-
nents ξ and η respectively.
A second computation of gravimetric deflections of the vertical was realized
in 2003 (ŁYSZKOWICZ 2003). In this computation the same gravity data set was
used as in previous computation but the new and better geopotential model
EGM96 available at that time. These calculations were made using Vening-
Meinesz formulas, which were evaluated by the fast Fourier transform. The
accuracy of compute deflections of the vertical is ±0.55’’ and ±0.47’’ for the
component ξ and η respectively.
5 At least 130 000 mean and point Faye anomalies.
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Summary and conclusions
In the last years many geoid/quasigeoid models were computed for the
territory of Poland. These models were computed using different methods and
from various types of data. The computed geoid models i.e. astrogeodetic
models and gravimetric models were computed using fast Fourier transform or
the collocation method while geopotential models were computed from spheri-
cal harmonics coefficients.
Accuracy evaluation of these models was done on the basis of satellite
networks such as POLREF network and control traverse, the points of which
were connected to the national levelling network assuming that heights
Ngps/levelling are error-free.
As a result it was found that absolute accuracy of the astrogeodetic geoid
model is ±7 cm, accuracy of gravimetric geoid models quasi97b and quasi09a is
±3.5 cm, while the accuracy of the quasigeoid model computed by collocation is
±3.2 cm. Quasigeoid model computed from the new geopotential EGM08 model
has an accuracy ±3.6 cm. The accuracy of the mentioned quasigeoid models
tested on points of the control traverse is much better and is at the level
of ±2.5 cm.
By suitable fitting of the quasigeoid model to the national vertical system
one can get the surface, which is obviously not an equipotential surface and in
the literature is called the correction surface. Accuracy of such correction
surface in the case of quasi09c model is ±1.4 cm, while in the case of quasigeoid
from geopotential model EGM08 is ±2.4 cm. Accuracy of the model “GUGiK
2001”, which is of course fitted to the vertical system Kronsztadt86 is ±1.8 cm.
It means that the above mentioned models have almost the same accuracy, but
the model quasi09 c is the most accurate model.
If we reject the hypothesis that the term Ngps/levelling is error-free, then the
accuracy of these geometrical distances depends on the accuracy of height
h from satellite measurements and on the accuracy of connection to the
vertical reference system. Accepting, that the accuracy of computation of h in
the POLREF network is ±1 ... ±1.5 cm (ZIELIŃSKI et al. 1997) and, that the
POLREF network was connected to the vertical reference system with the
accuracy of ±1.5 cm (WYRZYKOWSKI 1998), (GELO 1994) it means that the
quantity Ngps/levelling is determined with an accuracy of ±2.1 cm, what further
investigations show is a very optimistic opinion. From these evaluations it
appear that the POLREF network is not very suitable to estimate the
accuracy of recent quasigeoid models and new testing networks are indis-
pensable.
This new network could be the ASG-EUPOS network with height compo-
nent determined on the level of a few millimetres and connected to the vertical
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reference system. It should ensure credible evaluation of various
geoid/quasigeoid models and their proper fit to the vertical system (various
possibilities).
Additionally in the present work it was proved that the accuracy of gravity
anomalies computed from EGM08 model is of the order of ±25 μm s–2 and the
accuracy of the deflections of the vertical is 0.6’’ – 0.7’’, what can replace
difficult astronomic field measurements in many cases.
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A b s t r a c t
SECRICOM – Seamless Communication for crisis management was a research and development
project, realised within the Seventh Framework Programme (7PR). The aim of this project was to
develop reference solution based on existing infrastructure, which will be capable to ensure secure
and efficient communication for operational crisis management. The project was an answer to the
European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) report, in which key requirements for
a communication system have been stated.
Secure and efficient communication system is a necessity for effective crisis management. It is
assumed that such infrastructure may significantly increase rescue actions effectiveness. Currently,
however, there are cases when various services (not only domestically but also internationally) use
heterogeneous telecommunications systems. It results in the lack of or significant problems with
mutual communication. Such situation is often considered problematic and posing a threat to the
effective rescue actions.
For this purpose, a secure and multi-platform communications system (SECRICOM Silentel) has
been developed within SECRICOM project. The Multi Bearer Router (MBR) optimise the backbone
network by the use of multiple bearers and dynamic adjustment to various conditions. Advance
mechanisms enhancing end-user devices’ security – Secure Docking Module (SDM) – have been
developed using Trusting Computing principles. Secure Agent Infrastructure (SAI) ensures – based
on agents’ infrastructure – secure access to distributed data. The system is supplemented with
network monitoring platform – Communication Security Monitoring and Control Centre.
The SECRICOM project resulted in a communication system prototype, which is capable of
ensuring interoperability as well as secure and efficient communication for operational crisis
management. This system has been demonstrated on several occasions to the stakeholders.
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A b s t r a k t
SECRICOM – Seamless Communication for crisis management to projekt badawczo-rozwojowy,
który został zrealizowany w ramach siódmego programu ramowego (7PR). Celem projektu było
wypracowanie bezpiecznej i, co ważne, bazującej na istniejącej infrastrukturze platformy
komunikacyjnej do operacyjnego zarządzania kryzysowego. Projekt ten stanowi odpowiedź na raport
European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB), w którym określono najważniejsze
wymagania odnośnie do systemu komunikacji.
Bezpieczny i wydajny system komunikacji jest warunkiem koniecznym do efektywnego
zarządzania w sytuacjach kryzysowych. Przyjmuje się, że taka platforma jest w stanie znacząco
zwiększyć efektywność prac służb ratunkowych. Obecnie jednak są przypadki, gdy służby ratunkowe
(nie tylko na arenie międzynarodowej, lecz także podczas działań w jednym kraju) korzystają
z niejednorodnych systemów telekomunikacyjnych, co często skutkuje brakiem lub istotnymi prob-
lemami z wzajemną łącznością. Sytuacja ta jest postrzegana jako problematyczna i stanowi
zagrożenie dla efektywnego działania służb ratunkowych.
W ramach projektu SECRICOM opracowano system międzyplatformowej, bezpiecznej łączności
SECRICOM Silentel. Za optymalizację transmisji danych (w tym wykorzystanie wielu nośnych oraz
dynamiczne dostosowywanie się do warunków) w sieci dystrybucyjnej oraz szkieletowej odpowiada
Multi Bearer Router (MBR). Zaawansowane mechanizmy zwiększające bezpieczeństwo urządzeń
końcowych – Secure Docking Module (SDM) – opracowano z wykorzystaniem pryncypiów Trusted
Computing. Secure Agent Infrastructure (SAI) zapewnia – oparty na infrastrukturze agentów –
bezpieczny dostęp do rozproszonych danych. System uzupełnia platforma nadzoru nad siecią –
Communication Security Monitoring and Control Centre.
Jako rezultat projektu zbudowano oraz kilkukrotnie zademonstrowano prototypową wersję
systemu komunikacji. System ten jest zdolny do zapewnienia interoperacyjnej, bezpiecznej i wydajnej
łączności w zarządzaniu w sytuacjach kryzysowych.
The SECRICOM Project
The SECRICOM project was a FP7 collaborative and integration research
project, addressing the Security Theme in Call FP7-SEC-2007-1 in Topic
SEC-2007-4.2-04 Wireless communication for EU crisis management. The
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main aim of the project was to create Seamless Communication for Crisis
Management for EU Safety.
The project was started in September 2008 and finished – as planned – after
44 months (April 2012). The budget was 12.468.847 (incl. 8.606.791 co-funded
from FP7 programme) and the project have been realised by 14. partners from:
– Industry – QinetiQ (project coordinator), BUMAR, Hitachi, Infineon.
– SME – Ardaco (technical coordinator), CEA-LETI, Geothermal Any-
where, iTTi, Nextel.
– University – Universite du Luxembourg, Institute of Informatics,
Slovak Academy of Sciences, Graz University of Technology, University of
Patras.
– End-user – British APCO.
Figure 1 presents the structure of the project.
Fig. 1. Project structure
Source: SECRICOM Grant Agreement Annex I – Description of Work.
Motivation
The SECRICOM project has been established in response to the European
Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) report (published in September
2006) in which the key requirements of new communication infrastructure
have been proposed:
– Secure in terms of protection against tapping and external intrusion.
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– Trusted in the sense of behaving as expected by meaning minimising the
threats for failure to be a basis for creating emergency solutions.
– Providing enhanced connectivity between various networks and devices.
– Ensuring transmission of different data types such as multimedia (e.g.:
voice, picture, video sequences), geopositioning, etc.
– Supporting advanced search functions embedded in the infrastructure
itself (Meeting the challenge.)
The above mentioned requirements are in line with the current market
needs, including:
– Growing demand for seamless, resilient and secure communication
among various emergency communication systems required by public safety
organizations and their users.
– Necessity of ubiquitous multimedia communication, available every-
where, coupled with real-time access to relevant information in the crisis area.
– Need for recoverability and alternative restoration of damaged communi-
cation cells for infrastructure functionality.
– Requirement of authorization, authentication, data protection against
misuse, quick and flexible data acquisition whilst retaining Push To Talk
simplicity of operation.
– Interoperability and interconnectivity of existing communication plat-
forms (SECRICOM Grant Agreement Annex I – Description of Work).
The SECRICOM project was intended to fulfil those requirements, and
provide interoperable and efficient communication system dedicated to first
responders. The main innovations areas of the SECRICOM projects are:
– Interconnectivity of commercial (e.g. GSM, UMTS, Citizen Band) and
specialized communication systems (e.g. TETRA).
– Seamless and secure interoperability of existing mobile devices already
deployed.
– Efficient multi-bearer network utilisation,
– Software layer based on mobile agents’ paradigm.
– Security based on chip-level trusted module.
Concept
The SECRICOM project was aimed at a reference security platform devel-
opment for EU crisis management operations with two essential ambitions:
1. Solve or mitigate problems of contemporary crisis communication in-
frastructures (e.g. TETRA, GSM, Citizen Band, IP) such as poor interoperabil-
ity of specialized communication means, vulnerability against tapping and
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misuse, lack of possibilities to recover from failures, inability to use alternative
data carriers as well as high deployment and operational costs.
2. Add new smart functions to existing services which will make the
communication more effective and useful for users. Smart functions will be
provided by distributed IT systems based on an agents: infrastructure. Achiev-
ing these two project ambitions will allow creating a pervasive and trusted
communication infrastructure fulfilling crisis management users require-
ments, ready for immediate application.
The SECRICOM solution was based on four technological pillars:
1. Secure and encrypted mobile communication based on existing infras-
tructures (e.g. TETRA, GSM, UMTS networks) – secure Push To Talk.
2. Improved interoperability among various existing communicating sys-
tems, creating recoverable networks with seamless connectivity.
3. Introduction of distributed systems and the agent paradigm forming
a smart negotiating system for parameterization and independent handling of
requests essential for immediate reaction.
4. Security based on trusted hardware enhancing the data confidentiality
and the users privacy (SECRICOM Grant Agreement Annex I – Description of
Work).
The SECRICOM infrastructure was designed mainly for crisis manage-
ment communication (rescuers, fire brigades, special forces, police, healthcare,
etc.), but during the project’s live cycle also other potential end-users have
been identified. The SECRICOM delivers an interface between selected sys-
tems currently deployed for crisis management and new generation systems
which could be developed in next decade, such as SDR. An important goal is to
enable seamless and secure interoperability between currently used radio
systems. Achieving the latter will ensure that already invested resources are
preserved; also, developments and emerging technologies can be used in the
future.
The SECRICOM implementation principles were as follows:
– Provide value to end-users.
– Learn from end users.
– Provide new services and applications.
– Supplement existing technologies (not replace).
– Integrate with existing systems (like TETRA).
– Open interfaces to support extensibility (no vendor lock-in).
– Security built deep inside (not an afterthought).
– High availability/reliability.
– Throughout testing.
– Support of multiple bearers – MBR.
– Graceful degradation and QoS.
– On-site deployable infrastructure.
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SECRICOM architecture
The communication system architecture is smart and innovative concept
that allows technical interoperability, and in terms of this, is able to extend
communications across different agencies and across different countries. The
SECRICOM is also technically expandable, thus able to extend communica-
tions to places where it is usually not capable of achieving ubiquitous oper-
ations.
It is foreseen, that the features of SECRICOM project will impact directly
to communications systems and communication networks for Emergency
services, but the project’s results and technology could be used by civilian
markets as well.
SECRICOM system is based on following technologies:
– SECRICOM Silentel – a client-server communication system using IP
protocol. It optimizes and protects the way teams of people communicate
without being concerned about misuse of information. Regardless of whether
device is used to communicate, the connection is secure and safe. The basis of
the system is PTT technology, a two-way communication system, which works
like a two-way radio, however, with the possibility of transfering voice and
other data types (e.g. multimedia, text messages, control data, etc.).
– Secure Docking Module – in order to provide security for agents that dock
on to a trusted agent network, the SECRICOM project proposes the usage of
Secure layer based on hardware module so-called Secure Docking Module
(SDM). The design of SDM is based on Trust Computing principles.
– Secure Agent Infrastructure – designed for mobile services with agent-
like features (mobility, pro-activity) which would execute on secure devices. In
general, it consists of interconnected trusted (TS) and untrusted servers (US).
Each agent has features and “abilities”, which are used for the enactment of
certain processes. The processes enactment is designed for the management of
crisis situations in which information collection from multiple untrustworthy
environments is required.
– Communication Security Control Centre – collects information to assure
the secure status of the SECRICOM system, presenting it at a fixed location.
– Multi Bearer Router – an intelligent adaptive routing device enabling
seamless inter-networking in a multi-bearer, multi-node, mobile environment
designed to optimise network performance whenever users operate in environ-
ments where connectivity is poor
– IPv6 – All the modules developed for SECRICOM are eligible to cope with
an IPv6 environment. The modules like SECRICOM PTT, Secure Docking
Module, Multi-Bearer Router and Communication Security Control Centre are
capable of handling the IPv6. This protocol and its impact on secure communi-
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cation was studied and described in details by University Luxembourg. The
SECRICOM’s compatibility with the IPv6 is confirmed by IPv6 Forum, where
the IPv6 Silver Ready Logo have been awarded.
General SECRICOM network architecture is presented in the Figure 2.
Fig. 2. SECRICOM Network Architecture
Source: SECRICOM Deliverable D2.1 – Analysis of external and internal system requirements.
Push To Talk (SECRICOM Silentel)
SECRICOM Silentel is a client-server communication system. The applica-
tion has been designed to support the First Responders in their day-to-day
missions, as well as critical situations. The main aim of this solution is to
optimise and protect the communication between end users in a seamless way,
using existing infrastructure (incl. end users terminals and network infras-
tructure). The communication between endpoints is encrypted to prevent any
transmitted data (voice, text, images, position, status, etc) from misuse. The
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user requirements were defined in SECRICOM User Requirements1. The key
features include:
1. Voice communication.
a. One-to-one full duplex.
b. One-to-many half-duplex group call (Push To Talk).
2. Online group management.
3. Instant text messaging,
4. Smart text messaging.
5. Data delivery.
6. Video communication.
7. User location information and mapping, based on GPS.
The system is based on the IPv4/IPv6, which facilitates the system’s
scalability as well as integration with other technologies. The solution’s High
Level Architecture is given in the Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Secricom Silentel (PTT) high level architecture
Source: ARDACO dissemination materials.
Main parts of SECRICOM Silentel architecture are as follows:
– Communication Server – switching centre module to provide communica-
tion services to all system’s users.
– Certification Authority – trust module for server and users certification
creation, validation and revocation.
1 D2.1 – Analysis of external and internal system requirements.
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– Operator Studio – user management tool (incl. personal contact list
definition).
– End user application – software application to be deployed on end user’s
terminal. Currently several implementations on various operating systems are
available – incl. Symbian, Windows Mobile, iOS, Windows and Android.
– SECRICOM gateways – device to provide interoperability with some
legacy networks (e.g. TETRA, Citizen Band).
Multi-Bearer Router
The routers that are currently used in managing major incidents and crisis
situations tend to be inflexible and inefficient when it comes to meeting the
following requirements:
– Interfacing to selected communication systems which are taken into the
field.
– Interfacing to a number of communication systems which have survived
a major incident or were brought into the incident zone by a supporting
agency.
They do not provide a sufficient level of resilience to enable the business
processes and operations to continue to operate in areas where existing
communication systems and infrastructure are either destroyed by an incident
or poor in its original form.
The Multi-Bearer Router (MBR) technology has been designed to fill that
gap. It is an intelligent adaptive routing device enabling seamless inter-
networking in a multi-bearer, multi-node, mobile environment designed to
optimise network performance whenever users operate in environments where
the connectivity is poor. There is a need for SECRICOM solution to seamlessly
support different types of user traffic (with different QoS and security require-
ments) over different communication bearers (with a range of capabilities),
depending on the end user environment (e.g. disaster relief with ad hoc
communications, mobile working with dynamically changing access to com-
munications service provider networks). Leveraging legacy communication
systems is possible due to integrating together modern satellite communica-
tions, mature security, provisioning private networks, open architectures,
application persistence and ubiquitous mobile broadband. Conceptually, the
SECRICOM’s MBR performs two functions:
– Allows creating an efficient network-of-networks as the basis for busi-
ness focused traffic delivery (roaming-like) across different networks. This
network-of-networks is achieved by transparently integrating available com-
munication and network systems (both wireless and wired forms); and making
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intelligent and flexible traffic routing decisions based on multiple factors, e.g.
user application, availability and reliability of networks, effective bandwidth,
cost and security.
– Provides a gateway for SECRICOM end systems and devices to the
created network-of-networks through a single Service Access Point (SAP).
The MBR is independent of the type of traffic and is intelligent enough to
inhibit inappropriate data streams such as video, for example, over unsuitable
bearers whilst still maintaining the bearer usage for other systems. The
technology allows highly confidential data to always be routed over the TETRA
bearer. It simultaneously routes less sensitive high bandwidth data, such as
still photographs, video or CCTV images, over other high capacity bearers. If
one of these bearers is lost, the application routes seamlessly over an alterna-
tive bearer, with no need for user intervention and no interruption to the
service. The Multi-Bearer Router features a unique intelligent policy engine.
This constantly monitors the constituent network capabilities and modifies
traffic delivery policies dynamically according to pre-defined business needs
and the level of services available. This enables the user to automatically use
the available networks with the least impact on performance and without the
risk of security compromise. The flexible policies are tailored to meet objectives
such as operational imperatives, user needs and specific application require-
ments.
Key benefits include:
– Increases efficiency through provisioning of mobile broadband.
– Fast and reliable access to information for better situational awareness.
– Improves communication coverage.
– Prioritises business critical information flow.
– Supports minimal configuration in field.
– Provides unified access to all available communications services.
Secure Docking Module
Communication security is a well-established in today’s networked com-
puters. Security expert Eugene Spafford once said using secure communica-
tion technologies, such as SSL, is similar to “using an armored truck to
transport rolls of pennies between someone on a park bench and someone
doing business from a cardboard box”. This refers to the communication
channel being secure due to technologies like SSL and SSH, when used with
strong cryptographic algorithms such as RSA, elliptic curve cryptography and
AES. So what about the communication end-points? “Park benches” and
“cardboard boxes” have no place in a secure communication infrastructure,
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such as the one developed by the SECRICOM project. This is the gap that the
Secure Docking Module wants to close.
General purpose computing platforms such as PCs, laptops and mobile phones
are all vulnerable to over-the-network software attacks. The enormous amount of
known vulnerabilities in operating systems and applications is testament to this
vulnerability. A wide variety of malicious software is known to exploit such
vulnerabilities to take over unsuspecting computing platforms. Malicious sof-
tware on a computing platform used in crisis management is unacceptable. For
SECRICOM to be able to leverage the power of mobile computing platforms for
crisis management, as for example with the Secure Agent Infrastructure, the
security of the computing platforms must be established.
The Secure Docking Module is a platform-software-configuration verifica-
tion device. When malicious software infects a computing platform, it usually
integrates itself into the attacked platform. This integration changes the
platform software configuration. Now, if an external arbiter could detect this
change of software configuration, it might be able to deem the platform
insecure for use within a crisis management infrastructure. Thus, spreading of
the malicious software to other computing platforms in the network would be
hindered. The Secure Docking Module is just such an arbitration device.
The Secure Docking Module works in conjunction with the Trusted Dock-
ing Station. The Trusted Docking Station uses recent security additions to
commodity-of-the-shelf computing platforms to achieve two goals. First, the
Trusted Docking Station provides the ability to measure and attest a plat-
form’s software configuration. Second, it establishes a strongly isolated execu-
tion environment for crisis management applications. Thus, the Trusted
Docking Station is capable of reliably reporting its software configuration to
the Secure Docking Module. In addition, it provides an execution environment
where each software component is protected by virtualization technology form
other components of the system.
The Secure Docking Module provides the cryptographic resources required
to access the SECRICOM crisis management infrastructure. If a SECRICOM
software component wants to connect to the SECRICOM network it reports
the software configuration of its execution environment to the Secure Docking
Module. The Secure Docking Module then proceeds to check the integrity and
freshness of the platform software configuration report using cryptographic
algorithms. If the integrity and freshness of the report are verifiable, the
Secure Docking Module will validate the platform software configuration. Only
if the platform software configuration is valid, does the Secure Docking Module
provide its cryptographic resources to the Trusted Docking Station, and thus
to the SECRICOM software component. In this way only platforms with
a verified software configuration and approved applications are able to connect
to the SECRICOM infrastructure.
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Secure Agent Infrastructure
One of the challenges of the communication infrastructures for crisis
management is to add new smart functions to existing services which would
make the communication more effective and helpful for users. The aim is to
provide smart functions via distributed information systems which should
provide a secure distributed paradigm to achieve confidentiality and access to
resources. In the SECRICOM project requirements, design and implementa-
tion of such distributed information system – called Secure Agent Infrastruc-
ture (SAI) was enacted.
Requirements for such infrastructure were to provide a smart negotiating
system for parameterization and independent handling of access requests to
achieve rapid reaction. By fulfilling these goals a pervasive and trusted
communication infrastructure satisfying the requirements of crisis manage-
ment authorities and ready for immediate application was introduced. SAI
represents one of the core parts of the SECRICOM communication infrastruc-
ture.
In crisis situations there are requirements to collect information from
legacy systems of various organizations and from human operators in order to
semi-automatically manage the crisis mitigation process or to enact decisions
at various management levels. This collection of information must be enacted
in a secure manner while ensuring trust between both parties – information
consumers and information providers. Many actors participate in a crisis
situation. Information gathering is enacted by secure agents either from legacy
systems or from human end-users through mobile devices. Agent technology
was selected due to the ability to fulfill such requirements through support of
mobile and dynamically deployable executable code.
Additionally agents require safe secured place to store sensitive informa-
tion (such as cryptographic credentials) and provide interfaces to retrieve these
keys, ways to attest a platform and provide interface to safely communicate
with legacy systems – all these functionalities are provided to the agent
platform by a hardware module called Secure Docking Module (SDM) which
was also developed in scope of the Secricom projects.
The SDM allows agents to dock on a secure communication infrastructure
by ensuring the state of the device it is supporting. The SAI is a distributed
system and operates on confidential data. Therefore, the system must protect
its integrity against data loss/theft and data modification. In a distributed
system, data protection concerns are not limited to data transmission. As the
data is processed in different physical computing platforms it must be estab-
lished that all data processing entities adhere to the same security policy for
the data.
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The data security policy adherence is enforced by ensuring the software
configuration of a computing platform before it is connected to the SECRICOM
infrastructure. To this end the SDM protects communication keys and creden-
tial information and only releases this information to the host platform if this
platform is in an approved software configuration. The process of establishing
the fact that a platform has an approved software configuration is called local
attestation verification.
Conceptually, the SDM protects a small set of key pairs for asymmetric
cryptography, but in general is capable of protecting arbitrary data up to
a specific size. The SDM’s key protection facilities are a standard function,
which could already be implemented with today’s smart cards or hardware
security modules. The SDM extends this standard function by only releasing
these keys to a host device if and only if this host device is in a trusted state.
This host device is called Trusted Docking Stations (TDS).
Communication Security Monitoring and Control Centre
The main purpose of the Communication Security Monitoring and Control
Centre (CSMCC) is to provide Security Model, suitable for secure and in-
teroperable communications under crisis, which could be applied in the
SECRICOM communication infrastructure. The Security Model defines the
properties, capabilities, processes and controls that a secure infrastructure
should contain to protect against various threats.
Key features of SECRICOM Communication Security Monitoring and
Control Centre:
– Increased protection of assets: various protection mechanisms which
control access and usage policies, scalable network architecture, auditing tools,
and security assurance monitoring.
– Improved threat detection: new traffic patterns and event management
policies and correlation for anomalous events
– Enhanced reaction for hostile environments: increased network resil-
ience by enhancing IT structure, traffic blocking and isolating as well as
alternative routing
– Fast recovery for crisis critical communications: quick and efficient
recovering plans and mechanisms. One of the main strengths and unique
features of the CSMCC platform in SECRICOM is the set of custom agents
that have been deployed along the communication infrastructure. These
enhanced agents provide new detection and action capabilities, such as
adaptive routing features in case of network failure or congestion and VoIP
traffic monitoring.
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Additionally, Security Middleware Services and Framework was developed
to measure, document and maintain the security of SECRICOM services,
which are based on telecommunication services.
Designing the communication infrastructure security monitoring and con-
trol centre, started with a risk assessment of the SECRICOM system. It
consisted of a deep analysis of the operating system, in order to define key
assets, identify their security vulnerabilities and should risk occur, evaluate its
impact. The outcome of risk assessment was a set of security requirements
that the SECRICOM security model fulfils to provide an effective security
management. This has been supported by a team of users who updated and
validated these security requirements. The analysis of the security require-
ments results in a number of countermeasures and security mechanisms that
are used to mitigate the level of risk and protect the SECRICOM systems
against any kind of security threats. Finally, all these security principles and
guidelines are aggregated into the SECRICOM security model in order to
ensure continuous security of communication infrastructure in a continuous
way. The security model is supported by a security middleware named
Communication Security Monitoring and Control Centre (CSMCC) that pro-
vides not only a collection of security information and security status monitor-
ing capabilities, but also active control mechanisms. They provide enhanced
protection, improved detection, faster reaction and stronger risk mitigation,
more effective incident impact mitigation and quicker restoration.
Conclusions
In this article we considered the SECRICOM project as an answer to the
interoperability problems between first responders’ communication systems.
Those problems stem from different communication networks used by various
rescue services, low security level and thus high vulnerability to different
threats. The SECRICOM system was designed to provide unified, secure and
seamless communication between various end-users and to improve the effec-
tiveness of their work during crisis situation.
This paper provided a survey of all the technologies used within the
SECRICOM system. The SECRICOM project has successfully fulfilled all
requirements and designed a prototype capable of:
– Exploiting & optimizing existing communication systems.
– Enhancing interoperability among heterogeneous secure communication
systems.
– Enhancing interconnectivity between different networks and User Ac-
cess Devices.
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– Interfacing towards emerging SDR systems.
– Mitigating key capability gaps faced by users of existing systems.
Thus, the “Seamless Communication for Crisis Management” proof of
concept has been achieved. The SECRICOM has also been successfully demon-
strated to the stakeholders during national as well as European events,
including:
– BAPCO 2010 in Business Design Centre, London, UK.
– Civil Protection NATO Seminar in Lest Training Village, Slovakia.
– BAPCO 2011 in Business Design Centre, London, UK.
– ASTER 2011 in Żagań, Poland.
– SECRICOM demonstration 2012 in Portsmouth Technology Park, UK.
where the positive feedback have been received.
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A b s t r a c t
The SECRICOM Project as a communication system for operational crisis management, requires
paying significant attention to the requirements engineering phase. Any mistakes made during the
requirements gathering phase may affect the subsequent software development phases, which
creates excessive operational risks for the users of the system. These types of risks – as in any other
critical systems – could have serious consequences, such as inefficiency of rescue actions and loss of
lives.
This article presents the requirements engineering process, which was defined and carried out
for the needs of the SECRICOM project. It describes the system’s environment (the crisis manage-
ment reference structure and the main organizational rules) and its impact on the developed. As
a result, a requirements engineering process for SECRICOM is proposed. Finally, main points of
gathered requirements are presented.
WYMAGANIA UŻYTKOWNIKA DOTYCZĄCE SYSTEMU KRYTYCZNEGO –
PRZYPADEK SECRICOM
Shaun O’Neill1, Jim Strother1, Jan Zych2, Wojciech Wojciechowicz2,3
1 British Association of Public Salety Communications Officials
2 ITTI sp. z o.o., Poznań
3 Insytut Informatyki, Politechnika Poznańska
S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: SECRICOM, interoperacyjność, zarządzanie kryzysowe, inżynieria
wymagań, system krytyczny.
A b s t r a k t
W systemie SECRICOM, ze względu na tworzenie systemu komunikacji do operacyjnego
zarządzania kryzysowego, szczególnie ważne było położenie szczególnego nacisku na etap groma-
dzenia wymagań. Błędy popełnione na etapie specyfikacji wymagań mogą rzutować na kolejne etapy
wytwarzania systemu, co w rezultacie generuje nadmiarowe ryzyka dla użytkowników systemu.
Ryzyka te – jak w przypadku innych systemów krytycznych – mogą spowodować poważne konsek-
wencje, w tym obniżenie skuteczności akcji ratunkowych, a nawet straty po stronie ludności.
W artykule przedstawiono proces inżynierii wymagań, który zdefiniowano oraz przeprowadzono
na potrzeby projektu SECRICOM. Przedstawiono środowisko systemu (zarówno referencyjną struk-
turę zarządzania kryzysowego, jak i główne zasady organizacji) oraz określono wpływ na budowany
system. Na zakończenie przedstawiono główne wnioski z zebranych wymagań.
Introduction
This paper describes an approach to manage user requirements for the
mission critical application, which was developed within the SECRICOM
project. The main aim of the SECRICOM project is to propose a seamless and
secure reference communication platform for EU crisis management oper-
ations. For that purpose, the first step within the SECRICOM project was to
specify the requirements to be fulfilled by such a platform. As a result, not only
user requirements were specified, but also a methodology for managing user
needs for mission-critical application was created.
This article consists of four chapters. In the first chapter, the crisis
management structure used by SECRICOM to gather the requirements is
described. The second chapter explains the principles of crisis management
and its impact on the capability gap analysis. The third chapter presents
selected user requirements gathered in the SECRICOM project. The con-
clusions are provided in the fourth chapter.
Reference crisis management structure
In order to better address the user requirements, a reference crisis
management structure has been proposed within the SECRICOM project and
it is going to be described in this section. Typically, operational emergency
services use a 3-tier command structure. For that reason the same command
chain was proposed for the aim of collecting user requirements’ in SE-
CRICOM. Members of senior civil protection, and emergency service personnel
in the UK, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Poland, validated the
structure. All the aforementioned parties agreed that the basic operational
structure for the emergency services is similar, and it is based on three tiers:
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strategic command, tactical command and operational (called also ground
command). In the UK these tiers are represented by three types of metals
– Gold, Silver and Bronze – hence the colours in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Emergency Service Command Structure
Source: SECRICOM project.
The command structure has significant impact on gathering the user
requirements; not only in terms of functional requirements (e.g. circuit-
switched voice communication, Push To Talk, data transfer) but also non-
functional requirements (e.g. security requirements) – as confirmed during the
project.
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Principle of crisis management
Crisis management is a process carried out by public authorities in co-
operation with organisations, institutions and society in general, to cope with
the crisis and ensure broadly defined public safety. Assuming that crisis
management includes the whole sphere of the crisis situations, prevention
issues occurring before, during and after an event, it is taken that its process
should comprise of four permeating and highly connected fields of action that
all constitute four phases of the crisis management. In each phase, challenges
related to communication are identified. What’s more, each of them expects
different functionalities from communication. It seems that synthetic charac-
terisation of each phase is necessary. Decision making process within the crisis
management is greatly determined by the quality of system communication.
Fig. 2. Crisis management phases
Source: own elaboration based on http://oki.krakow.rzgw.gov.pl.
Prevention phase – the priority in this phase is to take actions, which will
eliminate or significantly decrease the probability of a crisis situation occur-
rence and reduce its consequences. The main objective of undertaken actions is
to foil the occurrence of a threat. Should it happen, the prevention phase will
focus on minimizing potential effects. Preventive actions mainly deal with the
risk analysis, predicting, spatial planning, strategic planning, realisation of
investments increasing safety, planning and developing preventive actions,
monitoring possible threatening events, systematic classification and identifi-
cation of a threat sources and evaluation of mental and technical state of the
society to the crisis management. However, there are threats which cannot be
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prevented, for example natural disasters. The only thing that can be done in
such situation is to minimise the effects. All actions in this phase are constant,
which plays an important role in the whole process of the crisis management. It
seems obvious that without properly organised communication the realisation
of prevention phase related tasks are impossible or at least very problematic.
In this phase, requirements concerning communication revolve around gather-
ing information from multiple sensors, its processing and developing preven-
tive measures.
Preparedness phase – deals with identification of a potential threats,
analysis of their character and probability of occurrence. In this phase, it is
crucial to formulate roadmaps and operation plans that would be executed
during the crisis situations, organise communication as well as warning and
alarm systems, establish crisis management centres and provide various
services and citizens with proper training of how to behave during the crisis
situation. Furthermore, in this phase, actions aiming at increasing manpower
and resources necessary for effective reactions are taken. One should remem-
ber that communication plans (usually formulated in several versions – for
instance in the event of damage of a part of communication infrastructure,
among others) shall be developed in this phase.
Response phase – is about taking actions initiating rescue services work,
directly responsible for eliminating or limiting the scope of arising crisis
situations, which should provide victims with necessary help and neutralize
sources of a threat. It’s a phase of practical actions that are taken in the event
of the crisis situation. Without compelling and well-organised communication
those actions cannot be taken efficiently. Properly organised communication is
a key to rescue actions. Constantly informing citizens about current situation
state is a vital element in the crisis management. Yet, it could not be generated
until efficient information flow is established. Taken actions are determined by
the character and the size of an event. At this stage all neglected elements from
previous phases can be noticed. Any faults or deficiencies in organisation
communication may cause great loses. Reacting relies on scrupulous event
analyses, designing set of possible solutions, taking right decisions and coor-
dinating works using means of communication.
Recovery phase – it covers actions, of which main objective is to recon-
struct infrastructure and strengthen its former state taking into consideration
gained experience so as not to let similar situation happen in the future. Such
actions rely on damage assessment, helping citizens, replenishing resources
and formulating conclusions. It is important to isolate those elements that
have been damaged or destroyed. Taken actions should focus not only on
eliminating the effects but also on removing causes determining the occur-
rence of a given crisis situation. There is a visible interdependence between the
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crisis management phases as mistakes made in the initial phases generate
negative consequences during decision making process. The borders between
certain crisis management phases are disappearing, which formulate decision
making to a continuous process.
From the communication system point of view, the most challenging is the
response phase. The response phase is characterized by a variety of emergency
plans that are put into action in order to rescue lives and minimize the damage
in a disaster or emergency situation. Response is the phase where actual rescue
actions are undertaken; these actions include search and rescue, risk assess-
ment, first responders’ actions (Ambulances, Fire brigade, Police, etc). Given
the unpredictability of natural disasters, this phase requires that first respon-
ders conduct rescue actions in real-time in order to stabilize the situation and
avoid further damage. Under these circumstances, the need for exchanging
information between participants of the rescue actions is undeniable. Another
important principle – from communication system perspective -is the decision
making process, as presented in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Crisis management decision making process
The crisis management structure was used in conjunction with the deci-
sion-making procedures to show how operational decisions are made. Starting
at the Situation Awareness, we can notice that the quality of information
available about the situation affects the quality of decision-making, which in
turn influences the quality of Command and Control orders and directions.
These should have a positive impact on the situation on the ground. New
information feeds the tactical and strategic commanders’ situational aware-
ness and the circular motion continues. This principle was used as a basis to
analyse the capability gap SECRICOM was intended to address.
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User requirements in SECRICOM
SECRICOM approach
After reviewing some of the most popular approaches to the requirements
engineering, it was decided that none of them fully meets SECRICOM project’s
needs. As a result, a dedicated approach to the requirement engineering
process has been developed within the project. The high-level overview of this
approach is presented in the Figure 4.
Fig. 4. SECRICOM Requirements Gathering
Source: own elaboration.
The approach used in SECIRCOM is summarized as follows:
– At the beginning, user requirements are collected from an initial scenario
(report or debriefing of an incident). From these URs a new scenario is
generated. Afterwards, an iterative process of extracting user requirements
that improve the given scenario begins.
– System requirements are selected form the URs, which defines the
technology development required.
– Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) are considered the URs that
concern exchange of information; IERs are used in gap analysis.
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– When an IER is not supported by the existing technology, it is considered
a technology capability gap and a new requirement for technology improve-
ments is elicited.
User Focus
Since the SECRICOM project from the very beginning was user-oriented,
a User Team had been established for collecting requirements. The team had
representatives from various countries as well as agencies to ensure that
a complete spectrum of issues is addressed within the project. The B-APCO
was responsible for leading this group.
The User Team comprised representatives from Spain, Sweden and UK.
These individuals reflected a variety of roles and responsibilities in terms of
national, regional and local first responders’ agencies. Furthermore, between
the members of the user group, they held a range of senior, middle and junior
management roles within Fire, Police and Local Authority agencies.
Users constitute the most important source of information in SECRICOM,
because it was possible to obtain from them experience based statements,
remarks and suggestions from individuals well versed in crisis management
and in terms not only of functional requirements, but also non-functional, incl.
security requirements for communications assets needed during a major crisis.
IER
In this section Information Exchange Requirements are presented and
their use and benefit for defining the requirements for crisis management
communication technologies is described.
Information Exchange Requirements (IER) are defined as “the description,
in terms of characteristics of the requirement to transfer information between
two or more end users. The characteristics described include source, recipients,
contents, size, timeliness, security and trigger. IERs are defined to be indepen-
dent of the communications medium. An IER can express both current and
future requirements” (http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-340/paper03.pdf).
Therefore, the purpose of the IERs is to provide structured means for
establishing the capability gap and thus defining new requirements. An IER is
the Unconstrained User Requirement for Information Exchange, thus IERs
shall be technology, system and solution independent. IERs are used in
capability gap analysis to model URs, which may (or not) be supported by
current technology solutions. In order to capture the IERs about an activity or
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actor, it is necessary to have a well-defined set of URs, and most importantly,
these URs should be independent of the technology or system.
To capture the IERs in SECRICOM, the following approach has been
applied:
– Define a set of User Requirements – describe what users want to
achieve.
– A representative Scenario brings URs to life.
– The Scenario is broken down into Activities.
– Activities are recorded as IERs.
– Each activity has one or more IERs associated with it.
– IERs fall into Situational Awareness or Command and Control.
Every operational need for a piece of information to be transferred from
one place or person to another has been captured. Then IERs were used in
a realistic scenario to ensure that all relevant activities were represented – and
in particular to allocate them into Situation Awareness or Command and
Control.
IER capture was done in an in-depth exercise during the User Team
Exercise in September 2009. In total, over 700 IERs were captured, providing
information across a range of criteria including:
– Source & Destination (of a piece of information).
– Information Type (e.g. voice, message, image).
– Size (associated with the Information Type).
– Timeliness expressed in the worst case as delivery time.
These criteria were complemented with qualitative data on:
– Criticality.
– Confidentiality.
– Other analysis attributes (e.g. business function).
The complexity of the information exchange is illustrated in Fig. 5, which
shows the mapping of IERs to the scenario node location mappings. These
location nodes represent a town, a chemical plant, school area, authority areas
of different countries, etc. The Fig. 6 presents information flow associated with
the scenario and demonstrates co-ordination and liaison with neighbouring
country’s units and information flows from operational to strategic and fixed
infrastructure nodes.
On the other hand, the demand for services – with respect to the agency
and command level – have been captured and aggregated. As foreseen, the
voice was predominant (for each command level and agency) while the access
to the internet was less valuable; those results have confirmed the expectations
from interviews. Detailed results are presented in Figure 6.
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During the next step, the IERs were developed from the URs analysed in
the context of a scenario, and used to model existing communications
architecture and to identify which IERs would be supported by the current
architecture. Any unsupported IERs would tend to indicate a Capability
– and therefore an Interoperability – shortfall (see Fig. 7 below).
Fig. 7. Capability gap analysis process
Source: SECRICOM Information Exchange Requirements 1.0.
Gap analysis
The purpose of the gap analysis in the SECRICOM project was to find the
problems of existing communication technologies when used in crisis situ-
ations, and mitigate key capability gaps faced by users of existing systems.
The SECRICOM project addressed not only existing capabilities but also new
ones. SECRICOM provides value added through finding new requirements for
future technology developments. This is achieved at the overlap between
existing and future infrastructure and systems, as illustrated in Figure 8.
To perform gap analysis a realistic operational scenario was used, user
requirements were formulated and then IERs were extracted from URs.
User requirements were extracted from the following sources:
– Interviews with end-users.
– Scenario-based demonstrations.
IERs provided the communications requirements upon which the technical
development would be based – and which would also direct the final demon-
stration.
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The idea was to identify URs that are not met by existing communication
systems and mark it as a capability gap. In this way, the capability gaps provide
the value added by SECRICOM as they are interpreted as system requirements
for technological development.
Additionally, in the SECRICOM the capability gap approach was used as
a basis to develop URs and was verified in a demonstration test.
Fig. 8. SECRICOM added value
Source: SECRICOM project.
Fig. 9. Requirements within the SECRICOM project
Source: Security requirements user workshop – Report.
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In order to demonstrate the significance of the capability gap outcome.
A comparison between the SECRICOM User Requirements and current
communications systems (e.g.: TETRA, TETRAPOL, WiMAX, CB,
GSM/UMTS) capabilities needed to be made. This comparison established the
difference / delta between where the capability shortfall exists and where
SECRICOM could add value. As it was explained previously, in the SE-
CRICOM project user requirements were created from the scenario through an
iterative process. Those URs, on the other hand, were feeding the system
requirements. Selection of the appropriated system requirements defined
the technology development required. A vignette or mini-scenario, together
with the new technology capability, formed the final demonstration. Figure 9
presents the methodology used for acquiring system requirements.
Security requirements
Another aspect that has been discussed through the analysis is security.
Security was always an integral part of the project. To correctly address the
security requirements, a workshop – dedicated just to security issues – with the
user team was conducted. The requirements that emerged are framed around
a crisis management structure; the security requirements vary on each of the
three levels of command chain. Furthermore, the impact analysis was per-
formed; hence the operational capabilities related with each asset have been
established, referring to:
– Saving lives.
– Ability to conduct emergency services.
– Provision of local contingency services.
– Impact on judicial proceedings.
– Impact on foreign relations.
Additionally the security requirements in terms of confidentiality, integrity
and availability have been established for the most important services, namely:
– File transfer (documents).
– Messaging (Email, Data/Image).
– Video.
– Voice.
– Access to the Internet.
The outcome of the security assessment was understanding of how import-
ant the identified factors are to the users. Bellow the main results achieved by
the security assessment are summarised:
– Voice communications at all 3 levels of command, and between agencies,
are seen as critical. It requires the highest level of security in terms of
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.
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– Messages and file transfer are seen as the second important.
– Access to the Internet is the least valued.
– Integrity, across all 3 command levels, is seen as a key requirement
(voice in particular) for all communications assets.
In comparison to Integrity and Availability, Confidentiality is considered
a less important requirement.
– Availability.
– Voice viewed as essential.
– Messaging and file transfer more important than video and web.
The following charts (Fig. 10, Fig. 11, Fig. 12) illustrate the results at
strategic, tactical and operational level considering the impact perspective on
confidentiality, integrity and availability, for the most dominant services.
Fig. 10. Security requirements at strategic level
Source: Security requirements user workshop – Report.
The key findings of the IER exercised as a whole are:
– Overall voice is predominant (~ 50%), messaging is next (~ 25%).
– Voice more concentrated at operational level – decreases higher up the
command chain.
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– Data more concentrated at strategic level – decreases lower down the
command chain.
– Specific increased need was identified for image and video capabilities at
operational level.
– Intra-Agency communications are key at all levels of command.
– Inter-Agency communications account for nearly a quarter of all IERs.
Fig. 11. Security requirements at tactical level
Source: Security requirements user workshop – Report.
– Situational Awareness provides the greatest proportion of IERs (~ 59%).
– Ratio of Command & Control to Situational Awareness distorted due to
voice.
– Data versions of the same IER (driven by the need of audit trail).
– Voice remains the most significant IER data type for both Command
& Control and Situational Awareness (Situational Awareness demands
a greater use of non-voice data types).
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Fig. 12. Security requirements at operational level
Source: Security requirements user workshop – Report.
Conclusions
In this article an approach to elicitation, analysis and validation of user
requirements for critical system has been presented. A brief review through
most popular approaches to the user requirements have been given, taking
into account its use in the SECRICOM project. The system environment (incl.
structure, principles and decision making process in crisis management) was
analysed and results were reflected in the proposed process.
Afterwards a detailed description of SECRICOM requirements gathering
process has been provided. This process is based on three complementary
approaches:
– Permanent monitoring of the technical innovations in terms of their adapta-
tion in the area of crisis management, with the particular focus on the
communication area.
– Use of scenarios – historical knowledge to develop two types of scenarios that
verify the effectiveness of particular features:
– Generic scenarios,
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– Anticipation scenarios (which assume a range of possible outcomes).
– Gap analysis.
This approach combines both retrospective and prediction elements. On
top of that, it allows to monitor and proper address important changes in
communication domain.
The most important change in crisis management communication is
a growing use of ICT systems. Although symptoms of these changes were
evident for many years, the current state of telecommunications infrastructure
allows to offer a wide range of new services, such as analysis of connections in
real-time, video telephony, use of new source of information (e.g. social
networks) or dynamic group management.
Finally, the requirements obtained were presented. The results were
presented for each command chain level. There was a particular focus on
security issues, since they were found critical in crisis management field.
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A b s t r a c t
In the present article selected telecommunication aspects in the area of crisis management are
exposed. In particular, the focus is put on the response phase, since there are new challenges at the
junction of organisational and technical layers, incl. interoperability, new functionalities and models.
Those aspects have not been exhaustively tested in real situations; thus such issues still require
multiple testing, verification and validation. In this article the communication problems are collated
with new solutions, such as the use of cloud computing, social media and additional functionalities to
increase the security level. The main aim of this article is to introduce challenges, as well as new
opportunities provided by the implementation of new Information and Communication Technologies
in the area of crisis management.
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A b s t r a k t
W artykule opisano wybrane problemy telekomunikacyjne, które identyfikuje się w obszarze
zarządzania kryzysowego. Szczególny nacisk położono na fazę reagowania. Na styku warstwy
organizacyjnej i technicznej pojawiają się nowe problemy, np. z interoperacyjnością, nowymi funk-
cjonalnościami technicznymi, które nie zostały jeszcze dostatecznie sprawdzone w praktyce, a to
wymaga wielowątkowych badań. Autorzy diagnozują problemy z obszaru łączności, uwzględniając
takie zagadnienia, jak: zastosowanie chmury obliczeniowej, wykorzystanie sieci społecznościowych
czy implementacji nowych funkcjonalności na podstawie istniejącej infrastruktury telekomunikacyj-
nej. Głównym celem artykułu jest przedstawienie zarówno wyzwań, jak i szans dla zarządzania
kryzysowego, płynących z nowych rozwiązań teleinformatycznych.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a significant change in the perception of
challenges in the field of crisis management (CM). Instead of focusing on
a major incident, there is a trend to draw special attention to several smaller
incidents, which overlap/accumulate in a relatively short period of time.
A perfect example illustrating this were the national crisis management
system exercises – LIBERO II, organised by the Government Security Centre
in collaboration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the PL.2012 com-
pany. During the event many scenarios were practiced, incl. energy failure,
a disaster on an expressway, removing the effects of civil unrest after the
football match. The scope of the exercises did not refer to one big event, but to
many events that correlated with each other.
Furthermore, there is an increasing awareness of other crisis management
aspects, such as use of modern information and communication technology,
and the search for communication platforms able to provide adequate func-
tionalities. News from social networks is of great importance, and is exception-
ally useful during decision making process. It turns out, that the first thing
that accidental witnesses tend to do is to post multimedia material on social
networks, instead of reporting it to the appropriate crisis management agen-
cies. Thus, there is a need for crisis management agencies to permanently
monitor those social networks with respect to extraction of useful, up to date
and unique pieces of information about given incident. In certain cases, it may
become the only factual evidence.
The main scientific problem was to identify communication challenges in
the field of crisis management, and to propose new solutions in this field. In the
article the focus was put on broad context of crisis management rather than on
a single incident.
Challenges in crisis management
Crisis management involves the coordination of activities by different
groups in an effort to avoid or minimize disaster impact. This section describes
the challenges that need to be confronted by crisis management in order to be
more effective. There are four phases in crisis management:
– prevention,
– preparedness,
– response,
– recovery (PIĄTEK 2006).
Where the most challenging – from the crisis management communication
system perspective – is the response phase. That is the area where rescue
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actions are executed; given the specificity of the domain, this phase is the most
dynamic. It is very difficult to precisely plan the response in advance, since it is
not possible to predict when and where crises will occur. In fact, response
actions always need to be undertaken in real time. Moreover, disasters often
affect communication systems (e.g. natural disasters like floods or fires can
seriously harm infrastructure). Therefore, the least that can be done is to
prepare for the effects.
When it comes to ensuring communication between all stakeholders re-
sponsible for crisis management it is important to identify threats in real time,
and coordinate the rescue actions accordingly to them. Participation of the
Police, National Fire Service and Emergency Medical Service in training
exercises confirmed that when an incident occurs, the number of connections
to the crisis management centres increases significantly. It means that re-
quests with the same content but through different channels (text, voice,
video) are made. Quick extraction of the most important part from each
message, its processing and passing to the decision makers, responsible for
coordinating rescue actions in the crisis management centres, is extremely
challenging, both at technical and organisational levels.
On top of that, multiple agencies as well as volunteers and passers-by are
involved in the actions at the crisis scene. This creates yet another challenge
which is the need to ensure communication and effective flow of information
between them. That, combined with the response phase characteristics, puts
an additional pressure on communication systems.
Furthermore, crisis management involves the execution of very broad and
diverse actions. Possible incidents include:
– riots during mass event,
– natural disasters (earthquake, avalanche, flood, wildfire),
– man-made/terrorist attack/confrontations,
– workplace violence/misdeeds,
– accidents (crashes on land, sea and air).
For those incidents – each supporting by technology – a number of
challenges might be identified. In high level of abstraction, they can be
categorised into technical and organisational ones, often influencing each
other. The key technical challenges include (Metody sztucznej inteligencji.
2009, ŚWIĄTNICKI, ŚWIĄTNICKI 1992):
– insufficient spectrum of services,
– lack of interoperability between various ICT systems,
– security aspects,
– managing user groups in real-time,
– effective information dissemination (incl. notifications to the population),
while the organisational:
– units autonomy,
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– frequency allocation,
– cooperation with telecommunication operators,
– improving the work of the international community in several areas,
such as decision making and situational awareness.
First responders have invested in many – often incompatible – telecom-
munication solutions. As a result, the possibility of exchanging information in
an effective way has been reduced. In the next sections we will discuss the
aforementioned technical challenges.
The technical challenges in the field of crisis management
This section provides a short description of technical challenges in the crisis
management field. The current status of technical challenges is presented first,
then a short description of future perspectives is given; and at the end we
provide examples of how difficult crises are becoming with the purpose of
illustrating the need for confronting the technical challenges.
State of the art
As it was stated previously, the response phase puts an extra pressure on
the telecommunication systems. Unpredictability of time and place results in
urgent needs for extra capabilities at the incident scene.
On top of that, agencies and some command chain levels have different user
requirements – not only functional requirements which may concern different
spectrum of services available but also non-functional (like security or perform-
ance). Additionally, the requirements may vary depending on the incident type.
Recently some investments have been done in various technologies sup-
porting first responders. However, these investments have been done without
taking into consideration the exchange of information between different crisis
management actors; hence there is no unification of infrastructure, end-user
devices and software applications. As a result, full interoperability is not
achievable.
Perspectives
Currently, there is no single vision for the crisis management telecommuni-
cation system. Many agencies have done some technology updates without
obtaining the consent of other stakeholders. There is also a lack of a perfect
telecommunication solution, which will meet the needs of each stakeholder
Wojciech Wojciechowicz et al.104
(in terms of characteristics and costs). Furthermore, such a solution have not
been designed yet.
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) is an open standard, created
by ETSI for dispatching digital radio-telephone communication [(Terrestrial
Trunked Radio (TETRA)a]. It could be said that TETRA is the optimal
choice; but its efficiency is still doubtful. One may notice that this solution is
getting more and more “mature”, and not even TEDS [(Terrestrial Trunked
Radio (TETRA)b] (TETRA Enhanced Data Services) may guarantee the
sufficient bandwidth when multimedia services are in use. Also the costs
(both implementation and maintenance costs) are believed to be drawbacks of
TETRA.
Crisis globalisation
The larger and larger crises, the greater number of agencies need to be
involved, which puts an extra pressure on the crisis management communica-
tion system. The incidents (esp. natural ones, like floods and wildfire) also
occur in cross-border areas, which require greater cooperation between na-
tions as rescue actions involve rescue teams from several countries (vide
Central European flooding in 1997 and 2010 or Haiti earthquake and Katrina
hurricane in USA).There are also other types of incidents, such as terrorist
attacks (incl. Madrid train bombings on 11 March, 2004, 2011 Norway attacks,
7/7 London bombings) or cyber threats (incl. attacks on SCADA systems) that
have already become crises.
The crises also vary in terms of specific telecommunication needs and
background, e.g.
– Prevention of disorders (e.g. riots during mass events) – a large number
of volunteers are engaged, as well as third-party organisations (incl. personal
security). Due to law requirements (e.g. banned access to the event for selected
persons) the access to external databases would be appreciated.
– Flood – mostly involves several agencies – and also third-party organisa-
tions (e.g. construction companies) as well as volunteers, but it is almost
impossible to indicate them in advance. Thus, there is a need for quick and
seamless inclusion of new actors into the system. Another very important
feature is the notification of residents. That could reduce disinformation as
well as improve the coordination at the scene.
– Terrorist attack – where behaviour detection would have great import-
ance. Audit trial could be very useful for public prosecutors. Different security
requirements could be defined, since e.g. confidentiality may play a great role.
Also actor localisation could be useful not only in terms of coordinating the
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rescue teams, but also rescuing the victims (using e.g. their mobile phones)
(Bezpieczeństwo... 2009).
The importance of ICT in crisis management is undeniable; communication
is necessary in order to achieve effective coordination. ICT provides efficient
coordination of activities, the sharing of information between organisations
working at the scene as well as access to new data and databases, such as
images, maps, and infrastructure information. The role of ICT is getting
broader, since not only new threats are identified, but also new opportunities
are visualised.
New opportunities for crisis management
Nowadays, crisis management is not able to operate efficiently without the
support of the state of the art ICT. In order to find an optimal operation model
in crisis management it becomes more frequent to take the advantage of
various technological innovations (e.g. trusted computing and agent-based
infrastructure) or organisational solutions (e.g. cloud computing). In this
section, an outline of new technological opportunities for improving crisis
management is provided.
Mobile technologies
Currently, mobile technology is advancing rapidly, both in terms of mobile
phone popularity and capabilities. Modern mobile devices (palmtops, mobile
phones, etc.) are capable of performing tasks that used to be reserved for
personal computers.
With regard to capabilities, there is a marked trend to integrate hitherto
separate devices into a single solution. Modern mobile devices are often
equipped with auto-focus, a digital camera with several Mega pixels, Full HD
video recording possibility (such resolution was barely achievable for dedicated
digital cameras just a couple of years ago); moreover, these devices have several
GBs of internal storage (with possibility to further increase using flash
memory). Combined with broadband (e.g. based on HSDPA or WiFi b/g/n) data
transmission and access to modern services (e.g.: online maps (even with
traffic information and predictions), weather forecast or social media) mobile
phones are considered to be a great tool in crisis management, used not only
for communication between responders, but also for dissemination of informa-
tion among the public in general (FICOŃ 2007).
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Social media
Social media is set of technologies that allow people to exchangemultimedia
information. Despite the fact that the information in social media comes from
sources that are not verified, social media allow people to exchange informa-
tion, ideas, opinions and experience. Therefore, social media has become very
popular and this trend is growing.
The example of the 2010 flooding in Central Europe emphasizes the
importance of using social media during crises situations. Citizens of the
Bydgoszcz city in Poland were using a forum to inform each other about the
water level; this source of information was much more effective than official
communiques in traditional media. Nevertheless, with the growing popularity
of social media, this information could be disseminated even faster -using
applications like Facebook, Twitter, Web log and others. Comparing social
media to internet forums, one may notice that the former one allows to
exchange information almost in real time e.g. through smartphones. The cost
in terms of development and maintenance of infrastructure as well as dissemi-
nating the information to many recipients is negligible, since social media does
not require any additional costs apart from the Internet connection bills.
Cloud computing
Another new opportunity for crisis management is the use of dedicated
services in modern business models – cloud computing. The main idea behind
cloud computing is to provide services from remote centres using the Internet
as a communication channel. In other words, cloud computing provides
applications that run on the Internet. Cloud computer services are divided into
four models, according to the capability provided (VOORSLUYS et al. 2011):
– IaaS – Infrastructure as a Service. This model provides all the equipment
needed by an organisation to support operations, it includes hardware, servers,
storage and network components. In this model, the cloud provider is respon-
sible for maintaining the equipment.
– PaaS – Platform as a Service. In this model, cloud providers deliver
a computing platform including an operating system, a programming language
execution environment, database and web server. With PaaS applications
developers can design, run and debug their software solutions on a cloud
platform, and do not have to worry about buying and maintaining the
hardware and software layers.
– SaaS – Software as a Service. It comprises software applications that are
installed on the cloud and that can be accessed by cloud users. Since the
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software applications are located on central hosts, the cloud users can access
them through a browser. In SaaS, users do not have to maintain the data and
infrastructure on which the application is running e.g. games, google docs,
e-mail, etc.
– BPaaS – Business Process as a Service. This model includes any business
processes delivered as a service over the Internet (for example, payroll,
printing, e-commerce) and accessible by multiple web-enabled interfaces and
devices such as PC, tablets and smartphones.
Cloud computing could contribute to crisis management by facilitating
information sharing among first responders at different management levels
(central, regional and local), and making the emergency notification more
accessible to the public. Additionally, cloud computing reduces costs when it
comes to data storage and recovery after a disaster. Companies that own the
infrastructure locally could be severely affected by a disaster as their server
may be permanently destroyed and backup may be lost. In the case of
a disaster affecting a cloud computing data centre, user data will not be lost
since suppliers of cloud infrastructure replicate user data and cloud servers
across multiple data centres.
Furthermore, the data stored on the cloud is highly secured by cloud
providers. In the data centres, the integrity of the information is protected
with power generators, monitoring systems and 24/7 security personnel as well
as technical specialists.
There is a wide range of possible cloud computing applications in crisis
management. It not only improves the current services (in terms of e.g. costs,
scalability, confidentiality, availability, security, redundancy and perform-
ance), but also provides new opportunities.
Commercial ICT in crisis management
In the previous section selected new opportunities for crisis management
have been presented. Mostly they are related to the use of commercial ICT
equipment in the field of public safety. Even if the infrastructure is designed
for commercial use, it still can bring significant value to the crisis management
field.
Current telecommunication infrastructures (e.g.: WiMAX, 3G, LTE or even
WiFi) enables a wide range of services desirable in the crisis management field,
like:
– (broadband) IP transmission,
– high capabilities:
– many simultaneous voice calls,
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– video calls,
– broadband data transmission,
– low latency,
– low error-rate,
– redundancy,
– positioning services,
– access to external data sources,
– a wide range of compatible, off-the-shelf devices,
– great network coverage (almost 100% in EU),
– access to numerous external services, incl.:
– social networks,
– on-line maps,
– current traffic information and forecast,
– weather forecasts (FICOŃ 2007).
At the same time, it provides an easy (often cost-effective) possibility to
implement additional services:
– increased encryption,
– audit trial,
– information broadcast,
– online group management.
Further actions and conclusions
In this article selected challenges as well as opportunities in crisis manage-
ment have been presented. The authors have underlined the possibility to use
commercial infrastructure – with respective risks and chances – in the crisis
management field.
The aim of this article has been achieved by identification of new function-
alities for communication systems in crisis management, at the junction of the
organisational and technical layers. The research is presented in a general
context, with the focus on a number of innovations that can be adopted in the
area of crisis management (e.g., social media, cloud computing, mobile
phones). Current results are proofs of concepts rather than ready-to-use
solutions. In addition, various approaches have been undertaken, incl. short,
medium and long-term solutions, but no common vision has been established.
It is worth mentioning that no ultimate telecommunication solution for
crisis management is available or expected to appear soon. As for today, the
research on this problem has been undertaken by several initiatives – incl.
research FP7 projects like:
– SAFECOM,
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– EULER – EUropean Software Defined radio for wireless in joint security
operations,
– MESA – Mobile Broadband for Public Safety,
– HIT-GATE – HIT-GATE – Heterogeneous Interoperable Transportable
GATEway for First-Responders,
– SECRICOM – Seamless Communication for Crisis Management for EU
safety,
– FREESIC – Free Secure Interoperable Communications.
However, the problem is still open.
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A b s t r a c t
Modern communication and computing devices have the potential to increase the efficiency of
disaster response. Mobile agents and seamless push-to-talk communication embody decentralised
and flexible technologies to leverage this potential. While mobile agent platforms are facing greater
variety of security risks compared to a classical client-server approach, trusted computing is capable
of alleviating these problems. This document describes design and integration of a Secure Agent
Infrastructure (SAI) with a Secure Docking Module (SDM) based on trusted computing principles for
crisis management support. SDM provides a single chip security device that replaces the centralized
trust decision and point with a suitable distributed solution. The main goal of SDM is protecting
information. The protected information is only released to a requesting host device if the host is in
a trusted state and adheres to a specific set of policies. SAI relies on the crypto-material protected by
SDM thus the mobile agent can be unsealed only if the host machine is in the trusted state. The paper
introduces the SDM and SAI technologies, describes motivation of SDM usage, provides summary of
the key concepts behind the SDM and SAI. Further we provide analysis of requirements and security
considerations as well as the integration points of the proposed architecture with other involved
systems and the communication adapters between agents and other legacy systems. The last section
concludes the article and presents our current achievements in integration and demonstration of the
proposed technologies.
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S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: mobilny system agentowy, trusted computing, zarządzanie kryzysowe.
A b s t r a k t
Współczesne rozwiązania teleinformatyczne mogą istotnie zwiększyć efektywność działań
w sytuacjach kryzysowych. Systemy mobilnych agentów oraz „bezszwowa” komunikacja push-to-talk
stanowią zdecentralizowane oraz elastyczne technologie wnoszące nową jakość do tej domeny.
Rozwiązania oparte na mobilnych systemach agentowych są bardziej narażone na różnorodne
zagrożenia w porównaniu z klasycznym rozwiązaniem klient–serwer; podatności te jednak mogą być
redukowane dzięki zastosowaniu rozwiązań typu Trusted Computing. W artykule przedstawiono
budowę oraz integrację Secure Agent Infrastructure (SAI) z Secure Docking Module (SDM) na
podstawie zasad Trusted Computing. Rozwiązanie prezentowane w artykule jest przeznaczone do
wsparcia zarządzania w sytuacjach kryzysowych. Głównym celem SDM jest ochrona informacji.
Chroniona informacja jest udostępniania innym hostom tylko i wyłącznie, gdy znajdują się w stanie
zaufanym oraz są w zgodności z określonym zestawem polityk.
W artykule opisano technologie SDM oraz SAI oraz uzasadniono stosowanie SDM. Przed-
stawiono także najważniejsze zagadnienia związane z SDM oraz SAI. Ponadto przeanalizowano
wymagania oraz zagadnienia związane z bezpieczeństwem; wskazano także możliwości integracji
zaproponowanej architektury z innymi systemami oraz urządzeniami komunikacyjnymi między
agentami a tradycyjnymi systemami. W ostatniej części artykułu podsumowano jego treść oraz
przedstawiono obecne osiągnięcia w dziedzinie integracji oraz demonstracji zaproponowanych tech-
nologii.
Introduction
Modern communication and computing devices have the potential to
increase the efficiency of disaster response. Mobile agents and seamless
push-to-talk communication embody decentralised and flexible technologies to
leverage this potential. While mobile agent platforms are facing greater variety
of security risks compared to a classical client-server approach, trusted com-
puting (TC) is capable of alleviating these problems. Unfortunately, remote
attestation, a core concept of TC, requires a powerful networked entity to
perform trust decisions. The existence and availability of such a service in
a disaster response scenario cannot be relied upon. One of the challenges of the
communication infrastructures for distributed systems is to add new smart
functions to existing services which would make the communication more
effective and helpful for users. The aim is to provide smart functions via
distributed IT systems which should provide a secure distributed paradigm to
achieve confidentiality and access to resources. Such infrastructure should
further provide a smart negotiating system for parameterization and indepen-
dent handling of access requests to achieve rapid reaction. A good application
of proposed system provides crisis management support that requires existing
information from legacy systems of various organizations and from human
operators in order to semi-automatically manage the crisis mitigation process
or to enact decisions at various management levels. This information collection
must be enacted in a secure manner while ensuring trust between both parties
– information consumers and information providers. Many actors participate
Emil Gatial et al.112
in a crisis situation, the competences and responsibilities of all parties are
explicitly defined in a crisis mitigation plan. Information gathering is enacted
either from legacy systems or from human end-users through mobile devices
by guided dialog.
Several crisis response systems have been successfully built using multi-
agent paradigm and other systems are being developed. Systems like DrillSim
(BALASUBRAMANIAN 2006), DEFACTO (MARECKI 2005) and Mobile-FIRST
(HONDA 2009) were developed to simulate disaster situation using software
agents enabling human actors to act more effectively. More realistic deploy-
ment of agent system was developed in the ALADDIN project (JENNINGS 2010)
demonstrating the usefulness of decentralised and autonomous agent behav-
iour in the disaster management domain. VOYAGER (2011) communication
platform delivers highly collaborative, dynamic, cross-platform applications
and infrastructure for all business situations without the need of overwhelm-
ing modification of underlying corporate information systems. Specific use of
mobile agents was presented in VEMPR system (MARTIN-CAMPILLO 2009)
dealing with reliable access to medical records of victims and in PA-UWNT
research project (KOPENA 2005) managing communication in mobile ad-hoc
network project and Web-service based applications.
In this article we focus mainly on the concepts of security and trust used in
Secure Agent Infrastructure (SAI) developed in the scope of SECRICOM
integrated EU project (SECRICOM 2012). The goal of presented SAI is to
enable easy collaboration and information sharing among actors in crisis
situation, with an emphasis on security and trust of the information. In the
following chapter, we present the architecture of SAI communication platform
that deals with secure and trusted data collection during the crisis mitigation.
We describe concepts of Secure Docking Module (SDM) and Trusted Comput-
ing approaches establishing trusted computing environment for SAI. Final
part is devoted to description integration of SAI and SDM and to description of
testing infrastructure. We conclude with achievements of SAI and SDM
integration.
Architecture Design
We present a distributed architecture designed for the management of
crisis situations where multiple actors are involved from various organizations
with different competences and communicating over IP-based networks in-
cluding wireless. We decided to design and implement such an architecture
using agent paradigm. The distributed agent-based infrastructure is designed
as a collection of software services with agent-like features (such as code
Securing Agents Using Secure Docking Module 113
Fig. 1. An overview of Secure Agent Infrastructure applied in crisis management scenario
mobility) which would execute in a secure and trusted manner. Agent technol-
ogy was selected due to the ability to fulfill such requirements through support
of mobile and dynamically deployable executable code. Other advantages of
agent-based systems are that they can help overcoming temporal or longer
term communication network failures, save network bandwidth by being
executed remotely and deliver only the execution results, provide means to
execute code on remote host platforms in a trusted and secure manner or
deploy code on host platforms on demand. The role of agents in the architec-
ture is primarily coordinated collection of information. Information gathering
is enacted either from legacy systems or from human end-users through mobile
devices by guided dialog. With respect to requirements the overall agent
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infrastructure must be a secure, robust and failure resistant system. Because
validity and authenticity of gathered information is a key factor for decision
making in crisis management, trust must be set between agents and third
party information systems. Also, agents must trust the host platform
providers. The required level of trust for agents is based on a special hardware
module – SDM providing TC functionality.
The home platform for agents is a network of Trusted Servers (TS) as it is
depicted in the above figure (Fig 1). There are many different users involved in
crisis management. Each type of user has a different level of responsibility,
performs different tasks and requires different information (CRADDOC 2008).
Gold Commanders who are in charge of producing strategy require informa-
tion about the incident and about its effects on the wider area. They rarely
need to make instant decisions, so have some time available to absorb
information. Silver and Bronze Commanders are usually located closer to an
incident site and need more detailed information about the incident and the
resources available to them, as they have to turn the Gold-level strategy into
a response, but are not as concerned with events outside the incident. They
may have to make quick decisions as events unfold. Response Team Com-
manders and responders who are implementing a response have limited time
in which to take in information and, as such, only need information relative to
their immediate task. The coordination of responders; actions as well as
providing live information to commanders in Silver and Gold level are the most
important challenges in crisis management.
Concept of Docking Station Functionality
The SDM should allow agents to dock on a secure communication infras-
tructure by ensuring the state of the device it is supporting. The SAI is
a distributed system and operates on confidential data. Therefore, the system
must protect its integrity against data loss/theft and data modification. In
a distributed system, data protection concerns are not limited to data trans-
mission. As the data are processed in different physical computing platforms it
must be established that all data processing entities adhere to the same
security policy for the data. The data security policy adherence is enforced by
ensuring the software configuration of a computing platform before it is
connected to the SECRICOM infrastructure. To this end the SDM protects
communication keys and credential information and only releases this infor-
mation to the host platform if this platform is in an approved software
configuration. The process of establishing the fact that a platform has an
approved software configuration is called local attestation verification. Concep-
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tually, the SDM protects a small set of key pairs for asymmetric cryptography,
but in general is capable of protecting arbitrary data up to a specific size. The
SDM’s key protection facilities are a standard function, which could already be
implemented with today’s smart cards or hardware security modules. The
SDM extends this standard function by only releasing these keys to a host
device if and only if this host device is in a trusted state. This host device is
called Trusted Docking Stations (TDS). The relationship between SDM and
TDS is depicted in the figure below (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Relationship between Secure Docking Module and Trusted Docking Station
A trusted platform software configuration is a specific software configur-
ation. This software configuration is measured by a Trusted Platform Module
(TPM). The combination of a SDM with a TDS is called a Secure Docking
Station (SDS).
Trusted Computing
Generally, TC approaches were summarized in the work (PEARSON 2002).
Trusted computing as specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG 2007)
enables the authentication of a computing platform’s software configuration.
The software configuration is measured and mapped to a single value. The
authenticity of this value is corroborated by signing it with a unique private
key. This process is called attestation. Attestation allows a verifying entity to
establish the software identity of a platform and correlate it with a configur-
ation that enforces a set of required policies. If a platform’s software configur-
ation adheres to this set, we refer to this software configuration as trusted
software configuration. For the attestation process to be valid, the software
configuration measurements must be protected against tampering, the private
signing key must be protected against misuse and compromise. Also, the
private signing key must be bound to the measured platform. For these
reasons, the core component of TC is a trusted module which fulfills these
requirements. The components of the architecture can be broken down into
Emil Gatial et al.116
different blocks, namely Secure Boot, Base System, Trust Management and
Virtualization Partitions. The following figure (Fig. 3) illustrates these blocks.
Fig. 3. Overview of the main components of the platform: Secure Boot, Base System, Trust
Management and Virtualization Partitions. Trusted components are in green, untrusted are in red.
The timeline indicates the different phases of platform boot
The Secure Boot block is responsible for initializing the system to
a predefined configuration that requires close cooperation of hardware and
software modules. We use Intel TXT as physical platform (Intel TXT 2011).
The software side is accomplished by using a standard boot loader (GRUB)
along with SINIT and tboot. Upon power-on, the platform performs a conven-
tional boot, but does not start an operating system; instead, the MLE is
prepared and a TXT late launch is performed. The precise, desired software
configuration is specified by the administrator in the form of policies stored in
the TPM. The LCP is evaluated by SINIT and specifies which MLE is allowed
to be executed. tboot’s policy is called Verified Launch Policy (VLP), and it
contains known-good values for measurements of the Linux kernel and its
temporary ram disk initramfs. A secure boot is performed into a hardware
guaranteed state and the chain of trust is extended over the kernel and
initramfs. If the measurements do not match the expected values provided by
the VLP, tboot will shut the platform down. The startup code in the initramfs
ensures an unbroken chain-of-trust; it measures the file system image of the
full Base System into a PCR before it is mounted.
The Base System is a customized Linux operating system. The kernel is
augmented with the Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) hypervisor module.
KVM requires common Commodity PC platform equipped with virtualization
extensions. KVM can run multiple virtual machines, where each virtual
machine has private virtualized hardware like a network card, hard disk,
graphics adapter, etc. Those virtual devices are forwarded to QEMU (QEMU
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2012), fast software which emulates a full hardware platform. To support
deterministic PCR measurement, the Base System’s file system must remain
read-only. A temporary file system provides the needed read-write storage
during platform operation. However, changes to the Base System do not
survive a reboot of the platform. This ensures robustness of the base system
image to malicious modifications. Management of the virtual partitions itself is
done by a component called TVAM, the Trusted Virtual Application Manager.
Virtualization Partitions may host any system normally running stand-alone.
This can be an unmodified out-of-the-box Linux or Windows system, or
a heavily customized system.
Securing Agents in Trusted Environment
The SAI actually provides the software components (HECTOR 2005) needed
to run agents. Moreover, TDS uses SDM to setup a TC environment and thus
enforces the policies required by the legacy systems. SDM releases the pro-
tected cryptographic material if and only if the TDS was booted into the
trusted state; that means the platform is in the well known state. The DSAP
service employs the SDM for storing the TDS private key, which is used to
decrypt incoming agent’s symmetric key to be run in a trusted environment.
The root of trust is established between the agents’ home platform and host
platform (HP) by audited agent code before its usage will take place. The audit
process must ensure that the agent does only what its creator states it should
do, and that it does not contain any malicious code, which may jeopardize the
integrity of the HP. Establishing the trust between an agent and a HP is
depicted in the next figure (Fig. 4).
Agent repository (AR) holds the set of certified agent Java classes or jar
files. The code of agents may vary from executing simple DB query to complex
management of HP resources. It is up to the agent designer to implement an
agent’s functionality, but with respect to the fact that the code must be audited
and certified whether by the HP provider or by a trusted third-party authority.
Based on the code certification the HP provider can trust the code running his
or her HP. When Process Management Subsystem (PMS), which is specialized
system coordinating data collection, decides to issue an agent it queries AR to
obtain the classes implementing the agent. Here, PMS is able to verify the
certificate of agent classes. Next, an instance of agent object is created by PMS
where the agent attributes are set. The agent object and its classes are
encrypted using an AES key secured by TDS1PubKE/D public key (referred to as
key encapsulation) (PSEC-KEM 2008) of HP. After the encrypted agent is
moved on the HP, the DSAP service decrypts the AES key using TDS1PrKE/D
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Fig. 4. The scheme of DSAP concept to establish secure and trusted communication of agents
private key of the HP (received from SDM) and uses this key to decrypt an
agent. The HP usually provides access to some resources that a specific agent is
able to process. Here, PMS is responsible for choosing the right type of agent
and for setting him up to provide the required results. The results are
encrypted using the same AES key and sent back to PMS.
Testing Infrastructure
The coordination of agents in SAI platform was tested in the scenario of
free hospital beds reservation, while rescuing injured people. The infrastruc-
ture, (Fig. 5) comprises four fictive hospital information systems, where each
system is attached to DSAP platform secured by SDM module (Linux OS).
Next, the dedicated host platform running PTT client (Windows OS) is
included in order to support end users to communicate with SAI via PTT
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Fig. 5. SAI testbed infrastructure
enabled devices. Reggie component contains registry of DSAP services avail-
able in the network. Finally the specialized component called PMS coordinates
agent communication and deployment.
The process of SAI enabled crisis management support starts when a first
responder needs to find the closest hospital with a particular type of injury
treatment. He can directly specify the type of process in the PTT enabled
device or call the command centre. User communication agent (delegated by
PMS) then collects information using guided dialog requesting the injury type,
number of injured people and the position of incident (by location name or by
GPS coordinates). By submitting the request the PMS sends information
delivery agents to every nearby hospital system to query specific data and send
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them back to PMS. PMS then automatically reserves specific number of free
hospital beds which are closest to incident location.
Conclusion
In this paper we described the integration of secure agents with a secure
communication infrastructure for rapid information gathering in a crisis
situation. Requirements for using secure agents arose from communication
challenges in crisis management problem domain. The concept of SAI shows
big potential in the applications using data from different legacy information
sources or even different end-users using different communication channels.
Moreover, the applications can benefit from the agent mobility and TC by
processing data at hosting storage element or in its vicinity. The benefits of
SDM as opposed to attestation based on sealing are twofold. First sealing is
rather inflexible and does not allow easy migration. The SDM on the other
hand can be plugged into any device with the appropriate interface. Further-
more, it is simpler to maintain a set of valid platform software configurations
on the SDM, because it represents a single point of management. The second
reason is that the SDM is a physical token. Its possession alone contributes to
the authentication of the owner and it cannot be plugged into two devices at
once. This restricts access to one device at the time.
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A b s t r a c t
Security and Trust in communication systems where very sensitive information are exchanged is
achieved and retained through hardware means. In the SECRICOM project where seamless,
interoperable crisis management communication is required, we have developed a security and trust
managements mechanism based on a smart card like hardware structure called Secure Docking
Module (SDM). However, given the highly secure and hostile environment (emergency, crisis
situation) where the SDM needs to function, this security module can be the subject of many attacks.
While cryptanalytic attacks on the SDM security are impossible due to the employed strong
cryptographic algorithms, attacks targeting the SDM implementation constitute a pragmatic threat
that cannot be neglected. In this paper, we address possible hardware issues of the SDM chip and
focus on the Hardware attack protection mechanisms especially on the SDM RSA and AES
cryptographic accelerators. We present the research work that was done through the SECRICOM
project on the above issues and analyze the basic concept behind the protected RSA-AES structures
that complement the SDM architecture. Those hardware structures are fully compatible with the
SDM protocols and offer strong protection against hardware power attacks and fault attacks while
retaining high performance characteristics.
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S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: mechanizmy bezpieczeństwa, Secure Docking Module (SDM), ataki
sprzętowe.
A b s t r a k t
Bezpieczeństwo i zaufanie w systemach łączności, gdzie są przetwarzane informacje niejawne,
jest zapewniane za pomocą rozwiązań sprzętowych. W projekcie SECRIOM, w którym jest wymagana
interoperacyjna oraz „bezszwowa” łączność w zarządzaniu kryzysowym, wytworzono mechanizm
zapewniania bezpieczeństwa oraz zaufania oparty na rozwiązaniu typu kart inteligentnych – Secure
Docking Module (SDM). Biorąc jednak pod uwagę wysoki poziom zagrożenia środowiska łączności
w sytuacjach kryzysowych, sam moduł SDM może być przedmiotem wielu ataków. Pomimo że ataki
kryptoanalityczne na SDM są niemożliwe ze względu na zastosowane silne algorytmy krypto-
graficzne, zagrożenie wynikające z ataków na implementację SDM nie powinno być zaniedbywane.
W artykule opisano możliwe problemy rozwiązań sprzętowych w chipie SDM oraz wyeks-
ponowano mechanizmy zapobiegania atakom sprzętowym, szczególnie skierowanym na SDM RSA
i akceleratory kryptograficzne AES. Zaprezentowano ponadto struktury RSA-AES, które uzupełniają
architekturę SDM z punktu widzenia wzmocnienia ochrony. Te struktury sprzętowe są w pełni
kompatybilne z protokołami w ramach SDM i oferują silną ochronę przed atakami fizycznymi,
jednocześnie nie obniżają wysokich właściwości użytkowych.
Introduction
Trust in Information Systems constitutes a fundamental security issue in
most sensitive data handling applications. However, achieving a high level of
trust in the entities of such systems is not an easy task. There are some
computer communication systems where the nature of the handled informa-
tion is so sensitive that untrusted behaviors cannot be tolerated. In such
systems, security and trust is ensured by hardware means.
SECRICOM European project is based on the efficient, seamless communi-
cation of civil emergency responders in situations of crisis (SECRICOM, 2008).
The project’s goal is to provide to emergency agencies a communication
infrastructure that is fully interoperable regardless of what devices (mobile
phone, smart phone, PC, Tablet, Push-to-Talk equipment e.t.c.) or communi-
cation system each agency uses (analog radio, GSM, 3G, TETRA, wifi, Internet
e.t.c.).
In such a communication environment, strong security places a very
important role. The communication channel where the all transactions are
made should always remain secure and protected from eavesdropping and
involved emergency responders must have trust to the communication they are
engaged in and also trust that their device provides them with accurate,
untampered data meaning that it has not been compromised. While there are
several hardware means of achieving high security, very few solutions exist
when it comes to offering trust. Trusted Computing Group’s TPM chip is the
most promising such solution however this Hardware Security Module (HSM)
is not easily deployable in crisis situations where extreme conditions are at
hand (portability of actors, various communication means, frequent disrup-
tions of communication channels e.t.c.). TPM requires remote attestation
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procedures in order to guarantee a high trust level. In the crisis management
case, that cannot and may not be provided, it would be much better if trust
attestation is provided locally. The above reasons stemmed the need for a local
security and trust attestation mechanism so within the SECRICOM project
we designed a passive smart card like hardware token, complementing
the TPM functionality and acting as a local trusted third party, capable of
storing security keys, credentials and attesting the trust level of devices
connected to it.
The SDM is described as an SD, MMC card or usb token that is physically
attached to a Host machine and upon request from its host, releases the keys
related to this host only if the host provides sufficient credential that it is in
a trusted state. The keys for each host along with the host’s id and public key
are stored in the SDM secure memory. The SDM has a unique id number and
a set of cryptographic keys (public, private key pair) that should not be
transmitted in any way through the communication channel. Apart from the
above, the SDM holds a series of valid configuration states (PCR values) for
each Host authorized to communicate with it in order to be able to verify the
trust state of such host.
In a way, the SDM plays the role of a local trusted third party. The process
of verifying the host’s trust level is called local attestation since it is similar to
remote attestation but do not require a network communication channel since
the SDM is attached to the host device (the attestation is performed locally). In
an SDM enabled environment, the various programs of the network are
controlled by trusted servers and are cryptographically secured using specific
keys.
Based on the above concept, the SDM is capable of validating the local
software integrity of a Host platform through trust measurements and provid-
ing sufficient proof that the measurements are authentic, fresh and untam-
pered. The SDM as an add-on structure on the user’s communication device is
associated to a specific user through a password mechanism and therefore can
bind a user along with the device to the crisis management communication
system. As such, the fundamental security principle of user non-repudiation is
retained, the user is bonded to the SDM and cannot deny its actions.
The SDM secret information that are handled by its cryptographic algo-
rithms (RSA and AES) cannot be deduced using traditional cryptanalysis since
the above algorithms are considered highly secure especially for high bit length
keys (in the SDM case, 2048 bit RSA and 256 bit AES is used). However, there
exist a series of attacks that do not target the cryptographic algorithm itself
but the algorithm’s implementation that can be successful in deducing secret
data. Even if secret information cannot be learned, attackers may be able to
disrupt the SDM hardware or deny service leading to other kinds of failures in
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the SECRICOM security system. Those Hardware attacks are powerful yet
easy to mount and can be invasive, semi-invasive and non invasive. While
invasive attacks require considerable expertise, chip depackaging and special
equipment (laser cutter microscope, probes) in order to work, semi-invasive
and non invasive attacks can be mounted by even inexperienced attackers
following instructions or with cheap equipment. For the above reasons, in the
SDM system design special care must be taken in order to include resistance
against the above hardware attacks.
In this paper, we elaborate on the hardware structure of the SDM chip and
focus on possible ways of attacking the SDM structure through hardware
means especially by targeting the RSA and AES cryptographic accelerators. We
present the research work that was done through the SECRICOM project on
the above issues including Fault attack and side channel attack protection
mechanisms capable of thwarting hardware attacks. The proposed hardware
structures are fully compatible with the SDM protocols offering strong protec-
tion against power attacks and fault attacks while retaining high performance
characteristics.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the SDM
architecture is discussed briefly. Section 3 provides a general overview on
Hardware attacks that can be mounted on the SDM and section 4 focuses
explicitly on attacks on the SDM AES and RSA accelerators along with
implemented countermeasures. Section 5 concludes the paper.
SDM Hardware structure
We envision the SDM as a synchronous System on Chip (SoC) device. The
hardware structure of the SDM can be determined by the functions that it
must fulfill. The SDM due to its potential connection with a TPM has
a TPM-like structure and includes an RSA signature unit, a control processor
unit, a non volatile memory unit for key storage, a true random number
generator unit (TRNG), a SHA-1 hash function unit and a symmetric key
encryption/decryption and key generation unit (AES algorithm).
The generic hardware structure of the SDM chip is presented in Figure 1.
The system is structured around a data bus where all the data values are
transferred for reading by or writing to a requesting unit of the SDM. There is
also an address bus connected to the memory unit for a successful memory
data reading and writing. An additional bus is also connected to all the units of
the chip which is responsible for passing all the control signals to those units.
Signals of this bus are in general managed by the processor.
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Fig. 1. The SDM hardware structure
The processor unit is responsible for controlling the whole SDM system and
realizing the SDM functionality by enabling-controlling (chip select, CS,
signal) SDM component units and performing operations that don’t require
the involvement of other units (i.e. comparisons or memory search). For this
task, the processor has stored in its ROM memory a firmware program
implementing the various SDM commands and a series of data required by
those commands.
There are three memory modules included in the SDM hardware structure.
The first module is a RAM unit that is employed for temporary value storage
during a single SDM to Host protocol session. The second module is a ROM
– EEPROM unit that is mainly used for storing and updating the SDM
firmware realizing the SDM functionality. The third module is an NVRAM
(flash memory) unit which constitutes the main storage area for all the
sensitive information involved in the AAT should be SDM transactions. The
three memory units are protected by special hardware structures that deter
attackers from deciphering memory data.
The SHA-1 unit is implementing the SHA-1 hash function and the RSA
encryption – decryption unit is responsible for performing the arithmetic
operation of modular exponentiation (memodN) as defined in RSA public key
scheme. The SHA-1 unit has a data input/output and a control signal indicating
the beginning of a hash function operation. The RSA unit has as inputs the
modulus N value (part of the RSA public key), the message m to be encrypted-
decrypted and the public or private key e along with a control signal indicating
the beginning of a modular exponentiation encryption or decryption.
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The AES encryption/decryption unit is responsible for the key generation,
encryption and decryption of an established session’s data that are transmitted
to and from the SDM. It has control signals that indicate an encryption,
decryption and key generation operation. The AES generated session key is
only saved within the AES unit and is changed when is replaced by a newly
generated session key.
The TRNG unit is connected to the data path through its data output and
has a 9 bit control signal that determines the bit length of the generated
random number. The NVRAM has a read/write control signal while is connec-
ted to the data and address bus in order to read the address and use it to write
or read the data values in or out of it. The system has a clock generator unit for
managing the SDM different clocks and a reset signal along with chip select
(CS) signals to enable or disable each SDM unit. The system works in
a synchronous way.
Note, that in order to ensure a high security level, the RSA keys used in the
SDM have a bit length of 2048 bits. As a result, the data related to the RSA
encryption and decryption will have similar bit length. However, there is no
feasible processing system able to operate with buses of such bits. Therefore,
the 2048 bit values are broken into several blocks (to match the bus bit length)
and reconstructed inside the SDM units (in example the RSA encryption-
decryption unit). The same problem exists with the SHA-1 unit that handles
160 bit values and is solved in a similar way.
Hardware Attacks on SDM
The SDM can be considered as an embedded system that operates in hostile
environment from security perspective. It can be stolen and manipulated in
order to give out the sensitive information that are stored or processed in it.
While the SDM system is protected from cryptanalytic attacks by the use of
strong security schemes (RSA and AES), it can still be compromised when an
adversary applies a hardware attack, an attack on the implementation itself.
Three types of such attacks can be discriminated.
1. Invasive attacks. These attacks aim at physically disrupting the correct
operation of an embedded chip. They involve removing chip packaging, micro
probing of the chip’s activity (memory, registers, buses) and physically tamper-
ing – interfering with the chip functionality. Invasive attack techniques begins
by chip depackaging, removal of on-chip protection layers (depassivation) and
modifying with probing tools the executed code or change values in Registers
or simply observing the behavior of static/dynamic RAM blocks after power off
since such units tend to “remember” values long after no power is applied to
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them. Invasive attacks are not easily mounted, require attackers with con-
siderable on chip expertise and expensive, specialize equipment like laser cuter
microscope, micro probes e.t.c. Such attacks are considered difficult to be
mounted on the SDM chip.
2. Semi invasive Attacks. These attacks aim at observing the behavior of
the embedded system chip after an attacker specialized triggering. Like
invasive attacks, they require depackaging the chip in order to get access to its
surface. However, the passivation layer of the chip remains intact, as semi-
invasive methods do not require depassivation or creating contacts to the
internal lines. The goal is to induce a fault in the computation flow of the chip
during a cryptographic operation and observe the cryptographic result as the
fault propagates. The attacker can deduce sensitive information from such
result on an unprotected embedded chip. In these attacks, also called Fault
attacks, faults are injected using power or clock glitches, extreme variations in
temperature, UV radiation or even optical laser beam induction. Depending on
the attacker’s equipment and expertise, the fault attacks are moderately
difficult to mount. Fault attacks constitute a real danger for the SDM security.
3. Non-invasive Attacks. Such attacks, also called side channel attacks,
exploit an embedded system’s hardware characteristics leakage (power dissi-
pation, computation time, electromagnetic emission e.t.c) to extract informa-
tion about the processed data and use them to deduce sensitive information
(cryptographic keys, messages e.t.c). An attacker does not tamper with the chip
in any way and needs only make appropriate observations to mount a success-
ful attack. Side channel attacks can be mounted very easily, cheaply, using
a PC, a digital oscilloscope and some probes. Therefore, they can be mounted to
an embedded system device by even the most inexperienced attacker. This ease
of use makes SCA very potent. Some of the most widely used side channel
attacks are the following:
– Power Attacks. These attacks involve physical measurement of the
power dissipation emitted from the chip during cryptographic operations.
Simple power signal analysis can reveal what mathematical operation is
performed in the chip (e.g. modular multiplication or squaring during an RSA
operation) and since in most cases the operation is related to the secret/private
keys this action can reveal the key itself. Even if the chip is protected against
simple power analysis, it is not fully resistant against power attacks since
differential power analysis can still lead to compromise. In differential power
analysis, the attacker perform guesses about a secret/private key bit, collects
the related to this hypothesis power signal and correlates it with the actual
power signal. The strongest correlation between the hypothesis and the actual
measurement is the correct guess. Taking enough power samples and correla-
tions the secret/private key can be revealed.
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– Electromagnetic attacks. These attacks use the electromagnetic radi-
ation emitted from the embedded system chip for simple analysis or differen-
tial analysis in a similar way as power attacks. In electromagnetic attacks,
specific chip areas can be targeted and no physical access to the chip is strictly
required (they can be mounted from afar). On the other hand, the existence of
physical noise, RF interference or measurement error limits the attack’s
effectiveness.
Countermeasures
Designing countermeasures for Hardware attacks is not an easy task. Each
security and cryptographic algorithm has its own vulnerabilities when imple-
mented to hardware and therefore a ubiquitous approach toward Hardware
attack resistance is impossible. In general, two approaches for counter-
measures are used in practice, algorithmic based countermeasures and circuit
based countermeasures. Algorithmic countermeasures aim at modifying the
cryptographic algorithm and associated computer algebra operations so that
when implemented it will leak to an attacked as less information as possible.
Such countermeasures are more focused to semi-invasive and non-invasive
attacks. Circuit countermeasures are hardware structures added to a crypto-
graphic algorithm’s hardware architecture, implementation or packaging,
capable of detecting or thwarting a hardware attack. Such countermeasures
can be used to protect an embedded system against all kinds of hardware
attacks.
Invasive attack resistance is achieved by designing special structures
during chip packaging and assembling in order to provide tamper evidence,
detection and resistance. This may include mesh sensors implemented in the
metal layer after packaging consisting of serpentine patterns of ground and
power lines that are shortcircuited if attempts on depackaging or depassivation
are done thus destroying the chip. Also, the on chip silicon layers can be
designed in such a way that visual chip surface analysis through microscope is
very difficult. Adding multiple layers with metal layers in between is such
a technique applied during chip fabrication. All the invasive attack counter-
measures are circuit based countermeasures.
Semi-Invasive attack resistance can be achieved by using some of the
countermeasures for thwarting chip depackaging attempts (used in invasive
attack resistance), however, usually such countermeasures are not enough or
are too expensive. So, semi-invasive attack countermeasures are focused on
detecting fault injection during cryptographic algorithm execution. One ap-
proach toward this end is to modify the cryptographic algorithm so as to
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support infective computation. The basic concept of infective computation is
that any computational errors introduced by a fault will propagate throughout
the cryptographic computation, thus ensuring that the final result appears
random and useless to the attacker in the end. Another approach that can be
combined with infective computation is the design of specialized fault detection
units in the cryptographic algorithm hardware architecture capable of detect-
ing single or multiple faults. Such units involve elegant circuit design as well as
modifications in the cryptography algorithmic flow to include specific condi-
tions between intermediate values that the fault detection unit must detect
after the computations are concluded but before the cryptographic result is
released. When faults are detected then a random number or zero value is
released thus denying an attacker any useful information about secret/private
keys.
There is a wide variety of non-invasive countermeasures depending on
what side channel attack they thwart. The basic goal of all countermeasures is
implementing the cryptographic architecture in such a way that the implemen-
tation’s characteristics like power consumption, timing or electromagnetic
radiation, leaks as little as possible of the secret keys or data. This can be
achieved either by scrambling the leakage signal in such a way that is
unrelated to the secret information that it is computed in the cryptographic
unit or by minimizing the leakage as a whole so that it is very difficult for an
attacker use it for a side channel attack. The first approach is related to
algorithmic countermeasures that aim at inserting randomization through the
cryptographic algorithm computation flow by providing Boolean, or arithmetic
(multiplicative or additive) masking of the secret information (multiplication
or addition with a random number). These countermeasures, also known as
blinding, is very useful against Differential attacks since they aim at decorrela-
tion of the secret data with the leakage itself. The second approach is related to
algorithmic and mostly circuit countermeasures. Through special circuitry,
like double rail technique, power rebalancing or additional dummy operations
(redundancy), we aim at normalizing the leaked signals so that they remain
unchanged during cryptographic operations. In general, it should be men-
tioned however, that protection against side channel attacks is never expected
to be absolute: a determined attacker with a vast amount of resources can
eventually, given enough time and effort compromise an implementation. The
goal from cryptographic engineering perspective is to realize in the crypto-
graphic accelerator enough side channel attack countermeasures so that an
attack on the system becomes too expensive in effort or cost to be interesting
(MANGARD et al. 2007).
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Designing Protection Measures against SDM Side channel
Attacks and Fault Attacks for AES and RSA
AES Accelerator countermeasures
AES accelerator implementation of the SDM can be the target of several
fault and side channel attacks. Side channel attacks of special interest are
differential attacks like Differential Power or EM Analysis (KOCHER et al. 1999,
GANDOLFI et al. 2001, QUISQUATER et al. 2001), Correlation Power Analysis or
Mutual Information Analysis (BRIER et al. 2004, GIERLICHS et al. 2008). Very
potent AES implementation fault attack is Differential Fault Analysis (DFA)
(BIHAM, SHAMIR 1997, PIRET et al. 2003, GIRAUD 2005).
Specific countermeasures on AES resistance against side channel attacks
consist in either adding noise to blur the measurements or reducing the
information-rich signal. “Balancing” consists in rendering the Hamming
Weight (HW) or Hamming Distance (HD) of sensitive internal data constant by
using “dual-rail” (each bit is encoded onto two wires) with, say, a “Return-to-
Zero” (RTZ) (TIRI et al. 2003, SOARES et al. 2008, AMBROSE et al. 2011, CHEN et
al. 2010). The propagation of the encoded values between the different parts of
the circuit can also be physically balanced by using ad hoc Place and Route
(P&R) techniques (GUILLEY et al. 2005). Moreover, noise can be added by
randomizing the order of the instructions, by adding dummy operations or by
masking the internal computations (AKKAR et al. 2001, TOKUNAGA et al. 2009).
As already stated in the previous subsection, countermeasures against fault
attacks consist either in detecting errors during the computation and then
taking actions to protect data or in making the circuit less sensitive to fault
injections. The detection of error is mainly based on information redundancy
either in space or in time (BERTONI et al. 2002, KARRI et al. 2003, KARPOVSKY et
al. 2004) and can be further enhanced by placing several sensors in order to
detect abnormal modifications of the chip’s environment (voltage, tempera-
ture, clock frequency, light, etc.). Once a fault has been detected, reactions may
consist in stopping the communication with the outside and/or resetting parts
of the running software or deleting the sensitive data etc.
However, existing countermeasures do not address both fault and side
channel attacks. In the AES SDM accelerator we realize countermeasures that
are meant to thwart both classes of attacks. To achieve this, we designed an
architecture based on duplicated-complemented (also called “dual”) data paths
applied to the AES algorithm. The dual data paths balance the data HW and
are also used to detect faults.
The AES protection against DFA consists of detecting faults and reacting
on them. We use spatial duplication in order to achieve that, as suggested in
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(MALKIN et al. 2005) and implement two instances of the algorithm working in
parallel. By checking the consistency between the results of the two instances
we can determine if a fault have been injected (the outcome of the two
instances won’t match). If a fault injection is detected then the AES architec-
ture reacts by returning an error value instead of the correct result. This value
is extracted by blurring the erroneous ciphertext with the scrambled value of
the detected fault. More on the fault detection mechanism can be found in
(JOYE et al. 2007).
The AES protection against side channel attacks consists on designing the
two parallel instances of the algorithm in such a way that when a bit of each
intermediate value is computed in one instance, the other instance computes
the complementary value. This approach effectively scrambles the power
signal and disassociates power dissipation with the AES processed information
(DOULCIER-VERDIER et al. 2011).
RSA Accelerator countermeasures
In the RSA cryptographic scheme, three n-bit numbers are used, the public
modulus N, the public key e and the private key d. Let N = p · q, where p, q are
secret prime numbers. Let also e · d = 1mod (p – 1)(q – 1). Assuming that m is
the message to be encrypted (plaintext), the RSA encrypted outcome (cipher-
text) is c = memodN and decrypted outcome is m = cdmodN. CRT is usually
used during RSA decryption since the bit length of the private key d is bound to
be long. In CRT RSA, we compute Sp = cdpmodp and Sq = cdqmodq, where dp
= dmod(p – 1) and dq = dmod(q – 1). Then, the final result is computed
following Gauss’s combination algorithm, meaning
S = CRT(Sp, Sq) = (Sp · q · qi) + (Sq · p · pi)modN (1)
Where:
qi = q–1 modp, pi = p–1modq.
The main computation and side channel attack security bottleneck of the
RSA structure is the modular exponentiation operation. This operation is
realized as a iterative process of modular multiplications that by themselves
have considerable computation cost. Also, the exponent in modular exponenti-
ation, which is usually sensitive information (private key), determines the
computation flow during the operation’s execution sequence and needs to be
fast enough in order to support the SDM functional and non-functional
specifications (speed, hardware resources e.t.c.).
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We propose optimizing and enhancing the modular multiplication oper-
ation, constituting the heart of modular exponentiation and mounting hard-
ware and algorithmic SCA countermeasures on the modular exponentiation
operation itself. To achieve the first goal, an optimized version of Montgomery
modular multiplier, described in (FOURNARIS 2010), is adopted. This structure
employs Carry-Save logic in all its inputs, outputs and intermediate results as
well as constant value precomputation during the multiplication algorithmic
flow, managing to reduce considerably both the time and space complexity of
modular multiplication.
To achieve the second goal, we focus our counter measures on popular side
channel attacks that can easily be mounted on RSA. Such attacks are Power
attacks (especially simple power attacks) and fault attacks. RSA Side Channel
Attack countermeasures can be generic, on circuit level, (more effective against
power attacks) (BHATTACHARYA et al. 2008), (TIRI et al. 2006) or specialized,
focused on specific cryptographic algorithms, on an algorithmic level. The
second approach can be more effective since it utilizes techniques that better
negate the RSA cryptoalgorithm’s specialized SCA weaknesses. Our design
adopts the second approach since it makes the proposed architecture Hard-
ware agnostic, meaning that it can guarantee Side Channel Attack resistance
regardless of the Hardware implementation technology.
In general, the target of RSA Fault and Power attacks is the modular
exponentiation unit. The use of CRT, increases RSA vulnerability to such
attacks, so strong countermeasures are needed for modular exponentiation
protection. Simple Power attack (SPA) resistance is achieved by making the
arithmetic operations during the exponentiation algorithm execution undis-
criminated from an external observer (JOYE, YEN 2003). RSA Fault attack
countermeasures are based on techniques of detecting single fault injection
and blocking further processing thus prohibiting the release of secret informa-
tion (AUMULLER et al. 2002).
Assuming that a fault is introduced during the first exponentiation (with
modulus p), then the faulty output would be S’p and the CRT reconstruction in
(1) would be S¯ = CRT(Sp,Sq) = (S’p · q · qi) + Sq · p ·pi)modN.
Knowing a legitimate CRT-RSA outcome S and a faulty one S¯ , one can find
the secret prime q by calculating q = gcd((S – S¯ ), N). The deliberate insertion
of a fault in the computation flow of one of the exponentiations constitute
a fault attack, originally proposed by BONEH et al. (1997) and enhanced by
LENSTRA (1996) where no legitimate outcome is also needed, as can be observed
by q = gcd((S¯ e = m)modN, N).
To thwart the above attack, we employ Girauld’s technique of detecting
faults (GIRAUD 2006). This approach uses Montgomery power ladder as an
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iterative modular exponentiation algorithm thus apart from fault detection it
offers resistance against SPA. Two Montgomery power ladder calculations are
performed, in parallel in each modular exponentiation round with different
initial inputs each. The initial input of the second Montgomery power ladder is
the first round’s result of the first Montgomery power ladder. At the end of
each round, two values are calculated, S
o
and S1, that have a known math-
ematical connection between them (So = m · S1mod(p · q)). This connection
exists due to appropriate initialization at the beginning of the algorithmic flow.
Fault detection is performed in the end of a modular exponentiation after CRT
reconstruction by checking if the connection between So and S1 is true. If this
test fails then a fault attack is detected and the cryptographic processes are
canceled. Thorough analysis revealed that the above technique is not complete-
ly fault attack resistant as observed by KIM and QUISQUATER (2007), since
a carefully injected fault after the final Montgomery power ladder round and
before the fault detection operation theoretically can damage the whole
protection mechanism without being detected. So, to thwart this attack, the
final Montgomery power ladder round result must be masked by adding
a random number a that is to be removed after CRT reconstruction and fault
detection. In that case, the correct (unmasked) RSA result is not revealed nor
stored during the whole RSA computations only after fault detection test is
Fig. 2. The SDM RSA accelerator concept and Hardware attack protection mechanism
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passed. More on the SDM RSA accelerator can be found in (FOURNARIS 2010,
FOURNARIS, HEIN 2011, FOURNARIS, KOUFOPAVLOU 2011). The concept behind
the above approach is presented in Figure 2.
Conclusions
In this paper, the SECRICOM project hardware security and trust module
(SDM) structure was analyzed and possible hardware attacks on its structure
where mapped. The cryptographic accelerator structures (RSA and AES) of the
SDM were identified as potential targets of such attacks and specific fault and
side channel attacks on these structures were presented. Specific counter-
measures both for side channel and fault attacks were presented for SDM AES
and RSA implementations based on spatial duplication (for AES) and modified
Montgomery Ladder technique (for RSA). The presented methodologies manage
to protect the SDM structure from the most popular side channel and fault
attacks and since they are based on open architectures (not proprietary), they
can be expanded in the future to include resistance against attacks yet to appear.
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A b s t r a k t
The AES is a standard encryption algorithm used in numerous cryptographic systems like smart
cards, TPMs as well as in protocols like WPA2 or OpenSSL. Measuring the robustness of AES
implementations against physical attacks is of utmost import-ance in order to guarantee the security
of the system into which the AES is used. In this article, we describe how a hardware AES, embedding
countermeasures against physical attacks, has been characterized using a laser. With the latter, we
tried to implement a class of physical attacks called fault attacks which, when successful, allows an
attacker to retrieve the secret key used by the AES module. Our experiments have allowed us to
validate the efficiency of some of the countermeasures implemented in this AES implementation and
have given us hints on how to further improve them.
OKREŚLANIE POZIOMU BEZPIECZEŃSTWA SPRZĘTOWEGO MODUŁU AES
Z WYKORZYSTANIEM LASERA
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S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), wstrzykiwanie błędów, laser, badanie
bezpieczeństwa, DFA.
A b s t r a k t
AES to standardowy algorytm szyfrowania stosowany w wielu systemach kryptograficznych, np.
kartach elektronicznych, TPM, oraz takich protokołach, jak WPA2 czy OpenSSL. Pomiar odporności
implementacji algorytmu AES na ataki fizyczne jest najważniejszy do zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa
systemowi opartemu na AES. W artykule opisano, jak sprzętowa implementacja AES z wbudowanymi
zabezpieczeniami przeciwko fizycznym atakom była badana z wykorzystaniem lasera. Następnie
podjęto próby zaimplementowania ataków fizycznych polegających na wstrzykiwaniu błędów;
ataki te – zakończone sukcesem – pozwalają atakującemu na przechwycenie tajnego klucza wykorzys-
tywanego w module AES. Przeprowadzone eksperymenty pozwoliły na sprawdzenie efektywności
zabezpieczeń zaimplementowanych w module sprzętowym AES oraz wskazały możliwości dalszego
podniesienia poziomu bezpieczeństwa.
Introduction
Security, through the authenticity, confidentiality and integrity of com-
munication systems, has become an essential component of all electronic
systems. The vulnerability to attacks of the devices implementing the crypto-
graphic algorithms (such as smart cards) has become a critical issue. Some
malicious means or “physical attacks” could be used to retrieve sensitive
information such as encryption keys and therefore lower the security of the
whole protected transmission chain of information. There are three types of
physical attacks: invasive attacks, which cover all the techniques based on the
modification (ANDERSON 1998) and probing (HANDSCHUH 1999, SCHMIDT 2009,
GAMMEL 2010) of integrated circuits (IC) by an invasive method (KO¨MMERLING
1999, KOEUNE 2005); observation or passive attacks which exploit the fact that
some physical characteristics such as power consumption (KOCHER 1999, LU
2010), electromagnetic radiation or the duration of computation depend on the
chip’s internal calculations (KOEUNE 2005); perturbation or fault attacks,
which are based on changing the environmental conditions of the chip to infer
information about the internal state of the IC. The latter ones are the most
complex to implement as various and complex parameters must be taken into
account such as the timing (i.e. the synchronization between the injection time
and the calculation), the localization and the power level.
In this paper we mainly discuss about security characterisations based on
fault attacks. One of the goals of such attacks could be to reveal the secret keys
of a cryptographic device based on techniques like Differential Fault Analysis
(DFA) (BIHAM 1997, BONEH 1997). Several methods can be used to induce
faults into cryptographic ICs: use of a laser (SKOROBOGATOV 2005, BAr-EL
2006), voltage pulses (BLO¨MER 2003), clock glitches (AGOYAN 2010) or elec-
tromagnetic (EM) disturbances (SCHMIDT 2007). The use of lasers is one of the
most effective techniques. Lasers allow a good reproducibility, an accurate
control on the timing of the injection (the instant of firing and the duration of
the pulse) and a precise focalization (the ability to restrain its effect to a limited
number of gates). Consequently, lasers generate precise local effects into the
IC thus leaving the rest of the chip “undisturbed”. Several theoretical attacks
against cryptographic algorithms are based on such models of fault injection
methods (PIRET 2003, GIRAUD 2005, 2010, MORADI 2010). Although protections
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against these kinds of attacks exist (YEN 2006), advanced methods combine
semi-invasive attacks and power or EM analysis (MORADI 2011).
In this article, we describe the security assessment of an AES hardware
chip done to validate the efficiency of the embedded countermeasures that
could be incorporated into the AES module of the SECRICOM’S secure
docking module (SDM). The SDM contains authentication keys and access
rights associated with each user of the SECRICOM secure communication
network. To access such keys, a secure channel, based on AES encryption, has
to be established between the SDM and its host device (Trusted Docking
Module). Hence, guaranteeing the resistance of the AES used against physical
attacks helps in hardening the security chain of SECRICOM’s communication
infrastructure.
The outline of this paper is as follows. First, we recall the physical
phenomena triggered when a laser is used to inject a fault into an IC. Then we
describe the AES implementation used as target of our laser-based characteriz-
ation. Third, we provide a description of the laser-based tests made on the
targeted AES. With attacks like those described in (PIRET 2003, GIRAUD 2005)
in mind, we tested the countermeasure in a “black box” approach (i.e. without
using the knowledge we had of the implemented countermeasures). We also
tested the AES in a “white box” approach where we tried to take advantage of
the knowledge we had of the implemented countermeasures in order to
circumvent them. Finally we provide a discussion about the results that we
obtained and the conclusions that could be drawn from them.
Physical phenomena induced by lasers into an IC
When analysing the effect of a laser beam onto an IC, two phenomena have
to be considered: the photoelectric effect appearing and the fact that some
parts of the IC are more sensitive to the laser than others. When a laser beam
strikes the Silicon and that the photon;s energy is higher than the Silicon’s
band gap, electron-hole pairs are created. In general, these pairs recombine
and there is no effect on the IC. However under specific conditions, some
undesired effects can appear. We shall focus on one of those effects called the
Single Event Effect (SEE).
Single Event Effect
A Single Event Effect can appear when the electron-hole pairs created by
the laser beam are drifted in opposite directions by the electrical field in the PN
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junction instead of immediately recombining. The consequence of that is the
creation of a transient current as illustrated in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Transient current resulting from charge collection after laser shoot
Fig. 2. Laser beam effect into the MOS structure
Along the laser beam shown in Figure 2, after the creation of the electron-
hole pairs, two phenomena lead to the creation of the transient current. The
first phenomenon stretches the depletion region (hence the extension of the
electric field) along the laser beam and within a few picoseconds, charges are
collected giving a current peak. In a second time, the rest of the charges are
collected in a longer diffusing scheme. Figure 2 shows the transient current
associated with the two phenomena of collection as given in (WANG 2008).
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Sensitive zones
In CMOS technology, some parts are more sensitive than others to SEEs.
To create an SEE, and then a fault, a strong electric field is needed. The
reverse biased PN-junctions of the chip provide this required electric field. The
position of these junctions can change, depending on the value of the data
manipulated.
A good example to illustrate this data dependency is the CMOS inverter.
The first case is a high state on the inverter’s input: the NMOS transistor is in
the “ON” state, its drain is grounded, the source and the bulk too and there is
no reverse biased PN-junction. The PMOS transistor is in “OFF” state, then
its source and the N well are in high potential, but its drain is grounded giving
rise to a reverse biased junction. Hence, the drain of the PMOS transistor
becomes sensitive to a laser shoot. In the same way, with a low state on the
inverter’s input, the drain of the NMOS transistor becomes sensitive to a laser
shoot.
Figure 3(a) shows an inverter with a high state on its input and the
“sensitive zone” is coloured in red. The second inverter (b) on the figure
represents the other case of localisation of the “sensitive zone”.
Fig. 3. CMOS inverter with a high state: a – or low state, b – on its input
From SEE to faults
We explained in the previous sections how a laser beam can create single
events into CMOS structures and which parts of it are more sensitive to
a laser. Even if an SEE is created by a laser, it is possible that the SEE has no
effect on the chip’s computations. An SEE can be transformed into a fault in
two different ways. The first one is to generate an SEE directly into a register.
In this case, the register’s state is changed and this change is stored and
propagated. The second way consists in creating, into the chip’s logic, an SEE
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which propagates through the logic up to the next register. Depending on the
timing, if the SEE reaches the register’s input on a clock’s rising edge, an
“faulty” value will be latched. Thus, a fault is injected into the chip’s
computations. Figure 4 illustrates the propagation of an SEE into the logic and
the difficulty of transforming it into a fault. In the first case, the SEE
generated in the logic is not captured by the D flip flop of the register cell and
has no significant effect on the data processed. In the second case, with the
adequate timing, the SEE is captured by the D flip flop. Thus, the value of the
register is changed: the SEE has been turned into a fault.
Fig. 4. Propagation of SEE through Logic
The hardened AES test chip
In this section, we describe the chip used as a device under test (DuT) for
our laser-based characterizations. The DuT is a hardware module implemen-
ting the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithmused, for example, for
encrypting the secure channel between a SECRICOM host device and the
SECRICOM’s SDM.
The AES algorithm
The AES algorithm is a symmetric key cryptography standard established
by the NIST (NIST 2001). This algorithm is a substitution and permutation
network based on four transformations (SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns,
AddRoundKey) used iteratively in rounds (Figure 5). In this paper, we focus on
the 128-bit key version. This version processes data blocks of 128 bits,
considered as matrices of 4x4 bytes called States, in ten rounds. The round
keys (K1 to K10) used during every round are calculated by a key expansion
routine (not detailed in this paper). We refer as M1 to M10 the States at the
end of each round.
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The secure ASIC AES
In our study, we use the secure AES test chip described in (AGOYAN 2011)
implemented in HCMOS9 gp 130 nm STM technology. The size of the die is
1336,m x 1411.8 μm and its working frequency is 25 MHz. A picture of the chip
is shown in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. Sensitive areas of the ASIC
The countermeasure against faults attacks implemented in this chip
consists first in detecting errors and then in reacting in case of detection. The
error detection is done by using spatial duplication: the AES is executed twice
in parallel and at each round, the results of the two instances (the original path
and the duplicated one) are compared. If an error is detected, the reaction
consists in blurring the erroneous cipher text with a scrambled value of the
detected error. The error detection mechanism is described in the following
section.
Figure 7 illustrates the architecture of the implemented AES chip. We can
see the two AES rounds executed in parallel with the error detection system.
The error detection mechanism
As mentioned in the previous section, when an error is detected (XNOR
operation between the States from the two paths), the error detection mechan-
ism scrambles the error value and then blurs the cipher text with the
scrambled error. An error matrix is used whereby the error is spread across the
rows and the columns as shown in the Figure 8. After that, the error matrix is
XORed with the SubByte’s results of the two data paths.
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Fig. 8. The Error Detection and Spreading Mechanism
The Cross-ShiftRows operation
In addition to the above error detection and spreading mechanism, the
ShiftRows operation is crossed between the two data paths. Half of the bits of
each byte come from the other path and vice versa. This “crossing” operation is
an additional security barrier to further scramble the error. If a fault is
injected onto one of the paths, the fault is detected and propagated onto the
two paths in parallel. With the Cross-ShiftRows, half of the information is lost
due to the transfer to the other path. Figure 9 illustrates the injection of a fault
on the last round of the AES and its propagation throughout the two data
paths.
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Fig. 9. Propagation of a fault on the last AES round (with the countermeasures)
Fault injection using laser
The Laser test bench
To perform the different tests on the AES chip, we used the laser facility of
the MicroPackSTM platform (MICROPACKS 2012). The laser used is a YAG
(Yttrium Aluminium Garnet) laser with three different sources: green, infra-
red and ultra-violet. We used the green source (with a wavelength of approxi-
mately 532 nm) with a 20× Mitutoyo lens. We obtained a spot size between
1 μm and 150 μm. With the largest spot size, we have approximately 15pJ of
energy per laser shoot.
The AES is interfaced with a control PC. When an encryption is launched,
a trigger signal is sent to an FPGA synchronization board, which sends a shoot
signal to the laser after a delay defined by the control PC. This delay allows
triggering the laser at different times during the encryption calculation.
We put ourselves into two configurations when doing those tests. In the
first configuration we adopted a “black box” approach where we ignored any
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of the implementation information we had on the DuT and tried to perform
fault injections on the data path of the AES, in the “classical one”, with the
objective of collecting the erroneous cipher texts and doing differential cryp-
tanalysis like in Giraud’s or Piret’s methods. In the second configuration, we
used our knowledge of the implemented countermeasures, in a so-called “white
box” approach, to try to circumvent the security mechanism by trying to fault
the detection mechanism itself.
Fault injection on the data path
The easiest way to generate errors and trigger the detection mechanism is
to inject faults into the register of the SubByte module. Despite the propaga-
tion of the error into the two data paths and the loss of half of the information
due to the Cross-ShiftRows, we can always try to use the faulty cipher texts in
Giraud’s DFA (GIRAUD 2005). The sine-qua-none condition for this attack is
to generate mono-bit faults (i.e. errors on only one bit of the State matrix).
The error matrix can be found with a simple XOR operation between the
correct cipher text and the faulty one. Figure 9 illustrates this kind of fault
injection.
Fault injection on the detection mechanism
Another way of generating errors is to use the error detection mechanism
itself. The DFA described in (PIRET 2003) needs a fault injection before the
last MixColumns operation (Round 9). With our countermeasures and a fault
injection on the data path, the faulty cipher texts cannot be exploited for this
attack.
When looking closer at the Cross-ShiftRows operation, it appears that if
the same fault is injected on the two data paths, the effect of the Cross-
ShiftRows is “neutralized”. Due to the dispersion of the lay-out of the two
paths across the chip’s surface, it’s very hard to inject the same fault into the
two paths with a laser which has a local effect. The solution is to inject the fault
directly into the error matrix. By doing so, we could propagate the same error
into the two paths and the Cross-ShiftRows will be “neutralized”. In the last
round, as the errors are the same on the two data paths, no detection appears
and we have a faulty cipher text that could be used for DFA. Figure 10 depicts
the propagation into the two paths of an error injected directly into the error
matrix at the 9th round.
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Fig. 10. Injection of an error into the error matrix and its propagation
Laser tests on the AES chip
Localization of the SubByte’s registers
Since the registers of the SubByte are dispersed across the ASIC, the first
step of the characterization work was to physically localize those registers. To
do so, we made a cartography using the laser. The surface of the chip was
partitioned into 36 zones of size 150 μm x 150 μm each as shown in Figure 6.
For each zone, 50 different encryptions were performed among which we
looked for specific faulty cipher texts: as shown in Figure 9, if a fault is
injected on one byte at the beginning of the last round, in the end, we obtain
the same error in six bytes of the resulting cipher matrix, due to the
propagation mechanism, and one different error at the position of the
injected fault. In Figure 6, the coloured regions highlight those where such
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specific faulty cipher texts were obtained and which appeared to be more
sensitive to this type of fault on the last round of encryption.
Results
Once the SubByte’s registers have been localized, we started injecting
faults on the data path. In the “black box” approach, we tried to perform DFA
as described in (GIRAUD 2005) using only the faulty and correct cipher texts but
in vain: the detection and error spreading mechanism proved to be efficient
against such attacks.
However, when we used the knowledge of the implementation of the
countermeasure (i.e. in a “white box” approach), especially the structure of the
Cross-ShiftRows, we managed to recover a few bytes of the secret key of the
AES. The complete knowledge of the Cross-ShiftRows is necessary because
half of the information is lost in this operation and we need, for the attack, to
keep all the information.
We also tried to inject faults directly into the error matrix in order to try
another type of DFA (PIRET 2003) where in theory two faulty cipher texts are
needed to recover 4 bytes of the secret key. To find all the 16 bytes of the key,
we need to inject an error in one of the bytes of each column of the error
matrix. Despite our efforts, we couldn’t inject any fault into the error matrix
with our laser test bench. One of the reasons for this is that the error matrix is
not implemented using registers but with logic gates. Thus it is very hard to
synchronize the laser shoot with the ASIC’s encryption precisely enough to
target separately each column of the error matrix.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have described how countermeasures implemented in
a hardware implementation of the AES have been tested using a laser as fault
injection means. We have seen that, in a “black box” approach, classical DFA
techniques are inefficient against such countermeasures. However our charac-
terization work has also shown that in a “white box” scenario, some bytes of
the secret keys could be recovered. This has led us to the conclusion that the
error propagation should have been truly random and independent from the
generated errors (requiring the implementation of a True Random Number
Generator in the chip). We also investigated another attack path by trying to
inject a fault in the error matrix itself but this has been unsuccessful
illustrating the limits of current equipment with respect to current technolo-
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gies. Such characterization works have provided valuable design rules for
implementing secure encryption AES modules like those used in the SDM of
the SECRICOM project.
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A b s t r a c t
This document describes the possibilities for Internet Protocol communications in crisis situ-
ations. Its main goal is to show IPv4 and IPv6 solutions developed during the lifetime of the
SECRICOM project. Communications technologies in current use are showing their limitations.
Whether reacting to a small incident or a great catastrophe, first responders increasingly need to
share information such as video, images or other data. Society’s evolving expectations concerning
safety can be compared with the development of Internet protocols. We examine IP-based communi-
cation for crisis management, and show that it is ready to bind together currently fragmented
technologies such as TETRA and analogue radios, providing a new dimension of interoperability,
including cross-border communication.
ZMIERZAJĄC DO PROTOKOŁU IPV6
Aurel Machalek
University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: IPv4, IPv6, „bezszwowa” komunikacja, TETRA.
A b s t r a k t
W artykule przedstawiono możliwości wykorzystania protokołu IP (w wersji 4 i 6) w zarządzaniu
kryzysowym, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem rozwiązań wytworzonych w ramach realizacji projektu
SECRICOM. Zauważa się, że zbliżamy się do limitów możliwości obecnie wykorzystywanych tech-
nologii komunikacyjnych. Podczas akcji ratunkowych – zarówno niewielkich incydentów, jak i wiel-
kich katastrof – u służb ratunkowych w coraz większym stopniu występuje zapotrzebowanie na
wymianę informacji pod różnymi postaciami (np. wideo, zdjęcia oraz inne informacje). Zwiększające
się oczekiwania społeczeństwa wobec aspektów związanych z bezpieczeństwem mogą być skonfron-
towane z możliwościami rozwijającej się technologii. W artykule omówiono łączność w zarządzaniu
kryzysowym opartą na protokole IP. Autor zauważa, że podejście takie jest już realizowalne oraz ma
potencjał umożliwienia wymiany informacji między różnorodnymi i rozproszonymi sieciami
(np. TETRA, systemami analogowymi), wprowadzając nowy wymiar interoperacyjności, także
w komunikacji międzygraniczej.
Context and Motivation
The SECRICOM project addresses communication security, interoperabil-
ity, and connection continuity. Its main deliverable is [...] a system that ensures
end-to-end secure transmission of data and services across heterogeneous
infrastructures with real time detection and recovery capabilities against intru-
sion, malfunctions and failures [...]1 A major aspect of the project’s work was
an assessment of the IPv6 protocol, and its advantages and disadvantages in
crisis communications. This paper discusses the following topics:
– Research in to crisis management communication and IPv6;
– The exhaustion of the IPv4 address space;
– Motivation for applying an IP-based communication system;
– Solutions to common communications system failure scenarios in crisis
situations;
– Benefits for end users.
Related work
Work on this topic started in 2006, with the launch of the U-2010 project:
U-2010 project overall objective is to provide the most capable means of
communication and the most effective access to information to everybody
required to act in case of accident, incident, catastrophe or crisis, while using
existing or future telecommunication infrastructures. The U-2010 project will
address the public safety issues by researching new emergency and crisis
management solutions investigating on innovative and state-of-the-art com-
munication technologies based on the current and new Internet technologies (i.e.
Internet Protocol version 6)2. This work has been continued in the SECRICOM
project.
Problem statement
Our research addresses many of the security and interoperability issues
that have been highlighted by catastrophes across the world. It must provide
answers to these questions:
– Is the Internet ready to be used as an emergency communications
channel?
1 Copyright is held by the author/owner(s). D.O.W. SECRICOM Projekt.
2 Copyright is held by the author/owner(s). D.O.W. U-2010 projekt.
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– Can it provide seamless, secure and reliable communications?
– Can first responders use this technology?
– Is IPv6 suitable for use with the latest communications technologies, and
can it solve these problems?
Research goals and methods
In order to deal with the increasing frequency and complexity of disasters,
whether natural or man-made, forward-looking emergency agencies are devel-
oping IP-based architectures able to integrate innovative solutions for their
evolving operational requirements. The end user adopting the SECRICOM
framework will benefit from:
– Improved Situational Awareness: Real-time communications allow offi-
cers to make better decisions more quickly, resulting in safer communities and
a more efficient public safety workforce.
– Network Reliability: Redundant wireless network connections ensure
reliable communications while on the scene or in motion.
– Office network extended to the incident: Provides real-time access to
remote broadband applications for first responders in the field.
– Confidentiality of Information: Ensures information shared between an
Emergency Operations Centre and first responders is secure and available only
for public safety use.
– Interoperability: Provides a standards-based network platform which
enables communications interoperability.
Future network growth requires that Internet-enabled devices can be
assigned, used and – most importantly – be reachable anywhere via a globally
unique IP address. Without sufficient global IP address space, applications are
forced to work with mechanisms that provide local addressing for local internal
communications and workaround “fixes” to communicate externally across the
Internet. While waiting for a permanent address space solution, there have
been numerous optional fixes to try to overcome the address space limitations.
These include Network Address Translation (NAT), Classless Inter-domain
Routing (CIDR) and extensions to IPv4.
Network Address Translation (NAT) allows multiple devices to be hidden
behind one or more real IPv4 addresses. Such mechanisms restrict the
end-to-end transparency of the Internet. While NAT has to some extent
delayed the pressure on IPv4 address space for the short term, it places severe
restrictions on capabilities for bi-directional communication between applica-
tion endpoints. While a client behind a NAT device can communicate out to
servers on the Internet (the client-server communication model), that same
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Table 1
IPv6 Feature Advantage (Compared to IPv4)
128-bit Addressing
[RFC 2460]
Scalability from 232 potential addresses to 2128 addresses, vastly ex-
panding usable unicast and multicast address space
End-to-End Addressing
[RFC 2460]
Reintroduces the end-to-end model to greatly lower the cost and
complexity of peer-to-peer communications by eliminating the need for
Network Address Translation (NAT)
Network Layer IPsec
[RFC 2460, 4301, others]
Improved security support via IP layer security (IPsec) making it
cheaper to deploy VPN-like security for all applications
New QOS Support
[RFC 2460]
Potential new QOS capability through use of IPv6 flow labels
Auto configuration
[RFC 2461, 2462, others]
Improved “plug and play” support using IPv6 link-local addressing,
scoped multicasting & anycast support to automatically self-configure
and discover neighbour nodes, routers, and servers
New Address Types
[RFC 4291, 4193]
New addressing options for link local, anycast, intra-domain3, and
globally unique Internet communications.
Security Addressing
[RFC 3041, 3972]
New security addressing options for randomly-generated addresses to
protect privacy, and cryptographically-generated addresses used to
sign and authenticate messages
Enhanced Multicast
Features [RFC 3306, 3956,
4291]
Enhanced local and global multicasting support scoped multicasting,
and a tremendous expansion of usable multicast address space. Each
site receiving an IPv6 prefix can generate 232 globally routable multi-
cast groups1. IPv6 multicasting can support creation of new geo-
spatial and community-of-interest information distribution para-
digms. Embedded-RP removes the need for IPv4 MSDP, simplifying
deployment. Multicasting is a key feature used extensively for IPv6
autoconfiguration features
Multihoming Features
[RFC 4291]
Multiple addresses can be assigned to IPv6 network interfaces. Use of
different addresses can be used to differentiate link-local, intra-
domain, and global messages. Addresses can be assigned and utilized
for specific security, reliability, load-balancing, and QOS policies.
Simplified Header
[RFC 2460]
Improved header structure that retains only the absolutely necessary
header fields and eliminates IPv4’s unnecessary CRC checksum fields.
Speeds up packet processing in routers and makes basic IPv6 header
more compressible than IPv4 for low data rate wireless and dial-up
connections.
Extensible Headers
[RFC 2460]
Extension headers are an extremely powerful feature that allows
additional protocol-level information to be added to the basic IPv6
header. This allows additional protocols and services such as IPsec and
mobile IPv6 to easily be integrated on top of the basic IPv6 protocol
Advanced Network
Services [RFC 2460,
3775]
Basic IPv6 features and extension headers can be leveraged to build
more powerful network services for mobility, security, QOS, peer-to-
peer applications, etc. Mobile IPv6 improves on IP mobility for IPv4.
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Fig. 1. High-level system overview
client cannot be guaranteed to be accessible when external devices wish to
establish a connection to the client (as typified by the peer-to-peer communica-
tion model). NAT breaks the end-to-end principle of the Internet, restricting
many applications that could be deployed as peer-to-peer to being deployed
within a more complicated and expensive modified client-server model that
relies on communications gateways and intermediate servers to connect hosts.
NAT inhibits the evolution of next-generation applications that demand IP
address space and direct remote connectivity into business premises and home
networks (e.g. from IP-enabled mobile handsets). IPv6 reintroduces the ability
to provide true end-to-end security that is not always readily available through
a NAT-based network (Ipv6 Forum Roadmap...).
IPv6 has numerous technical features which, when compared to IPv4,
make it a more powerful and flexible framework to deploy next-generation
network applications and services (tab. 1).
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Some of the operational benefits brought by adopting the SECRICOM
system are:
– Extension of emergency mission network to Outdoor & Mobile Environ-
ments.
– Seamless mobility & continuous access.
– Network Security, Scalability & Manageability.
– Standards-based interoperable solution with investment protection.
Conclusion
The technical benefits of IP are:
– Redundancy: Redundant network connections across multiple wireless
networks using standards based mobile IP.
– Security: Secure connectivity to the vehicle using network encryption,
firewall, intrusion detection, FIPS 140-2 compliance.
– Connectivity: Mobile router provides network connectivity for wired or
wireless client devices in or around a vehicle Network Management: Use the
same network management tools to manage the office network and mobile
network.
– Multi-Media Applications: Broadband wireless network for voice, video,
and data applications for real-time communications with mobile network.
– Wireless Agnostic: Interfaces with 802.11b/g, licensed 4.9GHz, 3G and
future wireless networks.
– Modular Design: Enclosure slots allows module expansion (e.g. video).
Translated by AUTHORS
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A b s t r a c t
The major incidents such as terrorist attacks in Madrid, London or huge natural disasters (fires,
floods etc.) showed that the factor that inhibits the full performance of emergency response is the lack
of interoperability between communication systems of different responders over Europe. The
SECRICOM project built a solution that seamlessly integrates the communication systems of
different organizations located in different EU member states. The term “seamless” means that the
communicating parties may use their own communication devices or can use new Secricom Silentel
enabled devices over the SECRICOM infrastructure without worrying about what technology or
communication system is used by other users. The provided solution offers high level of security in
a cost efficient way since it reuses the existing communication infrastructures including public and
dedicated ones (eg.: Tetra Radio, GSM, UMTS, Internet).
SECRICOM SILENTEL – BEZPIECZNA PLATFORMA KOMUNIKACJI
DO ZARZĄDZANIA KRYZYSOWEGO
Vladimir Hudek, Miroslav Konecny, Stefan Vanya
Ardaco a.s., Bratislava, Slovakia
S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: zarządzanie kryzysowe, Secure Docking Module (SDM), Bezpieczna Infra-
struktura Agentowa (SIA), SECRICOM, responder, PTT opcja naciśnij i mów,
„bezszwowa” komunikacja, bezpieczeństwo połączeń.
A b s t r a k t
Podczas poważniejszych sytuacji kryzysowych, jak ataki terrorystyczne w Madrycie czy Lon-
dynie, a także klęski żywiołowe (pożary, powodzie etc.), okazało się, że głównym czynnikiem
ograniczającym wydajność reagowania służb ratunkowych jest brak interoperacyjności między
różnymi systemami łączności. W ramach projektu SECRICOM zbudowano rozwiązanie, które
umożliwia „bezszwową” integrację środków łączności wykorzystywanych przez różne służby ratun-
kowe (także działające w różnych krajach). Pod pojęciem „bezszwowa” jest rozumiana możliwość
wykorzystywania przez służby ich własnego sprzętu komunikacyjnego (bądź urządzeń wyposażonych
w SECRICOM Silentel) na podstawie infrastruktury SECRICOM bez konieczności brania pod uwagę
typu sprzętu używanego przez inne podmioty. Zaproponowane w ramach projektu rozwiązanie
zapewnia wysoki poziom bezpieczeństwa oraz efektywność kosztową wynikającą z wykorzystania
obecnie istniejących rozwiązań telekomunikacyjnych (zarówno publicznych sieci, np. GSM, UMT,
Internet, jak i dedykowanych rozwiązań, np. TETRA).
SECRICOM Project Context
The major incidents such as terrorist attacks in Madrid, London or huge
natural disasters (forest fires, floods etc.) showed that the factor that inhibits
the full performance of emergency response is the lack of interoperability
between communication systems of different responders over Europe. The
complexity of this problem is increased by the number and structure of
responder organizations involved simultaneously at different types of emerg-
ency events. These organizations have absolutely different hierarchical gov-
ernance structures in place, maintain different cultures, pursue different goals
and also use different means and tools for communication. After all, the
cooperation of these stakeholders is essential for the successful resolution of
the most of crisis situations.
The SECRICOM project has built a solution that seamlessly integrates the
communication systems of different organizations located in different EU
member states. The term “seamless” means that the communicating parties
may use their own communication devices or can use new Secricom Silentel
enabled devices over the SECRICOM infrastructure without worrying about
what technology or communication system is used by other users. Moreover
the new capabilities and the secure communication itself can be extended to
mass market devices as PCs, mobile phones and tablets to increase cost
effectiveness and comfort of users. Of course the preservation of life is the top
priority but as the incident evolves the need for the confidentiality and
reliability of information is getting more and more important. In SECRICOM,
the communication sessions are ciphered, thus end to end security assurance is
provided by the SECRICOM enabled devices.
Since most of potential hacker attacks are targeting endpoints in the security
infrastructures, the SECRICOM solution introduced comprehensive network
monitoring, intrusion detection, a hardware chip called Secure Docking Module
and Trusted Docking Station that verifies the integrity of endpoint over the
complete chain of trust starting from hardware itself. Thus the SECRICOM
solution can provide a high level of security in a cost efficient way since it
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reuses the existing communication infrastructures including public and dedi-
cated ones (Tetra Radio, GSM, UMTS, Internet, etc.). The use of different
means of communication in parallel increases the availability of communica-
tions and makes the SECRICOM solution resilient.
During the analytical phase of the project different scenarios were identifi-
ed with the involvement of end user group and from different points of view at
different levels in the organizational hierarchy. The project results were
demonstrated in incremental way as more and more features and capabilities
were added during several shows and civil protection exercises. The SE-
CRICOM project has proven the feasibility of cooperation among emergency
responders in the face of many of constraints.
Operation Requirements of Communication System
Crisis management deals with unpredictable catastrophic events including
terrorism (e.g. Madrid and London, in the future CBRN) and crime, natural
disasters (including pandemics, earthquake and hurricane that are exacer-
bated in poor countries) and major industrial accidents/technological disasters
(Toulouse 2001, tanker Prestige, Hertfordshire fire etc.). The increasing
heterogeneity of potential crisis situations led to (and will lead to) establish-
ment of rescue organisations accountable for new types of threats. The
increasing number of organisations with different command structure and
communication systems created the need for a seamlessly integrated and
reconfigurable communications infrastructure for use inside and outside the
EU. Moreover the future communication systems are required to be secure,
smart, open, restorable and ubiquitous. The main challenge of the SECRICOM
project was to exploit the existing publicly available communication
network infrastructure with the possibility to add more sophisticated
tools.
Interoperability between various responder agencies may be defined as the
capability of two organizations or discrete parts of the same organization to
exchange decision-critical information and to use the information that has
been exchanged.
The Figure 1 beside depicts the interoperability stack in which compatible
high level objectives and physical interoperability (electrical/mechanical inter-
connections and transmission signalling) reside at the top and bottom, respect-
ively. Lack of interoperability has been recognized as a significant reason for
lack of effectiveness of a given crisis.
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Fig. 1. Interoperability aspects
This is due to the consequential weakening of the process of coordination
between emergency response personnel during the crisis management which is
brought about by the resulting increased likelihood of poor critical-decision
making.
SECRICOM Silentel Architecture
Secricom Silentel is a client-server communication system using Internet
Protocol (IP) as illustrated in the Figure 2. It enables the use of mobile devices
(i.e. smartphones, tablets or computers) together with technologies currently
deployed (i.e. Tetra, SDR, etc.) for daily routines and crisis communication of
public safety services. It optimizes and protects the way teams of people
communicate without being concerned about misuse of information.
The main parts of the SECRICOM Silentel architecture are as follows:
– The Communication Server is a secure switching center module intercon-
necting all users of the system – as described by Figure 3.
– The Certification Authority is the trust module for Server and Users
certification creation, validation and revocation (user can use his own CA as
well).
– The Operator Studio serves as a tool for user account management and
their personal contact list definition.
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Fig. 2. Secricom Silentel (PTT) high level architecture
The SECRICOM Silentel client application communicates only with the
server. This approach was influenced by the fact that there are no static IP
addresses and there is no support of IPv6 by current GSM network operators.
There are two main communication channels; one is the signalization protocol
(SIP) and the other is RTP for audio transmission. SIP uses TCP and RTP uses
the UDP protocol.
During the session, the server only uses the SIP protocol to send updates
about the presence status of user’s contact list; there are also regular “still-
alive pings” from client to server.
As soon as the user starts a session, SIP is used to transmit more
information, such as Talk Burst requests, text messages, pictures, information
about users in the same session (users come and go) and encryption keys. The
information structures transmitted by SIP are encoded in ASN.1. Each session
is encrypted by different AES256 key. The same AES key is used for encryption
of voice. When the user requests the Talk Burst, he can receive it back from the
server – the application plays a signalization tone and changes Press-To-Talk
button’s colour. The audio recording is transformed by AMR compression,
then the AES encryption takes place and RTP transmission is started. The
server knows what users are in what session and simply serves as router; the
server does not process the audio information in any way.
Security provisions of SECRICOM Silentel include besides ciphering func-
tions also user authentication and management tools for the control of user
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permissions. Unique user name and password with physical gridcard authen-
tification protects user accounts. Smart card (microSD) and PIN (electronic
signature) support the security of access. The Operator studio enables to
manage rights, groups and visibility of clients with a possibility to block
a suspiciously behaving account in real time.
Fig. 3. SECRICOM Silentel Server Components
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The client and server have a layered architecture. Each layer, process or
module communicates with the rest of the system using asynchronous mess-
ages. The concept was proven on various supported operating systems of
Secricom Silentel client, i.e. Symbian, Windows Mobile, Android, iOS as well as
Windows. Communication gateway was implemented for Tetra and CB radio
services, and the implementation allows also integration with further systems.
The concept is described on Figure 4.
Fig. 4. SECRICOM Silentel Integration with Tetra and Analogue Radio
SECRICOM Silentel Capabilities
SECRICOM Silentel application features were designed to support the
operation of public safety agencies and other actors in PTT
daily routines and crisis situations. As defined by the user requirements
analysis undertaken by SECRICOM consortium, voice conversation still
remains the very first requirement. SECRICOM Silentel enables to build
a one-to-one call with full duplex voice transfer or one-to-many group call (Fig.
5) with half duplex voice (press-to-talk). The management of any group is
flexible with a possibility to add additional members by any of users involved in
conversation. This voice service can be used for seamless involvement of actors
using different devices and located in different countries.
Another feature offered by SECRICOM Silentel is textual service such as
instant messaging (one-to-one or one-to-many) or long message up to 1000
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Fig. 5. Secricom Silentel Voice Conversation
unicode characters (Fig. 6). These were proven by a demonstration exercise as
an useful tool for correct spelling of name (instant messaging) or treatment
instructions for hazardous chemical sent by external expert (long message).
Both services enable audit trail within protected environment and also delivery
and read receipt.
Fig. 6. Secricom Silentel Texting
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Emergency response requires all senses in action including visual sense.
Visual sense can be supported by use of images in daily business and special
occasions. SECRICOM Silentel enables to send images in conversation groups,
both saved from device memory and taken in real time. This feature was used
for sending an image of hazardous barrel label in Portsmouth, UK to an
external expert located in Poznan, PL. Similarly, some devices can use hand
drawing over defined canvas to share directions – like sketching directions over
building floor plan during evacuation (Fig. 7).
Fig. 7. Secricom Silentel Images Transfer
Fig. 8. Secricom Silentel Operator Studio and GPS positioning
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When managing a group of actors, their location and availability really
matters. SECRICOM Silentel has a GPS positioning feature, so a master
user (such as an operator) can see the current location of different resources on
a map in real time. Every installed application contains a secured contact list
with presence status – users can simply select one of pre-defined statuses, such
as available/emergency state/non available/etc. This allows identifying avail-
able resources at a glance (Fig. 8).
Conclusions
SECRICOM Silentel is a scalable ICT solution consisting of a communica-
tion server, a certification authority, an operator studio, end user application
and interfaces to other systems. It was designed and developed in line with the
SECRICOM vision – to provide technologies supporting performance of emerg-
ency responders in a comfortable way on standard devices and networks. It
introduces new features for standard devices such as smartphones and laptops
– they are turned into powerful and secure communication tools suitable for
current actors and allowing involvement of new actors with certain responsi-
bilities into emergency actions. These can include officers in emergency
agencies, local government officials (county, town) and also infrastructure
services (water/gas/electricity/transport).
SECRICOM Silentel is open for further integration with systems currently
in use by public safety services. Its ambition is not to replace, but supplement
them by adding new devices and actors to emergency teams. Concerns about
connectivity of IP based systems can be answered by listing priority users in
public/private networks, extendable network means and/or use of Multi-
Bearer-Router for seamless connectivity.
SECRICOM Silentel supports heterogeneous actors cooperating during
emergency response, both cross-border and inter-agency. Security is taken as
an integral part of the service in sense of transfer of data, access and user
management. It allows using the infrastructure for security-sensitive oper-
ations as well. These features were demonstrated in an integrated demonstra-
tion of the project and are to be developed into a product by ARDACO in
following months.
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A b s t r a c t
An emergency situation often occurs as a result of unpredictable events, and as a consequence,
existing communications may either get collapsed or congested. The aim of the Communication
Security Monitoring and Control Centre (CSMCC) solution proposed in SECRICOM is to provide
a suitable security framework that enables the development of security service. These services give
response to individuals and institutions operating in heterogeneous communication infrastructures,
when responding to major incidents. In the light of this objective, a Security Model has been designed
facilitating the measurement of operators’ and end customers’ confidence in the security of the
communication infrastructure, and addressing security challenges in terms of a distributed and
heterogeneous solution. The proposed Security Model has been supported by the Security Middle-
ware Service and Framework, which is responsible for measuring, documenting and maintaining the
security level of the services provided by the SECRICOM communication system.
ROZWIĄZANIE COMMUNICATION SECURITY MONITORING AND CONTROL CENTRE
PRZEZNACZONE DO ZARZĄDZANIA KRYZYSOWEGO
Saioa Ros, Oscar López, Mikel Uriarte
NEXTEL S.A., Zamudio, Spain
S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: infrastruktura komunikacyjna, ocena ryzyka, mechanizmy bezpieczeństwa,
model bezpieczeństwa, świadomość sytuacyjna, sterowanie.
A b s t r a k t
Sytuacje kryzysowe występują zazwyczaj w wyniku nieprzewidzianych wydarzeń, co implikuje
problemy z niedostępnością lub przeciążeniem systemu łączności. Zadaniem zaproponowanego
w ramach projektu SECRICOM rozwiązania Communication Security Monitoring and Control
Centre (CSMCC) jest bezpieczeństwo usług z nim związanych. Usługi te są kierowane do podmiotów
obsługujących różnorodne infrastruktury telekomunikacyjne na potrzeby zarządzania kryzysowego.
W tym celu opracowano model bezpieczeństwa ułatwiający pomiar bezpieczeństwa infrastruktury
komunikacyjnej oraz wspierający rozwiązywanie problemów wynikających z heterogenicznych i roz-
proszonych rozwiązań. Zaproponowany model jest wspierany przez rozwiązanie Security Middleware
Service and Framework, który jest odpowiedzialny za mierzenie, dokumentację oraz utrzymanie
poziomu bezpieczeństwa usług oferowanych przez system SECRICOM.
Introduction
The aim of the communication security control centre is the design of
a Security Model for the SECRICOM communication infrastructure suitable
for secure and interoperable communications under crisis situation. Addi-
tionally it has been supported the development of a Security Middleware
Services and Framework to measure, document and maintain the security
assurance level of services based on telecommunication systems.
On the technical aspect, SECRICOM presents important research chal-
lenges for the design of information security management solutions. SE-
CRICOM has provided a heterogeneous communication infrastructure inde-
pendent from the different civil forces that participate in crisis incidents, and
also a boarder cross distributed interoperable solution that allows cooper-
ation among agencies from different countries. The communication infras-
tructure proposed in the project is able to be dynamically reconfigurable in
terms of security settings to address diverse communication-data exchange
contexts. Last but not least, SECRICOM solution has provided seamless
operation for end-users, so that a user can make use of the communication
infrastructure in a transparent manner to the underlying security mechan-
isms.
From a more pragmatic overview, the challenge of engaging with end-
users has been covered, in such a way that meaningful security requirements
has been defined for the communication infrastructure. The first responders
and commanders are under stress and very busy while trying to handle the
situation. It is not likely that they turn to different communication system
than the one they are used to from day-to-day operations just because of
security issues. The system is prepared to be used in daily and able to handle
the emergency situation specifics. The security mechanisms and policies have
been built in by default. As a result of this, SECRICOM provides secure
communication services for day-to-day operations and on-site-deployable
infrastructure for crisis situations in a very efficient manner.
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Security Objectives
These challenges are met in the design of a Security Model suitable for
secure and interoperable communications under crisis. The scope of the
Security Model is based on the structure of security objectives (Information
Security) that represent the principles on which an effective security has to be
established.
By ensuring confidentiality any unauthorized disclosure of communica-
tions between two or more parties is prevented. By ensuring integrity data
cannot be manipulated during the transmission. Indeed, integrity guarantees
that the recipient of some data will realize if any alteration of the originator’s
message has been done. Additionally, integrity of the data includes the
authentication of the user source, which guarantees that network entities are
not pretenders. Lastly, by ensuring availability users are always sure that
information and resources are available. Though it is not possible to complete-
ly avoid Denial-of-Service type of attacks, SECRICOM components such us
network monitoring, network control, multiple bearers, policy based routing
and dynamic reconfiguration greatly improve the overall service availability
and thus provide increased continuity of business processes during disaster
relief operations.
Fig. 1. Security Objectives
Availability of SECRICOM services is guaranteed not only through a bal-
ance of risk reduction measures but also through recovery options. The IT
Service Continuity Management (IT SCM) plan for SECRICOM ensures that
even in case of disaster the system will continue to provide the services.
Provision of pre-determined and agreed level of IT services is particularly
important for crisis management systems and even in case of interruption it
has to support the minimum requirements, by means of the identification of
required minimum level of SECRICOM services as well as the development of
an IT risk mitigation program.
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Responding also to project high level objectives, the design and implemen-
tation of assets must be done considering security as an integrated design
element in order to ensure the availability, integrity and confidentiality of data
and system resources supporting the key security functions.
Secricom Risk Assessment
Taking into account the complexity of the SECRICOM system, a single
security technology has not been enough to overcome all the security objec-
tives. The used method has consisted of a set the requirements for the
security model that have to address all the security challenges. Thus, firstly
a risk assessment (STONEBURNER 2002) and analysis of the heterogeneous
communication infrastructure of SECRICOM has been done. The system
architecture has been analysed in order to determine the value of assets in
terms of impact or criticality for the whole system. SECRICOM infrastruc-
ture consists of Secure Agent Infrastructure (SAI), Push-To-Talk Service
(PTT), IP Core Network, Legacy network gateways and Communication
Monitoring and Control Centre. Furthermore, assets evaluation has been
conducted, regarding the offered communication services as well as their
relevance for the system.
SECRICOM critical networking, information and operational assets analy-
sis has been helpful to identify the potential weaknesses (Common Weak-
ness...) of the assets. It also permits to estimate the probability of exploiting
particular vulnerabilities by a given threat and the potential impact that it may
have on the operation of the system. Therefore, it is possible to determine the
risk level of each asset. The outcome has been a risk treatment plan and a set of
security requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to create an effective
security model for a pervasive and trusted communication infrastructure.
In the aim of validating and updating drafted security requirements, a user
team workshop was held on 13 April 2011 in London UK, in order to enhance
SECRICOM requirements of the security model. The workshop aimed to
obtain experience based statements, remarks and suggestions from individuals
well versed in crisis management in a structured framework in order to
establish the user requirements in terms of the security of the information
carried on communications systems used by first responders during crisis
management. The impact analysis was set against the background of Civil
Protection Agency operational outcomes, such as the importance of having or
not having a particular communication asset with reference to saving lives,
ability to conduct emergency services, provision of local contingency services,
impact on judicial proceedings and impact on foreign relations.
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Information Exchange Requirements (IER) analysis results were presented
as the starting point for this user team workshop in terms of considering the
varying needs for security of communications assets depending on the differing
three command levels, that is, strategic, tactical and operational levels. IER
describes the process used to enable the Capability/Interoperability shortcom-
ings of current Crisis Management communications systems to be identified.
From this study it is possible to conclude that at strategic level, there is an
identifiable need for data style communications to assist in decision making
and the provision of strategic direction. At the operational level, which is
mobile by nature, there is a high level of voice communications. Sitting
between the operational and strategic level is the tactical level, which can be
fixed and mobile but predominately nomadic (temporarily located at a location
for a period of time with a capability to move). This level reflects the need for
voice and data capability. What is irrefutable is that all levels have an
increasing need for data capability. Thus, in the figure below it is shown that
although Voice remains the most significant method of Information Exchange,
Messaging (email / text) and other data types, such as web services (understood
as services that will be consumed by final users via web interface), file transfer
and video, also emerge as prominent, as shown in the figure below.
Fig. 2. IER distribution grouped by Communication Service
Back to the user workshop, these services have been the communication
assets that have been analyzed and weighted in terms of impact against the
operational outcomes described before and in terms as well of continuity and
service operation for the typical information security components of Confiden-
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tiality, Integrity and Availability. A standard risk assessment process was
adapted to assist the users in prioritising different security requirements for
the communication assets. Subsequent analysis and evaluation of the work-
shop findings concluded in the following table that illustrates the impact
perspective of all the three command levels for each communications asset for
the core security requirements of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.
Table 1
Communication Asset value
Strategic Tactical Operational
confiden- inte- availa- confiden- inte- availa- confiden- inte- availa-
tiality grity bility tiality grity bility tiality grity bility
Assets
Voice 5 5 5 6 5 5 6 6 6
Messaging
(e-mail, data/text) 4 2 2 3 4 4 3 3 3
File Xfer
(dokument) 4 2 2 3 4 4 3 3 3
Video 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Web 0 2 2 3 1 1 3 1 1
Where “6” represents a “High” risk impact level and “0” represents
“None”.
The key security requirements findings that emerged from the workshop
were as follows:
– Voice communications at all three levels of command and between
agencies, is seen as critical and therefore would require the highest level of
security in terms confidentiality, integrity and availability.
– Messages and file transfer are seen as the next important communication
assets in terms of security requirements.
– Web services are the least valued communication assets at all levels of
command with video considered the next least valued communications asset.
– In comparison to Integrity and Availability, Confidentiality is considered
a lesser requirement; probably reflecting the desire for as flexible communica-
tions as possible when life is at risk.
– Integrity, across all three command levels, is seen a key requirement
(voice in particular) for all communications assets. I.e. a message sent in any
medium during a crisis has to be received in a format that the receiver
understands the message so that the requested action, decision etc is carried
out.
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– Availability of all communication assets, apart from voice which is viewed
as essential, is seen as moderately important across all three levels of command
with messaging and file transfer being viewed more important than video and
web.
Hence, security objectives concentrate the security requirements that have
to be covered by a set of appropriate countermeasures and security mechan-
isms (Implementing Network...) identified through the risk management
process. These mechanisms support the three integral concepts of a holistic
security program: detection, reaction and protection. Detection monitors for
potential breakdowns in protective mechanisms that could result in security
breaches. Reaction responds to detect breaches to thwart attacks before
damage can be done. Protection provides countermeasures such as security
policies, procedures, and technical controls to defend against attacks on the
assets being protected. A security policy is a set of rules that dictate how
sensitive data has to be managed, protected, and distributed. It provides the
security goals that the system must accomplish. The level of security that
a system provides depends upon how well it enforces the security policy, and
a security model is a statement that outlines the requirements necessary to
properly support and implement a certain security policy.
Secricom Security Model
The output of the risk analysis and the identification of the security
mechanisms solutions that will provide the required security services is the set
of security requirements presented in Table 2.
All these requirements are aggregated in the specification of a suitable
security model. The SECRICOM Security Model proposes the application of
these security principles to define the guidelines and rules for achieving
a secure infrastructure. The security model does not define how to build or
implement a secure infrastructure, but instead defines the properties, capabili-
ties, processes and controls that a secure infrastructure contains to protect
against a range of threats.
The SECRICOM Security Model defines two fundamental security objec-
tives that are total visibility and complete control. Total visibility consists of
identifying and classifying users, traffic, applications, protocols and usage
behaviour; monitoring and recording activity and patterns; collecting and
correlating data from multiple sources to identify trends and system-wide
events; detecting and identifying anomalous traffic and threats. Complete
control consists of hardening IT infrastructure, including individual devices
and increasing network resilience; limiting access and usage per user, protocol,
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Table 2
Security Requirements
Security Architectural
Principle
Description
Defence-in-Depth Never assume that a single control can provide sufficient risk mitiga-
tion for specific threat. Deploy multiple layers of controls to prevent,
identify, and delay attacks in order to contain and minimize damage
while an organization responds.
Service Availability
and Resiliency
Ensure service availability through device hardening and by
strengthening the resiliency of the network to adjust to and recover
from abnormal circumstances.
Segregation and
Modularity
Infrastructure is organized in functional blocks with distinct roles
facilitating management, deployment, and securing of the devices and
business assets within each block.
Regulatory Compliance
and Industry Standards
Follow industry standards and best practices to facilitate the achieve-
ment of regulatory compliance.
Operational Efficiency Simple and efficient configuration, deployment, and management of
the infrastructure, throughout it entire life cycle, increase control and
visibility allowing for faster auditing, troubleshooting, problem isola-
tion, and incident response.
Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability
Security controls work to provide acceptable levels of confidentiality,
integrity and availability of data.
Auditable and Measurable
Controls
Security controls must be auditable and measurable to be effective.
System-wide Collaboration
and Correlation
Infrastructure security is not a set of independent point solutions.
Effective security requires sharing, analysis, and correlation of infor-
mation from all system-wide sources.
service and application; isolating users, services and applications; protecting
against known threats and exploits; dynamically reacting to anomalous
events. The success of a security architecture and infrastructure implementa-
tion ultimately depends on the degree to which they enhance visibility and
control. Without visibility there is no control and without control there is no
security.
Secricom Security Model middleware
As a result of the performed analysis, the need of a SECRICOM Security
Model software approach has been identified, which conducts, aggregates and
integrates the necessary security protocols and mechanisms. This approach
consists of an intelligent security framework and middleware service for
adaptive information security management. It is represented by the Communi-
cation Security Monitoring and Control Centre (CSMCC). The CSMCC surveys
if network infrastructures are resilient to both well-known and new forms of
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attack, implementing a cyclic assessment approach by means of network
enumeration, network scanning and security assessment for dynamically
plugged assets. CSMCC covers an increased scope for asset protection, includ-
ing information protection mechanisms, access control and usage policies,
scalable architecture, auditing tools and security assurance monitoring. It also
manages improved detection processes and network forensic solutions in terms
of new traffic patterns and enhanced event correlation mechanisms. Not only
awareness and detection capabilities, but CSMCC has also enhanced reaction
capabilities for hostile environments, such as traffic blocking, alternative
routing solutions and isolation mechanisms. CSMCC includes fast recovery
plans for crisis critical communications as well, to provide quick and efficient
recovery mechanisms (CA eTrust...).
In order to be able to cover in an efficient manner the wide and heterogen-
eous communication infrastructure of SECRICOM, CSMCC follows a distrib-
uted architecture composed by a centralized server, which manages all the
security information, and distributed sensors and agents, which are respon-
sible for security information gathering.
Figure 3 describes the distributed architecture for security management,
which enables to deploy the different components for monitoring and control,
where some valuable enhancements with regards to legacy systems have been
done.
– Agent level: Adaptive agents that fetch the state and the behaviour of the
components of the SECRICOM multibearer and interoperable communication
solution specifically deployed for this context.
– Sensor level: Adaptation and normalization of data specifically for each
type of event generated by the agents.
– Correlation level: Intensive stress tests have provided a balanced per-
formance between sensibility and time reaction, reducing the false positives
events.
– Presentation level: Enhanced final user experience for modelling, con-
figuration and reporting, dealing with alarm behaviour and treatment.
Indeed, it should be highlighted that one of the main strengths and unique
features of the CSMCC platform in SECRICOM is the set of custom agents that
have been deployed along the communication infrastructure in order to adapt
to the security requirements that such a scenario as major crisis communica-
tion management needs. These enhanced agents provide new detection and
action capabilities, such as adaptive routing features in case of network failure
or congestion and VoIP traffic monitoring. Furthermore, in order to process
the security events detected by this set of agents, the CSMCC platform has
defined a set of patterns and policies adapted to the prioritization and
correlation of these events, providing them of a meaningful context.
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Finally, in order to cover the security objectives of total visibility and
complete control of the security model, CSMCC capabilities are described
below and they are split mainly in two categories, those related to security
status monitoring and those capabilities related to reaction, that is, awareness
and control capabilities.
– Security awareness:
– Inventory and auto-discovery of network assets
– Repository of hosts
– Policy management to modify the importance of detected events
– Sensibility policies and correlation management
– Anomalous traffic detection
– Intrusion detection
– Event management
– Alarm generation
– Vulnerability discovery that allows a soon awareness of potential weak-
nesses
– Network monitoring in terms of network usage and network latency
– Host and service detail monitoring in terms of availability status
– Control services:
– Traffic blocking
– Traffic isolation
– Alternative routing
– Agent trust renewal
– Configuration management
Results and Achievements
The main results achieved during the SECRICOM project in terms of
communication security management can be summarized as follows:
– Identification of the security requirements to be covered by the SE-
CRICOM Security Model.
– Delivery of the SERCICOM Security Model that defines security specifi-
cations and framework for a trusted communication infrastructure.
– Definition of the software prototype that allows the evaluation of the
SECRICOM Security Model: Communication Security Monitoring Communi-
cation Centre (CSMCC) Platform.
– Deployment of enhanced and custom agents, responsible for collecting
the state of the SECRICOM components.
– Development of a set of functioning patterns and policies adapted to the
SECRICOM context.
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Conclusions
The followed roadmap to design the communication infrastructure security
monitoring and control centre starts with a risk assessment of the SECRICOM
system. It consists on a deep analysis of the operation of the system, in order to
define the key assets, identify their security vulnerabilities and evaluate the
impact in terms of risk. The outcome of the risk assessment is a set of security
requirements that the SECRICOM security model fulfils to provide an effective
security management. This has been backed by a user team workshop that
updated and validated these security requirements. The analysis of the
security requirements results in a bunch of countermeasures and security
mechanisms to mitigate the risk level obtained and protect the SECRICOM
systems against the exposure to security threats. Finally, all these security
principles and guidelines are aggregated into the SECRICOM security model,
in order to achieve a secure communication infrastructure in a continuous
way, ready for the dynamicity of the communications.
Fig. 4. Security roadmap
The security model is supported by a security middleware named Com-
munication Security Monitoring and Control Centre (CSMCC) that provides
not only security information collection and security status monitoring capa-
bilities, but also active control mechanisms, providing enhanced protection,
improved detection, faster reaction and stronger risk mitigation, more effec-
tive incident’s impact mitigation and quicker restoration.
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A b s t r a c t
QinetiQ’s Multi-Bearer Router (MBR) has been designed to operate in harsh-dynamic environ-
ments and provide seamless data transfer within these situations. During certain network environ-
ments, specifically complex mesh, it has been witnessed that the MBR has not chosen the most
appropriate interface quick enough to maintain seamless data transfer. This is mainly due to the
MBR basing all of its decisions on local knowledge; hence a network change at two or more routers
away can take too long to filter through the network for all MBRs to have up-to-date routing
knowledge. Thus it was planned that a new MBR component would be created to assist in the
distribution of all remote MBRs local knowledge to create a central global knowledge that can then be
tailored to each MBR on the network. With updated remote knowledge the MBR can better support
seamless data exchange in complex network environments without a large burden on the network or
its constraints.
ZWIĘKSZENIE EFEKTYWNOŚCI „BEZSZWOWEJ” TRANSMISJI DANYCH
W ZŁOŻONYM ŚRODOWISKU SIECIOWYM PRZEZ ZASTOSOWANIE SECURE AGENT
Phil Entwisle1, Steve Lawrence1, Ondrej Habala2
1 Qinetiq Ltd, Portsdown Technology Park, United Kingdom
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S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: Secure Agent Infrastructure (SAI), Multi Bearer Router (MBR), „bez-
szwowa” transmisja danych, optymalizacja ruchu sieciowego.
A b s t r a k t
Opracowane przez QinetiQ rozwiązanie Multi-Bearer Router (MBR) służy do zapewniania
„bezszwowej” transmisji danych w szczególnie trudnym i zmiennym otoczeniu. Zaobserwowano, że
w niektórych środowiskach sieciowych (w szczególności przy złożonych sieciach kratowych) MBR nie
zawsze wybiera optymalne trasowanie. Głównym powodem takiego stanu rzeczy jest fakt, że decyzje
w MBR są podejmowane na podstawie wiedzy dostępnej lokalnie. Zaobserwowano, że czas propagacji
informacji bywa za długi, by cała sieć MBR miała aktualne informacje o dostępnych trasach.
W następnej wersji komponentu MBR przewidziano wsparcie do budowy scentralizowanej i globalnej
wiedzy. Byłaby ona dostępna dla poszczególnych urządzeń sieciowych, a te mogłyby wykorzystać
i dostosować tę wiedzę do własnych potrzeb. Poszczególne routery MBR – dysponujące taką
wiedzą – byłyby w stanie lepiej wspierać „bezszwową” wymianę danych w złożonych środowiskach
sieciowych, z jednoczesnym minimalizowaniem obciążenia sieci.
Introduction
Initially the QinetiQ Multi-Bearer Routers (MBR) make all their decisions
locally, occasionally it has to make assumptions whether or not the next MBR
in-line has access to the required networks. Therefore, a need arises to allow
MBRs to communicate and pass their local knowledge to all other MBRs for
dissemination of the network routing information, especially with regard to
meshed networks. After discussions and a couple of meetings with Ustav
informatiky Slovenska akademia vied (UI SAV) it was decided that the Secure
Agent Infrastructure (SAI) could help solve this mesh-network situation and
ensure that all MBRs have an up-to-date local knowledge.
Fig. 1. Overview of SA & MBR Integration
The design was broken into three core sections:
1. MBR Interface – QinetiQ
2. MBR Secure Agent – UI SAV
3. Network State Collector (NSC) – QinetiQ & UI SAV
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The MBR Interface would enable communications between the Agent and
the MBR to ensure the local knowledge is passed to the NSC and the tailored
remote knowledge is passed back into the MBR policy-engine for better
decision making.
The MBR Secure Agent would be responsible for going to all registered
MBRs on the network and passing the data back and forth between the
appropriate locations.
The NSC will take all the information gathered from the MBRs in the
network and build a representation of the topology so that it can be tailored to
each MBR and returned via the Agent.
Components
MBR Interface
The MBR Interface to the SAI will allow the agent to request what is
referred to as MBR local knowledge, i.e. the network state in which that MBR
is currently in, the subscribing subnet and local state of bearers. The Agent
will ensure each MBR’s local knowledge is passed to the NSC to calculate the
wider picture of the network. This in turn is used to create the unique remote
knowledge for each MBR and the agent will ensure that each MBR receives its
personal remote knowledge picture.
For example, consider the simple three node MBR network in Figure
2 below.
Fig. 2. Three Node MBR Network
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MBR A has a direct link with MBR B (red line) and MBR C (green line), but
has no knowledge about the status of the link between MBR B and C (blue
line). However, if each MBR collates its own knowledge of the network and
distributes this to a central server the state of all links can be disseminated to
all MBRs.
Given a situation, such that the link between MBR B and C is unavailable
and the link between MBR A and B is unavailable.
– MBR A senses its loss of link to MBR B
– MBR C senses its loss of link to MBR B
– MBR B senses its loss of links to MBR A and C
However, MBR A will “expect” that MBR C is still connected with MBR
B but has no method of validation, however, with both MBR A and C advertis-
ing its local knowledge MBR A can now “learn” that C has not got a connection
to MBR B and MBR C would “learn” that MBR A has not got a connection to
MBR B. Therefore, neither MBR would allow traffic to traverse the network
which is destined for MBR B, thus reducing the amount of bandwidth that is
utilised and helping to ensure all accessible services are supportable through
the network.
The proposed component would bridge the MBR Orchestration Layer
(orchd) with the SAI. The orchd application is the core daemon and message
bus for MBR operations, enabling components to communicate with each other
along with the Linux kernel. The Orchestration Layer utilises a SHA-1
encryption and comprehensive packing functionality to allow secure and
compact communications. Therefore to ensure compatibility a new component
(open-interface) will expose certain MBR functionality to the Agent via
specific messages passed over a loopback network socket. This functionality
will consist of:
– Register MBR – This function would register the MBR with the “reggie”
service (expected to be running with the NSC) to enable Agent communica-
tions.
– Retrieve Local Knowledge – This message type returns the specific MBRs
current knowledge of the status and network configuration of each of the
network interfaces and the serving Local Area Networks. This is one of the two
core messages required to enhance the MBRs knowledge, the Agent will collect
this information from all MBRs in the network and submit it to the NSC for
processing.
– Update Remote Knowledge – This message type accepts the tailored
updated remote knowledge calculated by the NSC. This is the second core
message type required for the enhancements by giving the MBR an under-
standing of the topology of the network to know which communication bearers
access which served Local Area Networks.
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– Change Running Configuration Set – This function would allow the
Agent to alter the current running configuration set to another one stored on
the MBR. An added bonus being that an Agent could be sent out to all
registered MBRs in the network and told to start running a pre-set configur-
ation, such as an emergency configuration to disable any restrictions on
network access. Currently only capable through the MBR Web Interface
(web-utility) and acts as proof that other web functionality could be ported
across.
– Retrieve Policy Table – This function returns a copy of the specific MBRs
installed policy table, both IPv4 and IPv6. Another added bonus being that an
Agent could be sent out to all registered MBRs and bring back a copy of each
policy table to build an exact replica for management purposes. Currently only
capable through the MBR Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
Interface (network-agent) and acts as proof that other SNMP functionality
could also be ported across.
The local knowledge is passed back to the NSC for processing into global
knowledge (topology) of the entire network. The NSC then tailors the remote
knowledge for each MBR, giving it a personal view of the entire network
accessible to them. Taking the previous simple network example (Fig. 2) in
a full mesh:
– MBR A can be told:
– MBR B is reachable via both MBR B and C
– MBR C is reachable via both MBR B and C
– MBR B is directly connected via interface one
– MBR C is directly connected via interface two
– MBR B can be told:
– MBR A is reachable via both MBR A and C
– MBR C is reachable via both MBR A and C
– MBR A is directly connected via interface one
– MBR C is directly connected via interface two
– MBR C can be told:
– MBR A is reachable via both MBR A and B
– MBR B is reachable via both MBR A and B
– MBR A is directly connected via interface one
– MBR B is directly connected via interface two
Therefore, if any interface changes state while parts of the mobile mesh
network move around the personalised remote knowledge sent to each MBR
can be updated. Such as if the link between MBR B and C is unavailable, due to
if either or both MBRs disconnected from a shared/multi-nodal network such
as Wi-Fi or Internet, the tailored remote knowledge for each MBR would
change to become:
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– MBR A would be told:
– MBR B is reachable via only MBR B
– MBR C is reachable via only MBR C
– MBR B is directly connected via interface one
– MBR C is directly connected via interface two
– MBR B would be told:
– MBR A is reachable via only MBR A
– MBR C is reachable via only MBR A
– MBR A is directly connected via interface one
– MBR C would be told:
– MBR A is reachable via only MBR A
– MBR B is reachable via only MBR A
– MBR A is directly connected via interface one
If and when MBR network interfaces change state they immediately inform
the NSC via the Agent a quicker response to network changes should be
achieved, maybe not in the region the MBR is used to (< 20 ms) but
considerably better than the dynamic routing protocols available today (~ 40s)
and without over flooding the network with adjacency messages along with
other issues that routing protocols face in an ever changing environment (e.g.
designated and backup router assignment).
Even with this regularly updated knowledge ultimately a timeout would
still have to exist for assistance in capturing against ambiguous groups
forming. For example taking the original setup where MBR B is completely
disconnected from MBR A and C, as long as MBR A and/or C has connectivity
to the wider mesh network, the NSC will process the updates that MBR A
and C send when they locally sense the loss of those interfaces connection to
MBR B. However, if MBR A and C have formed a separate group without
access to the NSC then the original problem would still exist; this is due to the
centralisation/server-style of the NSC.
Secure Agents
The MBR Agent has been developed using the framework and standards
common for the whole SAI. The standard envelope of a secure agent has been
used, and filled with code specific to the task of communicating with a MBR via
its socket-based interface.
Figure 3 shows the class diagram of the final MBR Agent implementation.
The class MbrAgent is derived (as said above) from the standard SAI Agent
envelope (GATIAL et al. 2011). It uses a structure of several support classes,
which are abstracted into several interfaces – most notably MBRStatusInter-
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Fig. 3. The class diagram of MBR Agent implementation
face (methods for querying MBR status) and MBRConfigInterface (methods
for changing MBR configuration), which are both implemented in the
MBRSocketComm class, which gives these methods actual communication
transport – via sockets to the MBR Interface. Exception handling is done via
a small hierarchy of MBRCommException and its implementing classes.
Testing of a SAI agent is a complicated task, since agents are code objects
which do not act on their own, but upon request. To allow for proper testing of
the code which implements the agent, a separate envelope in the form of
a common Java program has been developed (eu.secricom.dsap.
agent.mbr.test.MbrTests) and this has been linked to the same classes,
which implement the actual MbrAgent class. This program can be run using
command-line arguments, and so the tests may be automated. Other methods
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of automated testing have not been used, since they are not standardised in the
SAI development environment, and would create too much complexity.
A placeholder implementation of the MBR interface has also been created, in
order to be able to autonomously test the MBR Agent communication. This may
be found in the class eu.secricom.dsap.agent.mbr.test.DummyServer.
Only after the tests of the MBR Agent have been done using this artificial
testing grounds, a real MbrAgent implementation has been successfully tested
with the real MBR Interface.
Network State Collector
The learning process is provided by the NSC component itself which
gathers together the different fragments of local knowledge coming from the
MBRs and analyses them to work out the inherent connectivity. By performing
an iterative search process that “joins up” the details about active interfaces,
the NSC is able to determine, for each MBR, the possible networks accessible
from any one interface. Figure 4 illustrates the effects that network topology
can have on the “reach” of an interface, i.e. what other network nodes can be
accessed from a particular interface.
Network A in the example is a fully “looped” arrangement of connections
that allows any interface on any node to route its traffic to all other nodes.
Network B illustrates that interfaces marked as C1 and C2 may only broadcast
to nodes A and B respectively; likewise for interfaces D1 and D2 on node
D which can only reach nodes E and F.
Fig. 4. Examples of interface “reach”
The NSC needs to inspect the network as a whole to draw up a picture of
the possible routing choices that will be used to build the global knowledge
passed to still-alive and reachable MBR’s.
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The development of the Network Monitoring system for the MBR was
implemented in parallel. QinetiQ took the lead on developing the MBR
Interface along with the NSC. UI SAV took the lead on developing the SA for
this purpose. Further use-cases were discussed around the MBR Interface
component, such as the ability to get and set certain MBR properties.
The development of the NSC took place in two phases. During the initial
phase, a bespoke tool (see Figure 5) was created to stand in place of the “live”
MBR agent, which was still being developed in parallel. This tool was capable
of being configured to show a variety of network forms and also the connect-
ivity required between the MBRs.
Fig. 5. Bespoke “mock” MBR tool
Communication between the mock MBR tool and the NSC was achieved
using network socket architecture. The tools interface allowed for the “state”
of an illustrated MBR to be altered by turning on and off different aspects of its
functionality. Whenever this would happen, a new set of local knowledge was
sent to the NSC which would re-assess the situation and define a fresh set of
global knowledge data. This ability to precisely choose the network state meant
that it was possible to very easily validate the functionality of the NSC
component.
It was decided to replicate the network graph drawing within the NSC also
in the first phase of development. This provided the enormous benefit of being
able to perform a comparison between the diagrams shown in the two different
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tools. As the network state in the mock MBR window is modified, the NSC was
shown to “catch up” with its own view of the network;s revised infrastructure
based on a change in broadcast local knowledge.
The NSC can use its complete knowledge of the network to build tailored
remote knowledge unique to each MBR registered in the network. Ideally it
will do this quickly enough that the instance an updated local knowledge
message comes from an MBR the NSC will be able to recalculate the topology of
the network and send updated tailored remote knowledge back to each MBR.
Fig. 6. Network state collector application
Having satisfactorily completed the logic and implementation of the NSC,
the second phase of its development involved replacing the socket communica-
tion mechanism with the SAI toolkit functionality.
Currently, the NSC is designed to work with a “mock” or “fake” MBR
service that can supply details about MBR devices on the network. This is
handled by a ServerProcess class and it is this class which would need to
undergo most of the changes to make use of the SAI toolkit as required.
First of all however, the actual agent “definition” would need to be added
into the NSC project. An agent item is a component that can be dispatched to
a location (an MBR in this case) that makes use of the Distributed Secure
Agent Platform (DSAP) service. This service would receive the agent and allow
it to execute in its “address” space. For this work package, UI SAV are creating
a “layer” that would exist on an MBR and would act as the go-between for the
MBR and the NSC. Note that the agent definition (also being created by the UI
SAV) is based on a subclass of Agent which is part of the toolkit and would
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enter into a permanent loop (via the toolkit AgentThread class) polling the
MBR device to acquire local knowledge.
This agent component has to be deployed initially by the NSC itself when
the NSC first initialises and detects the presence of running MBRs. This would
be done by adding a small element of start-up code to the NSC which would
look for the “reggie” service that should already be active on the network. This
service can be used to obtain the details about the registered MBRs (when an
MBR device starts up, it would need to locate the “reggie” service and register
its existence).
For each “discovered” MBR, the lookup-client upload function would need
to be called to send an instance of the agent to the MBR where it would start
executing. The agent would presumably call its fireEvent method to send
data to the NSC about local knowledge and heart-beat messages.
Within the ServerProcess of the NSC, the notify method is used to
receive the messages coming in from the deployed agents. Once the data from
an agent is received, it is handled in exactly the same way as now. If global
knowledge needs to be created by the NSC, it can be passed back to the agent
using the appropriate SAI toolkit message.
Conclusion
One immediate issue that sprang from the use of the “mock” MBR system
to mimic the required behaviour and infrastructure was the impact of the
routing protocol. During tests of the system working with real MBR’s, when an
MBR link was disabled, it broke the communication with the MockMBR
component (and ultimately with the NSC). Once the routing protocol had
resolved an alternative route, the NSC was able to once again determine the
change in local knowledge and so compute new global knowledge. However, it
takes quite some time for this process to be performed so that the NSC can
resume its full function. It is hoped therefore to demonstrate with the use of
the SAI toolkit, this problem is alleviated. It would be interesting to see if this
large amount of latency is eliminated by using another layer of communication
which is presumably fundamental to the toolkit and sits below the routing
protocol.
Functionality that exposes the information for remote processing helps
further on the reduction of hardware requirements for the MBR enabling the
software to easily operate on hardware constraint mobile devices.
The ability to combine the exposing functionality from the Web and SNMP
Interfaces in a unified secure manner is a new opportunity for remote
management and control of many MBR aspects. Once full integration with the
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SAI has been completed it will be a simple case of adding new message type
functionality to the open-interface MBR component and creating an Agent
with a new fireEvent method.
Recommendations
The core recommendation would be to de-centralise the NSC, so that each
MBR can initialise its own operating knowledge directly with other MBRs and
not reliant on a single NSC. This should also help in keeping seamlessness and
reducing delay in passing tailored local knowledge out to all relevant MBRs.
Further to de-centralisation of the server, by combining the MBR knowl-
edge and routing information dissemination the system could reduce its
network bandwidth footprint and ensure that no information is unnecessarily
duplicated. To make this easier the QinetiQ Routing Bridge (SPENCER et al.
2009) (a patented proprietary routing protocol) could be utilised in assisting
the translation between routes and remote knowledge.
Translated by AUTHORS
Accepted for print 30.06.2012
References
GATIAL E., BALOGH Z., SˇIMO B., HLUCHY´ L. 2011. Distributed secure agent platform for crisis
management. In: SAMI 2011: 9th IEEE International Symposium on Applied Machine Intelli-
gence and Informatics. Budapest, IEEE, p. 247-253. ISBN 978-1-4244-7428-8.
SPENCER J., KENDRICK G., MILLINGTON P., STEPHENSON I., ENTWISLE P. 2009. Communications System
QinetiQ Limited, December 2008, WO 2009/001041 A1.
Phil Entwisle et al.198
Reviewers
Zoltan Bologh, Jarosław Bosy, Apostolos P. Fournaris,
Jacques Fournier, Emil Gatial, Gabriela Gheorghe, Bernard Kontny,
Marian Kopczewski, Foued Melakessou, Jan Pawlak, Adam Rybka,
Jaroslaw Teska, Gyula Tóth
